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Abstract
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINESE AGRARIAN
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES: 1949 - 1964 .
(Order No.
Agnes S. Bain'
Boston University Graduate School, 1978
Major Professor: Ishwer C. Ojha
Professor of Political Science
China is a modernizing agrarian society. As such, it
pursued certain goals within an environment of resource scarcity.
This research analyzes Chinese public policies for agrarian develop-
ment within a framework of political economy. It begins with the
hypothesis that resources, (material output, infrastructure,
political legitimacy, etc.), can be politicized such that their values
becane relative within a single costs/benefits framework". The exchange
of resources between the regime and social sectors is reflected in
public policy.
The hypothesis is tested in a longitudinal case study of
Chinese agrarian policies, extending from 1949 through 1964. During
this period, Chinese decision makers focused on the agrarian sector
and its role in the attainment of national goals •. Therefore, within
this time frame, the dynamics of resource creation, inves~ent and
exchange can be traced through the agrarian policy matrix to demonstrate
v
.the utility of this model.
When resources are politicized they are brought into a
"political market" where they become available for use. The first
step toward the creation of this market is the politicization of
eXisting resources. In China, this was effected by land reform and
by the creation of infrastructure to penetrate and control the rural
marketplace itself.
As the political market expands, it also becomes more complex,
generating greater demands for all types of resources. Chinese collec-
tivization policies reorganized the internal resources of the agrarian
sector -- land and labor -- in order to increase their productivity.
However, internal resources proved insufficient for agrarian modern-
ization and the collective infrastructure proved costly in terms of
political and social resources. Therefore, communization was adopted
as an alternative pattern of resource use and investment.
The size, functional scope and structural efficiency of the
commune were designed to maximize the use-value of internal agrarian
resources. But its high risk component was the introduction of a
division of labor into the rural environment. Differentiation and
specialization in the production process would destroy traditional
socio-economic units which were functionally integrated. In terms of
the political market, these policies would secure and control the
availability and value of agrarian resources.
The immediate costs of rapid, qualitative change quickly
surpassed long-term benefits. During' the crisis period of 1959-1961,
the division of labor was withdrawn, along with all but the
vi
,administrative functions of the commune. However, political inflation,
followed by a drastic deflation, resulted in the collapse of the
political market. Still seeking workable alternatives for resource
utilization, the regime combined agrarian "self-reliance" with
selective technological and capital investments. This strategy
promised differentiated development within the sector and a perpetual
rural/urban dichotomy. As such, it was opposed by the ~Maoist"
faction. Reconsolidation policies -- rebuilding the pOlitical
market -- became infused with an ideological debate. OUt of this
struggle there emerged a workable and essentially Maoist approach
the Dazhai model -- which created a supportive environment for long-
term agrarian development.
The political economy of agrarian development energes when
these policies are viewed within a single costs/benefits framework.
Long range goals were held constant by ideology while intermediate
aims were pursued by evaluating and exchanging resources, and by
choosing among options for resource utilization and investment. The
agrarian policy matrix between 1949 and 1964 thus emerges as complex
and non-linear. But it is developmental, in that the aggregate level
of resource availability and political productivity was increased.
vii
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NOTE ON ROMANIZATI0N STYLE
Because the Chinese language· uses no alphabet, it
is romanized so as to convey the sounds of the
Chinese characters. Several different systems of
romanization have been developed. In recent years,
the Chinese have developed their own system, based
on the science of linguistics, which simply and
accurately approximates their language. It is
called pinyin roumaji. Many western professional
journals in the China field currently employ
pinyin. In this research it has been used to
romanize all Chinese words, including proper names.
However, for the sake of clarity, place names
(for example, peking or Shanghai) have been left
in the more familiar form.
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INTRODUCTION
The general purpose of this research is to demonstrate that
the study of politic~l process in.the People's Republic of China can be
brought into the context of comparative political analysis. New oppor-
tunities for access are increasing the available data relating to the
post-l949 Chinese experience. Although barriers of language and data
collection remain, the major problem now confronting the comparativist
is the relative absence of analytical tools with which to approach
this growing body of information.l Common sense suggests that China
is somehow developmental. Noreover, given that "political developr.lcnt"
acts as a major organizing fr~ework for the field of comparative
politics, focusing on the developmental nature of the Chinese political
system would seem to generate a solid· linkage between China studies and
comparative political analysis.
However, the political science literature of the late 1960's
and 1970' s has been marked by debate over tllemeaning of "development"
and over thc definitions of its key variables· and indicators.2 The field
has become increasingly disenchanted with its own basic paradigms -- tile
lThose not familiar with the develop~ent of the China field
may find it useful to consult the fol1mTing wozks by Bichel Oksenberg:
"Sources and Hethodological Problems in the Study of ContCI:lporary China."
in A. Doak Barnett, ed., Chinese Cor.nunist Politics in A~tion, (Seattle:u. of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 577-606; "On Learning Fro~ China,"
in Uichel Oksenberg, ed., China's Developmental Experience, (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1973); and, "Political Changes and Their Causes in
China: 1949-1972," in tli11iam 1\. r.obson and Bernard Crick, eds , ,
China in Transition, (Beverly llil~s, CA.: Sage Publications, 1975).
2For.a concise discussion of tilemajor schools of thought, see
Samuel Huntington, "The Change to Change," COl':lparativePolitics, Vol. 3,
No.3, (April, 1971).
implicit equation of development with pluralist democracy; Weberian
conceptions of rational-efficient organization; and the imperative of
industrialization for economic growth.l Dissatisfaction with these
assumptions has only been reinforced by the problems of China.
Most systematic knowledge of China comes from specialists
who worked, for the most part, outside the mainstre'am of political
science and under the adverse research conditions of the 1950's and
1960's. They concentrated on descriptive and intuitive analyses of
the system's political structures, its economy and the ideology of its'
governing regime. Their combined efforts have established a view of
China as a change-oriented or "revolutionary" political system. But
these categories are not often defined in any way that can be useful
for cross-national comparison, and the China specialists have thus
createc the L~pression that China is the exception that proves the rule.
Focusing primarily on the "mass line" leadership style, many describe
the Chinese zeq ime as' seeking the legitimization of its authority through
an emphasis on struggle and conflict rather than on stability and
equilibrium. 2 Their research suggests that China uses political and
lA generai outline and critique of these paradigms can be
found in S.H.Eisenstadt, 'l'radition,Change and l·lodernity Wew Yori:
Jo!m Wiley and Sons, 1973), especially pp. 3-115.
2Descriptive studies which underscore the functional role of
conflict in the Chinese revolutionary model include: nark Selden, The
Yen an Hay in Revolutional China, (Cambridge: Harvard University Pr~,
1972) ; .i~·illianHinton, Fanshen: A Docunentary of Revolution in a
Chinese Village, We'" York: Vintage Books - Random House, 1,968).
Studies of the post-Liberation period also refer to the importance of
conflict. See for example, Stuart Schram, 'l'hePolitical Thot:.ghtof Nao
Tse-tung, (llewYork: Praeger Publishers, 1969);' John Lewi.s, Leadership
in Communist China, <Uew York: Cornell University Press, 1962);' and
James Townsend, Political Participation in Co~unist China, {Berkeley:
University of Califo:cnia Press, 1969). Recently, conflict analysis has
focused on the Cultural Revolution. See for example, Jean Doyle, "Con-
flict Management in the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study in
Political Change," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Eoston University,
1973).
administrative infrastructure in innovative and flexible ways. It
describes rectification campaigns against negative behavioral tenden-
cies within institutions, which thus maintain their capacity to
radically restructure and political agenda in light of changing
co~itments.l This research also reveals that the Chinese approach to
economic growth has come to question the primacy of the industrial/
urban sector. It has established that rural industry has been included
in Chinese economic plans since 1959; and that economic development is
based on a doctrine which rejects internal as well as external
dependency in favor of self-reliance, with loose coordination aoong
principle sectors.2 All such analytical literature has stressed the
uniqueness of the Chinese experience, and the historical-cultural
singularity underlying the process, direction and content of change in
lsome of the major institutional studies of the Chinese system
include: John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967); R. F. Price, Education in Co~unist
China, (New York: Praeger publishers, 1970); and Charles Neuhause~,
"The Chinese Communist Party in the 1960's: Prelude to the Cultural
Revolution," China Quarterly, No. 32, (Oct.-Dec. 1967), pp. 3-36.
Also by Neuhauser, "The II:\pactof the Cultural Revolution on the
Chinese Communist Party Hachine," Asian Survey, Vol. 8,'Uo. 6,{June,
1968), pp. 465-488 •. A good general review of institutions and pro-
cesses is contained in James Townsend, Politics in-China, (Boston,1-1A.:
Little Brown & Co., 1974).
2General analyses of the Chinese econoI:\ic5ystem include:
Audrey Donnithorne, China's Economic System, (New York: Praeger Pub-
lishers, 19(7) ; Alexander Eckstein, China's Economic P.evolution, (Hew
York: CaI:lbridgeUniversity Press, 1977); John Gurley, China's
Economy and the l·laoistStrategy, (Ne,,,.York: l-1onthlyRev Lew Press,
1976) ; and Jan S. Prybyla, The Political Economy of cor.munist China,
(Scranton, PA.: International Textbook Co., 1970). hll contain
descriptions of the basic sectors and trace relationships between
ideology and economic policy from a traditional "political economy:
perspective. See also, Audrey Donnithorne, "China's Cellular Economy:
Some Econonic Trends Since the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly,
No. 52, (Oct.-Dec., 1972), pp. 605-619.
o the Chinese revolution.l
For those interested in the potential contribution of the
Chinese case to the development and testing of insights into comparative
politics, such singularity is an analytical "dead end". Horeover, it
may be an unwarranted assumption arising fram the disproportionate
number of studies focusing on methods of social, political and economic
change in China. t~ile practices such as zheng feng (rectification)
or xia fang (the "downward transfer" of cadres) often appear to be
peculiar to their setting, they are vehicles and, as such, should not
be equated with goals.2 This research begins instead with the minimal
requisites associated with political development, postulating that
these are as relevant to the Chinese case as to any other. They
include the legitimization of political authority; the creation of
lThis is particularly true of the socio-cultural and politi-
cal psychology approaches. See for example: Robert Jay Lifton,
Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Cultural Revolution,
(New York: Random House, 1968); Lucian pye, The Spirit of Chinese
Politics, (Cambridge, HA.: HIT Press, 1968) i and Richard Solomon,
~1ao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1971). For a critizue of this
approach with particular reference to Solomon see Oksenberg,
"Political Changes •••", pp. 108-110.
2The lintitations imposed on Soviet scholars by the
"totalitarian model" serves as a reminder of the analytical problems
inherent in a sui generis framework. See Carl J. Friedrich, Michael
Curtis and Benjamin Darber, Totalit~rianisI:l in Perspective: Three
Views, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969).
effective infrastructure; and the generation and maintenance of economic
growth.l In this sense, what the comparativists have already defines as
developmental, and what western scholarship asserts that the Chinese in
fact pursue, are by no means mutually exclusive. Therefore, it should
be possible to understand the Chinese experience, both comparatively and
developmentally, without necessarily beginning with any new theories or
definitions of development.2
lThese "minimal tasks" were distilled fran a large body of
comparative literature which, while approaching the problem of political
development from widely different perspectives, seems to converge on
these essential points. In more traditional language they may be called
"nation-building", "state-building" and economic gro\vth. However, these
terms connote biases and preconceptions which have limited their appli-
cability to certain political systems, including China. For some in-
sights into the state of the art see: Gabriel Almond, "Introduction,"
in Almont rold James Coleman, eds., The Politics of Developing Areas,
(Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp 4-17; Samuel'
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, n:ew Haven: Yale
University Press, 1968); and Leonard Binder, ct al., eds., Crises and
Sequences in Political Development, (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1971), especially pp. 3-72. For a critique on the applic-
ability of political development concepts to Chinese politics see
Benjamin Schwartz, "China's Developmental Experience: 1949-1972," in
Oksenberg, ed., China's Cevelopmental Experience, p. 17.
2Franz Schurmann's success in bringing Chinese data into a
broader theoretical perspective by employing administration theory as
an analytical framework gives substance to this assumption. Schurrr.ann
was able to provide useful insights into China's flexible and creative
infrastructure and organizational behavior. See Ideology andOrganiza-
tion in Co~munist China, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1968). See also Edwin v:inkler, "Political Hanagement of the Development
Process: Assessing the Chinese Experience," China Quarterly, No. 55,
(1973), pp. 560-566. Winkler cautions elat organization theory is most
productive when applied to particular structures engaged in specific
kinds of activities within a given environment; and that if applied as
a single-factor analysis of all Chinese political processes--one grand
experiment in social managemcnt--it rapidly loses its utility. This
warning has implicit relevance for this research and for all those who
would seek to integrate China within. existing theoretical approaches.
In the absence of established precedents, there is a strong t~ptation
to build general rather than middle-range models.
To formulate a framework for stUdying something as potentially
abstract as "development" in a comparative perspective, it is useful to
focus on the concrete expression of development strategy -- public
policy. The relationship between public policy processes and political
development is simple, yet critical. Without some measure of authority
and legitimacy, decision makers cannot create the consensus necessary
to both make and execute policy. \'lithout infrastructure, they are
plagued by informational constraints at the formation and implementa-
tion stages. These in turn reduce policy effectiveness and control
over outcomes. Without access to some flexible economic resources,
policy initiatives cannot be funded; they remain empty statements of
purpose rather than vehicles for achieving goals. At the same time,
public policies act as the means to create the very environment to
which they will operate most effectively, such that development occurs.
Policies establish and maximize normative as well as coersive controls;
institutionalize relationships and processes in and among sectors of
the society; and stimulate economic gro\Vth. Horeover, policies
generate particular patterns of autilority~ organization, and growth.
There is thus an inter-dependence between development and public
policy which politicizes the process of development itself --
purposively creating policies for development.
Much of the existing literature explains Chinese policies
for development in terms of the interaction between ideological con-
cerns and rational calculations in regime decisi9n-making.l From
lsee for: examp l.ee Bcnj-amin sch;...artz, "l1odernizatio:1 and
the Maoist Vision - SOMe Peflections on Chinese Goals," in
Roderick MacFarquhar, cd., China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command,
(Cambridge 1-IA.: HIT Press, 1966), pp. 3-19/
this perspective, two models of public policy process have been either
implicitly or explicitly employed. The first conceptualizes individual
policy outputs as part of a comprehensive strategy. It assumes that
policies are based on long-term planning and point in the single
direction toward which the regime (viewed monolithically), continually
strives. From this perspective, decision making emerges as a process
occurring within a cost-benefit matrix, with ideology acting as a
dependent variable, subordinate to rational calculations.l Political
and economic resources operate as separate and independent factors for
decision-makers, with the value of the resources being held constant
over time. The model assumes that policy decisions are made sequen-
tially, on an informed basis, by actors who are "rational" in their
outlooks. Chinese "political development" thus emerges as a kind of
linear progress toward certain goals in any given policy area, with
deviations (such as those caused by an "over-emphasis" on ideology) ,
dismissed as temporary aberrations.
The second model, pursuing the alternative, vfews ideology
as an independent variable in tiledecision-making process. It also
differs from the rationalist-comprehensive approach in that is focuses
on factionalism within the regime and does not assume a consistent
unity of goals and values. Resources are politicized and valued or
devalued arbitrarily. Policy outputs are regarded as experimental
(in terms of furthering ideological goals); and marked by advances
and retreats (reflecting elite battles over ideological interpretations).
lThe meaning of "rationality" as used in this research is
Weberian and involves secularism, functionality and efficiency as well
as some form of allocative planning. For a review of this perspective
sec Peter H Dlau and Harshall H. Heyer, Bureaucracy in r-1odernSociety',
(New York: P.andomHouse, 1971).
·The resulting policy patterns are, therefore, categorized as random,
and historically particularistic, lacking both sequence and
predictability. From this perspective, the extent to which policies
are developmental cannot be measured by a focus on the policy process
itself, except in those rare cases when rationality rather than
"politics" temporarily manages to' "take command".l
This research aims to demonstrate that there exists yet a
third model which is more useful for measuring and understanding
development within the context of public policy in China. It is
based on a particular understanding of the concept of political
economy. This frame,-.'orkadopts, for analytical purposes, many of
those mechanisms which have been heretofore defined in exclusively
economic terms -- for example, "resources", "markets", and "produe-
tivity". But it is neither "liberal" nor Harxian in its assumptions.
Classical political economy addressed itself to the kind of
decision mID;ing necessary to optimize resources for the achievement
~f policy goals. It pre-supposed a functional relationship between
lThe major studies of policy in China do not adopt one or
the other of these models exclusively. For examp Le-, the tendency to
explain policy in terms of economic determinism has always been
counter-balanced by the acknmdedgenent of Hao 7.e-dong I s personal
ability to keep politics separate from economics. Oksenberg,
"Political Changes •••", pp. 117-118. Host studies'emphasize
rationality in the evaluation of recovery policies; but focus en
ideology When dealing with events such as the Great Leap FO~'ard or
the Cultural Revolution. The latter, in fact, is usually described
as a "great debate" between rationalizers and ideologues. See for
example: Ezra Vogel, Canton Under Canmunism, (New York: Harper and
Row, 1969), pp. 321-349; Schumann, Ideology and Organizatio:\,
pp. 501-592; and Jack Gray, "Politics in Command: The liaoist Theory
of Social Change and Economic Growth," in Robson and Crick,
China in Transition, pp. 30-52.
government and economics. The "lib~ral" 'school based its approach on
the premise that the public and private sectors must remain separate,
with strict limitations on the functional scope of the former. It
defined "available" resources and their relative use values
accordingly. 1 By contrast, the Marxian variant of political economy
was based on the comprehensive analytical framework'of "class society".
Public and private sectors were part of the "superstructure"
articulated by a common economic base. Resources were less differen-'
tiated as to use value; but the values assigned were constant,
regardless of sectoral location.2
The "new political economy", as conceived by Ilchman and
Uphoff, also ad~esses itself to the optimization of resources in the
lThe functional relationship between economics and politics
was pioneered by John M. Keynes. By looking at the economy in
systemic terms, he conceived of a creative inter-relationship between
it and the polity. Political economy, as a sub-field of liberal
economics, was already well developed before Keynes. But in the
twentieth century it focused on the need to balance a rapidly
developing industrial society and a pluralist political system, and
thus became concerned with methods and levels of government interven-
tion. See, John K. Galbraith, The ;.qc 0:: Cncertainty, (:::oston~:A.:
Houghton-Hifflin Col, 1977); James Coleman, liThe P.esurrection of
Political Economy" ~n Norman Uphoff and \';arrenIlchr.lan,The Political
Economy of Cevelopment, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1972), pp. 30-39; K.J.H. Alexander, "The Political Economy of Change,"
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. I, p. 21.
2In the last century, Karl l1arx also proposed a theoretical
relationship be tween economics and politics whi ch conceiveC: of the'
former as the base of all social relationships and the latter as part
of its dependent superstructure. With the advent .of the Bolshevik
revolution, this link between the economic and political spheres was
made explicit, but in a non-wes tern context. soviet orthodoxy con-
tinued to use the Harxian formulation, but the practice of Leninism
and Stalinism often reversed the positions of base and superstructure.
For a useful review see: Louis Dupre, The Philosophical Foundations
of Uarxism, (New York: Harcourt, Drace and v:orld, Inc., 1966), pp.
159-171; and Alfred :·leyer,LeniniSm, (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1962), pp. 185-216.
pursuit of policy goals. However, unlike its liberal predecessor,
it proposes that all resources which enter the "political market: in
the service of either a regime or other actors, c~ he valued
according to a single set of criteria. But contrary to the Handan
approach, the "new political economy" also argues that the values of
such resources are seen as relative and mutable by all actors depending
on their level of interest in a particular category of policy. As
such, resources can and will be exchanged or traded-off as a regime
pursues its goals.l Ideology is not dismissed in the costs-benefits
framework, but neither does it become the sole determinant of use values.
Using this mode of analysis, this stu~y proposes to test the
following hypothesis: that Chinese public policy-making nay be seen
as a rational process if understood as the outcome of trade-offs among
politicized resources. As a corollary, it is hypothesized that
resources have relative and mutable exchange values within and among
broad categories of policy. It follows that if political economy is
the most useful model for linking development and public policy-making
in a Chinese setting, then an investigation of policies will demonstrate
neither linear progress toward a set goal nor random variations without
direction. Instead, developmental public policy should present a
picture of variations direc~ly attributable to trade-offs among three
major political dimensions: legitimization of authority; creation of
effective infrastructure; and socio-economic change. For example,
1See \'1arrenIlchman and Normal Uphoff, The Political Economy
of Change, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); and
Uphoff and Ilchman, The Political Lccnony of Development, especially
pp. 1-22.
fiscal decisions establishing levels of State investment in a particu-
lar sector may necessitate an exch~~ge of authority resources for
building the infrastructure which would control the use of that invest-
mente Variations within distinct categories of policy may be explained
by the fact that production, distribution, and value of resources
changes over time. Development would then be defined as an increase
in the aggregate availability of highly valued resources.l
Graduate students, like decision makers, often find themselves
constrained by preference and by a scarcity of resources. Given the
need to choose a case study for this dissertation, preliminary research
underscored one increasingly obvious fact: in the developmental context
of the Chinese experience, all roads lead to agriculture.2 Policies
aimed at the agrarian sector are basic to tile developmental strategies
of all Third World nations. 11oreover, agricultural issues encompass
the three dimensions of public policy which both tilepoliticai economy
lAS the orientation of Hestern economics shifted to the study
of the Third Norld, the logical primacy of politics came to be recog-
nized in the literature as a "situational necessity" in under-developed
countried. However, the Marxian variant has remained static in its
analysis of the dynamics of development. See: Coleman, "The
Resurrection of Political economy," p. 35; Robert T. Hold and John E.
Turner, The Political Basis of Econonic Development, (New York: Van
Nostrand and co ., 1966); Peter Hiles, The Political Economy of Cornnunism,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962); and Harry G. Shaffer
and Jan s. Prybyla, eds ,, From Under-developr:\ent to Affluence: \';estern,
Soviet and Chinese Views, (flewYork: }\.ppleton-Century-Crofts, 1968).
2This choice is not, howevex , to be equated with any deter-
ministic argument regarding agrarian economics. Rather, it stems from
an appreciation of Schram's assertion that China's reality-is a "rural
reality". Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Hao Talks to the People: Talks
and Letters: 1956 - 1971. (New Ylrk: Pantheon Books, 1974), p. 29.
,model and the co~parative field posit as developmental. With specific
reference to China, the focus on agriculture further suggests a limited
time frame within which to conduct this analysis. The critical era
began with political consolidation in 1949, and ended in 1964 with the
period of rehabilitation following the Great Leap Forward. During
these fifteen years, the over-arching goal of the regime (froc the
perspectives of legitimacy, infrastructure and economic growth) was to
devise a developmental model for the agrarian sector. This choice of
a longitudinal case study in a single policy area recognizes that in
order to fully ascertain the utility of tllepolitical economy framework,
research should be conducted into all areas of Chinese policy since
1949, and the processes of value ~utability among resources, and trade-
offs among policies demonstrated. Clearly, such an endeavor is beyond
the scope of a dissertation. It is hoped that the results of this
limited research will suggest the benefits which may be derived from a
further elaboration of the framework.
Exploring the utility of the new political economy model with
respect to Chinese agricultural policy d~~ands further definition as
woll as analysis. In Chapter One, the case study itself and tlle
methodology adopted for testing the political economy of Chinese
agrarian development policies will be elaborated. Relevant literature
on the study of public policy is presented, focusing on its application
to China. Also, those el~enta of the Ilc~an and Uphoff ~odel which
seem to make it a useful vehicle for analyzing the Chinese public
policy process are elucidated; while 'its conceptualization of the
nature and function of ideology, and of the relationship between the
regime and tllesectors are more rigorously and usefully defined.
·Chapter Two discusses the function of ideology as a constraint on
choice by tracing the development of the Maoist approach to the
agrarian sector~ it also reviews the nature of the policy making equip-
ment available to the Chinese regime during the 1949-1964 period~ and
outlines other elements of the regime's "environment of choice" which
may be critical to policy formation.
Those policy issues which fall within the broad rubric of
"agrarian development" are presented in subsequent chapters. Chapter"
Three looks specifically at land reform, taxation, and "planned
purchase and supply" as mechanisms designed to politicize resources
within the agrarian sector. Chapter Four traces the reorganization of
land and labor through land reform, cooperativization, collectiviza-
tion, and communization. These are viewed in terms of the institution-
alization and administration of an increasingly complex "political
market". Chapter Five will focus on the politics of agro-technical
transformation in China, and the factors which finally combined to
create the "Dazhai model" of agrarian development -- a blueprint for
the realization of long-range political and socio-econonic goals.
In the course of this presentation, existing research data,
from a time period which is already well documented, will be re-
interpreted and inter-related within what is viewed as a more
innovative and useful framework. Primary sources have been used
whenever possible in order to keep this analysis free from the possible
biases inherent in data selection and aggregatio~ by other researchers.
An exception in made in the case of statistical data, since the
Chinese sources have proven to be insufficient, especially in economic
areas. Recognized secondary analyses of Chinese government and
economics such as Prybyla's The Political Economy of Communist China
and Donnithorne's ~1e Chinese Econonic System have been relied on to
fill in many gaps.l The primary material was drawn most heavily from
the highlights of the domestic press, available in the SCHP, ~ and
CB series of translations compiled in Hong Kong, Mao Ze-dong's
published works and speeches; and other relevant public documents.
Extensive use of a research guide to central CCP and government
meetings, conpiled by Kenneth Lieberthal, aided in the effort to
pinpoint decisions which related to agriculture or to the agrarian
sector. 2
In every instance, the purpose is to demonstrate the utility
of the analytic framework. Therefore, the process of trade-offs will
be located, describeu,and rolalyzed both within the various dllnensions
of agricultural policy and between agriculture and other regime
concerns. Viewing the matter retrospectively, a determination will be
made as to whether these trade-offs occurred on the basis of changing
resource values or if they were sioply inadvertent.
In conclusion, this study will attempt to est~ate the
extent to which an interactive, transactional rationality (ratller than
a linear rationality or a random variability), can be used to explain
lThese texts also rely heavily on Chinese sources, but also
compare questionable statistics with other estL~ates.
2Kenneth Lieberthal, A Research Guide to Central Party ar.d
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International l~rts and Science Press, Inc., 1976).
China's agricultural policies as "policies for development". To the
extent that this inquiry succeeds, it will establish, in a preliminary
fashion, the utility of a particular political economy model, both as
a tool for analyzing the salient factors of Chinese political develop-
ment and as a method for linking the study of China to the more
general study of comparative politics.
CHAPTER ONE
AGRARIAN POLICY AND POLITICAL ECONC1'1Y: A MODEL
This research begins wi~h the problem of relating, within a
single analytical framework, the process of political development and
the process of public policy in the People's Republic .of China. It
will operate from the hypothesis that the analysis of these processes
can be most usefully integrated by employing a particular model of
political economy. On this basis, Chinese political development will
be viewed as the creation and management of scarce resources with
relative and mutable exchange values. Public policy becomes the
vehicle for utilizing those resources, a process of investments,
expepditures and trade-offs, designed to achieve regime goals. This
hypothesis will be tested by applying it to a longitudinal case study
of Chinese agricultural policies formulated and implemented between
1949 and 1964.
Geographically, only about 15 per cent of the Chinese land
mass is arable. However, demographic data indicates that more than
.75 per cent of the population lives in the rural areas, engaged in
agricultural production.l Both econ~micaily and ideologically, the
locus of change lies in the agrarian sector. The revolutionary move-
ment found its support there, and Mao Ze-dong considered the rural
population his most loyal and constant "public". The regime has been
ever mindful of the effect that policies would have on its economic
lTownsend, Politics in China, p •.5.
and political productivity. While Chinese agriculture has been the
subject of much research in the past, all of it highlights, from many
different perspectives, the centrality of the agrarian sector to
Chinese development~l
Preliminary research indicated that the period of greatest
policy activity with respect to the agrarian sector in China began with
Liberation itself (1949) and ended on the eve of the CUltural Revolu-
tion (1964). No innovative agricultural policies have been implemented
,
since that time. This is not meant to imply stagnation in the agrarian
,sector. There has been, rather, a great deal of activity directed
toward realizing the potentialities of the developmental model which
had come into being by 1964.
This examination of agricultural policies in China is primarily
directed toward one goal: testing the utility of a particular model
of policy analysis. The model has a dual thrust: the analysis of
policy decisions and the analysis of the systemic context of those
decisions. Moreover, it is not intended to simply describe all agri-
cultural policies made between 1949 and 1964, but to analyze the
systemic constraints and the availability or scarcity of politicized
IThis focus has led to some wide-ranging studies, for
example: G. William Skinner and Edwin A. Winckler, "Compliance Succes-
sion in Rural Communist China: A Cyclical Theory", in Amitai Etzioni,
ed., A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations, (New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 410-438; Roy Hofheinz, "Rural
Administration in Communist China," in MacFarquhar, China Under Mao,
pp. 99-118; M. Lindsay, "Agrarian Policy and Communist Motivation,"
China Quarterly, No.1 (1960), pp. 15-17; Peter Schram, The Develop-
ment of Chinese Agriculture, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1969); and C.K.Yang, Chinese Communist Society: The Family and ~~e
Village, (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1959).
resources which combined to create agricultural policies for
;developnent.
policy decisions which effect the agrari~ environment are
viewed as outcomes of political exchange, in which various resources
are valued and transferred. Exchanges occur between the regime and
the peasantry and among the institutional or factional divisions of
the regime. Sane policies may be seen as the products of direct
peasant/regime resource transfers, while others involve factors which
ere,external to that relationship. Trade-offs are indicated by
shifts in emphasis, priorities and goals.l In the process of locating
trade-offs, the following questions are raised.:
are these shifts congruent with insti-
tutional factors, including ideological
constraints?
do these shifts reflect the constraints
of environmental factors (poor harvests,
rural population, etc.)?
are they related to the unintended by-
products of other policies (e.g., economic
priorities on industry rather than agricul-
ture, domestic political unrest, cadre
training and rectification, or changes in
the internal situation), which increase
political and economic pressure on the
agrarian sector?
lUphoff and Ilchman note that: "••• the use of numbers
cannot replace the careful and critical use of language as an
analytical tool for social scientists." The Political Economy of
peveloenent, p. 106. However, the model has been criticized for
its lack of criteria for quantification. See Lloyd Fallers' critique
in Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 29, No.4, (1970), p. 909. In this
stUdy, the valuation of resources will be confined to retrospective
and often intuiti.ve analysis.
The "give and take" implicit in exchange mechanisms results
in a non-linear pattern of policy decisions, even if the goals of the
leadership have remained constant. Thus, the availability and value of
resources increases or decreases in different areas. For example, if
the infrastructural changes involved in the collectivization of agricul-
ture outstrip the commensurate availability of agro-technology, there
are at least two possible explanations. Decision makers may have
purposely invested leadership resources in rural areas, thus facilitating
the exchange of individual relationships of production for collective
ownership and distribution beyond all expectations. Or, the situation
may simply reflect the "fall-out" from an external exchange which
limited investment priorities to heavy industry while under-capitalizing
agro-technical enterprises.
As the above example suggests, decisions involve priorities
and choices. It follows that not all agrarian policies are policies
~ development; and not all resources are equally critical to the
process of exchange at the same time. Resources are assessed on the
basis of their "use-value" -- their availability and productivity. The
development nature of agrarian policies is demonstrated where they
modify the availability and utilization of resources so as to make them
more politically productive in terms of goal achievement.
Within this chosen time frame, three categories of agri-
cultural policy are compared in order to determine their effect on
critical developmental resources. They are:
a) policies which allowed the regime to politicize
the traditional agrarian environment, especially
its social and material resources (for example,
land reform, or taxation and purchase mechanisms) 1
b) policies which were designed to reshape the
environment, and at the same time increase
planning and control capabilities, through
the creation of new sccio-economic infra-
structure (for example, mutual aid teams,
cooperatives and communes) :
c) policies which contributed to the''growth of
the rural political economy (for example,
capital inves~ents and technical trans-
formation).
The study of public policy in a Chinese, context at the
present time is largely limited to national level decision making.
Although more statistics and data on policy operations at the
provincial level are becoming available, there is an almost total
lack of informati.on at all other sub-provincial levels. Access to
data is limited to formal bureaucratic communications, specifically
in the form of central government and ministry directives; Central
Committee plenum communiques; and the "official notice" taken of
provincial and local situations in the mass media. Moreover, policy
implementation in China, even during periods of structural centraliza-
tion, has been decentralized to a greater degree than those more
familiar with Western'or soviet policy studies may expect. It must be
stressed from a methodological as well as from a decision-making
perspective, that policies are often modified according to local condi-
tions. Implementation may be postponed or circumvented, and feedback
to the national level is the weakest link in the entire policy process.
Although this research is further limited by these factors,
it is no more limited than those circumstances in which national level
policy makers often worked. This absence of regular channels of
information and communication is a condition of China's ~~der-development.
However, the Chinese media in the 1950' s and early 1960' s was,
perhaps for this reason, a surprisingly open forum of debate and
criticism and a vehicle for a great deal of vertical and horisontal
political communication. For example, trends which the regime perceived
as violating either the letter or the spirit of its policies were
regularly called to national attention; as were those developments
which were even more "progressive" than the regime' had envisioned
possible. Provincial leaders, by.selectively editing their local
newspapers, were able to communicate both· their successes and their
problems. National level theoretical journals, identified with the
PLA and CCP, were indicative of different positions being taken within
the regime on specific matters of policy and on broader issues of
ideology. The media, therefore, canbined with actual policy direc-
tives and speeches by key regime figures, will reveal a great deal
about the priorities and goals as well as the limits which governed
the use or investment pattern 'of resources. Moreover, the focus of the
media on agricultural and agrarian issues was consistent throughout the
1949-1964 period, which facilitates the location of resource trade-offs.
From a methodological perspective, two additional factors
must be considered. Policy content, the working of proclamations or
directives, may reflect one or all of the following: a statement of
goals or intent; a summary of past experience; or a program for acting
upon immediate situation. These documents, moreover, invariably
contain the prescription to apply the policy on the basis of an
assessment of local conditions. Thus, there is a built-in expectation
of diverse outcomes. In the implementation process itself, the policy
,experiences certain adjustments which may go so far as to displace the
intent of the policy itself. In this research, policies will be
approached on both of these levels. Whenever possible, analysis will
begin with the content of a policy as it was initially handed down.
'1'henvironment in which it was formulated will be described, and any
potential relationships between the situational context and the policy
will be drawn. This will be followed by an analysis of the tmplementa-
tion process. In both case~, inter-relationships and trade-offs will
be sought and located.
Choosing a Framework for Policy Analysis in China
'rhe study of public policy centers not just on the descrip-
tion of.government activity but also, and more importantly, on the
analysis of the process of choice in government decision-making.
Publippolic)" involves· all decisions taken by a government concerning
what it chooses to do and what it chooses to refrain from doing. 1
Policy serves as the means through which a government intervenes into
its political, social and economic environment. POlicy mechanisms
(inclUding both government institutions and the political behavior
associated with policy making), and policy content (the empirical and
normative elements -- goals, values and priorities -- found in the
policies themselves), comprise the ma~or components of the policy
process. The normal assumption is that in the making of public policy
a government acts purposively. toward some end or goal, however limited.
But policy is more than the simple result of purposive action.
NJ. :
~homas Dye, Understanding Public Policy, (Englewood Cliffs,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 2.
·Frequently it represents the outcome of unplanned environmental and
institutional impacts on the decision making process.l An overall










Policy analysis may focus on either policy mechanisms or
policy content. The former implies that the policies themselves are
dependent variables, set in motion by institutional and environmental
factors. Policies may also be seen as independent variables, reshaping
institutions and generally altering the environment. The study of
policy necessarily ~e9ins with an identification of those environmental
and institutional constraints or pre-conditions which determine the




lTalcott Parsons, "Introduction," in Max Weber, Theory of
Economic Organizations, A.M.Henderson and T. Parsons, trans.,
Oxford U. Press, 1947), pp. 3-86. Parsons discusses the
distinction between action intents and action outcomes.
2Dye, Public PoliSX' p. 5.
-impacts which can be attributed to a particular policy initiative
explaining in the process why certain policies were more likely to
succeed or fail and why certain alternatives were rejected or perhaps
never even considered. Policy analysis, therefore, operates on many
levels to explain policy decisions in terms of their own dynamic and
in terms of their systemic context.
If public policy is a function of combined environmental
and institutional impacts, then it follows that specific policy goals
are developed and pursued successfully only in particular situational
contexts.! Policy prescription, especially when distilled from the
experience of one particular system, has limited utility when applied
to different settings. Experience teaches that attempts to generate an
"import-export" trade in public policy between systems is not productive
for either side. For example, American anti-trust policies applied in
Japan after World War II failed to break up the indigenous family-based
monopolies (zaibatsu), which have continued their economic and political
activities. The efforts of the Cuban government to "export" revolution
to Latin America in the 1960's were generally wasted. On the other
hand, the alternative -- a dogmatic and ethnocentric approach to
problems of economic and political development -- leads to a parochial
conceptualization of the rich complexities of the development phenomenon.
Such biases deny both the scope of available alternatives for action and
Ipeter Dorner, "Needed Redirections in Economic Analysis
for Agricultural Development Policy: I," in Uphoff and Ilchman,
The Political Economy of Development, p. 41.
,and the importance of choice.l As a result, the effectiveness of
policy advocacy for developing nations has often been jeopardized.
The realization that development in this century has come
to mean "politically forced development", a product of conscious
policy initiatives, is relatively recent. But it is a step in the
right direction.2 The "minimum tasks" of policies for development
involve the legitimization of political authority; the creation of
effective political and administrative infrastructure; and the genera-
tion of socio-economic change. Against this background the policy
process, its mechanisms and contents, must be analyzed within particular
"environments of choice", and any framework must first reflect such a
utility.
In his study of public policy analysis, Thomas Dye posits
several frameworks or approaches for understanding policy process in
general. 3 Those which draw on either systems theory or theories of
institutiona~ politics essentially describe policy as an output
function. Those derived from elite-mass or group-conflict constructs
are more dynamic and process oriented. From the first perspective,
public policy is a reflection of the values and interests of competing
elites. From the latter, it emerges as an outcome of conflict and
lAlbert o. Hirschman, "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance
to Understanding," in Ibid., pp. 64-73; also, Robert L. Ayers, "Develop-
ment Policy and the Possibility of a I Livable I Future for Latin
1Im.erica,"~' Vol. 69, ue , 2, (1975), pp. 507-525.
2Townsend, Politics in China, p. 167.
~he follOWing discussion draws liberally from the insights
of Dye, Public Policy, especially pp. 19-29.
bargaining over competinq group demands. These four approaches are not
essentially contradictory. They share a common systemic conceptualiza-
tion of "politics" in which the boundaries and "rules" of activity are
defined and equilibrium is thus maintained.
The two decisional frameworks which have cane to dominate
policy studies revolve around different intellectual techniques. The
comprehensive approach, based on the Weberian-Parsonian definition of
"pure" rationality and decision makinq, treats policy as efficient qoal
achievement -- the product of programmatic or synoptic problem solving.
A decision-maker, conceptualized as "rational-actor", first clarifies
values or objectives and then surveys alternative methods of reaching
objectives. After identifyinq all possible consequences of each
alternative, he evaluates each set of options in liqht of the objectives
and finally determines the "best" choice. The incrementalist approach,
on the other hand, is pragmatic and experimental. The emphasis is on
the sufficient rather than on the necessary conditions for achievinq
ends that are limited and constantly redefined in light of past experi-
ence and the means at hand. policy thus appears not as a programmatic
formulation but as the sequential variation or modification of established
precedent. 1
The frameworks for policy analyses described above serve to
order and explicate certain relationships in a general sense. But a
model must accomplish this task in a particular context -- a feature
lSee Albert o. Hirschman and Charles Lindbloom, "Econc:mic
Development, Research and DeveloJXllent,Policy Making: Some Converginq
Views," in Etzioni, Sociological Reader, pp. 87-103; Charles Lindblom,
"The science of Muddling Through," PAR, Vol. 1~, pp. 79-881 and Graham
T. Allison, Essence of Decision: EXPlaining the Cuban Missile Crisis"
(Boston, MA.: Little Brown & CO., 1971), especially pp. 10-38.
,lacking in these approaches. Knowledge of the environmental and insti-
tutional "givens" which govern decision making processes, gives concrete
meaning to the "environment of choice" in which policies are formulated.
Environment includes geography, demography, and economy as
well, as sociological variables such as religious or cultural homogeniety
and the level of literacy. These factors effect policy making in a
general way. The weighted relevance of particular environmental charac-
teristics would then be largely determined by whatever specific policy'
area is under consideration. For example, in the analysis of American
policies aimed at reducing inflation, national unemployment is assigned
a certain level of acceptability. But: an analysis of urban policies
would assign more significance to unemployment rates in certain indus-
tries or among black urban youth.
Institutions are cora than organizational vehicles. They
represent patterns of relationships which have etched themselves
indelibly on the system.l Institutional constraints on policy processes
may be structural, behavioral and intellecutual. In designing an
analytical framework which can operate within a particular context,
and which approaches decision-making from the perspective of choice,
the existence of ideologY as an institutional constraint becomes a
critical factor. Ideology consists of a body of abstract principles
which preordain goals and values. Usually, it is reified such that
it represents not situational precedents but "universal law", and it is
seen to govern all processes and relationships regardless of their
lThis th~sis was developed by Philip Selznick, Leadership In
Administration, (New York: Row Peterson & CO., 1957).
spatial or temporal location. 1 Ideology appears in forms that are both
active and passive: a written constitution, a state religion (such as
Shinto or Islam), or the prominent display of "little red books".
However, even when such outward signs are present and seem to dominate
all other factors, the role of ideology in the process of policy choice
must be demonstrated rather than tClkenas axiomatic.
Political infrastructure is very often the correlate of a
system's ideology.2 To this extent, ideology can be shown to operate
as an institutional constraint on the policy process. It indicates a
particular form of government, type of party ~stem and bureaucracy,
and criteria for elite recruitment. Ideology may also prescribe a
certain outlook on class structure, the pattern of equality or in-
equalitY in resource distribution among identifiable groups, and
acceptable patterns of political participation and conflict. Again,
some of these institutional characteristics consistently effect the
entire policy process while the relevance of others varies with
respect to policy areas. Together with environment these factors and
variables form the "environment of choice" within which public policy
making occurs. A description of this political context with respect
to China is the first step in choosing an approach and building a
lDaniel Bell, who takes a negative view of the phenomenon,
noted that because ideology provides vocabulary, rhetoric, categories
of analysis and formulae through which to process new or foreign exper-
iences, it leads to " • • • a hardening of commitment, a freezing of
opinion. to The End of Ideology, (New York: The Free Press - MacMillan
eo., 1962), p. 350.
2For a discussion of this relationship see Kenneth Jowitt,
hAn Organizational Approach to the stUdy of Political Culture in
Marxist-Leninist systems," APSR, Vol. 58, No.3, pp. 1171-1191.
useful model for the study of Chinese public policy.
A general overview of the "environment of choice" in which
the Chinese regime has operated since 1949 reveals both environmental
and institutional constraints. The explicit aim of the regime is the
developnent and transformation of its environment. Ideology dictates
that this is a "total" goal to be realized economically through
socialism, politically through the dominance.of the Chinese Communist,
Party as the vanguard of "proletarian dictatorship", and socially
through the creation of a classless, collectivist society. In terms of
structural or organizational correlates, these goals involve centraliza-
tion and monopoly of political power, the elimination of any
particularizing criteria of group identity or interest, and the
nationalization and collectivization of all major economic enterprise.
They point, in turn to a need for programmatic, coordinated planning
and complex, hierarchical vehicles for implementation in the policy
process, best achieved in an atmosphere of stability.
This same overview also reveals other, seemingly contradic-
tory, environmental and institutional characteristics. The Chinese
"system" has been subject to a continuous process of redefinition.
The Chinese approach to political lead~rship emphasizes a personal
rather than a managerial or bureaucratic style, especially at the "basic"
(grass roots) levels. This is manifested in the doctrine of "mass line",
a unique f~rm of elite/mass interaction. Mass mobilization techniques,
first developed as a method of revolution, have been adapted as a tool
for the transfo~nation of society which often bypasses formal organiza-
tions and processes. The regime works against the emergence and
solidification of particular group interests, both within the society
,ataarge and within its bureaucratic structures, by drawing and sharply
defining class lines and periodically fostering "struggle" to eradicate
"contradictions among the people". Although the regime pursues
socialism through industrialization, it seeks to avoid the "inevitable"
by-products of a modern, industrial society -- the rural/urban
dichotomYJ organizational differentiationJ functional specialization
(division of labor)J and socio-economic stratification. The predominant
policy process suggested by these factors would be one that is flexible
and experimental rather than plannedJ executed by the kind of decentral-
ized, organizationally simplified mechanisms which can withstand higher
levels of turmoil and uncertainty.
These systemic factors demand a multi-dimensional approach
1to the study of policy processes in China. A structural-fUnctional
analysis alone is too broad and static for application to a political
entity which is continually redefining its "rules". But, there must be
sOtne "systems" framework in policy analysis so that decisions can be
put into a complete context. Other major approaches show similar
strengths and weaknesses. For example, institutional analysis is limited
by the fact that the Chinese, while conservative with respect to
structural change, are radical in their approach to changing values and
behavior within organizations so as to prevent the emergence of institu-
tional interests.2 However, there are periods where such interests
surface, to which researchers are alerted by the regime's campaign
against "sectarianism". For example, analyses of the PLA suggest that
lOksenberg, "Political Changes •••".,p , 118.
2schurmann, Ideology and Organization, pp. 45-73.
,it began ~ function as an "institutional interest group" as its level
of professionalization increased.l
Until recently, the predominant trend in,the analytical lit-
erature was ~ approach Chinese politics in general fran an elite
perspective. However, the utility of elite analysis is also limited
owing ~ its theoretical bias against the masses, who are seen as the
beneficiaries of a decisional process in which they have no functional
role. Moreover, such analysis assumed a basic value and goal consensus
among e1ite, with conflict limited to minor tactical issues.2 In China,
policy goals are authoritatively but flexibly defined and implemented
consultatively, with high levels of mass input. , "Bureaucratism" and
"commandism" are regarded as major violations of the consultative
process. A1so, the events of the last decade have effectively set aside
monolithic conceptualization of the regime. On the other hand, the
dynamics of the policy process must still be viewed to some extent in
elitetmass ter.ms.
Group analysis is also not generally applicable to China,
at least at the macro-level, due to its focus on equilibrium
e
!ellis Joffe, "The Conflict Eet~een Old and New in the
Chinese Anny," China Quarterly, No. 18, (1964) pp. 118-140; William
L. Parish, "Factions in Chinese Military Politics;" China Quarterly,
No. 56, (1913), pp. 667-699.
2studies of elite configurations and preferences can add
beneficial insights to policy analysis. See for example: Donald W.
Klein and Lois B. Hager, "The Ninth Central Committee," China Quarterly,
No. 45 (1971), pp. 37-56; Donald W. Klein, "The Next Generation of
Chinese Conmunist Leaders," China Quarterly, No. 12 (1962), pp. 57-74,
and Rebert A. Scalapino, ed., Elites in the Peonle's Republic of China,
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972).
�maintenance.l In China, classes struggle rather than bargain to effect
social chan<Je in a predetermined direction. However, the notion of
struggle itself implies groups and group interests which are divergent
by definition. This must have a direct bearing on the creation of the
consensus needed to formulate and implement policy goals. In the
process of struggle there is "rectification" and through this vehicle,
"unity" is established. In those periods when rectification has not
resulted in consensus, as for example in the early 1960's, policy
initiatives were debilitated. Thus, some attention must be given to
group dynamics in the policy process.
Existing research on decision-making processes in China has
produced further indications of the need for mUlti-dimensionality.
Given the obvious weight of ideological factors, the utility of an
incremental framework is limited for analysing the content of poli~r
formulations in China. This approach assumes a lack of vision and
thus denies ideology. However, several studies point to the frequent
use of pragmatic and flexible policy mechanisms in China, which seemingly
belie the functional role of ideology.2
lFor an example of the macro-analytic group approach, see
Andrew J. Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," China
~arterly, No. 53 (1973), pp. 34-66. Given the dynamics of the mass
~, however, and its importance to Chinese political processes~
understanding of some middle range theory of group dynamics may have
considerable utility if applied to the Chinese environment. See for
example, Sidney Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior: A Study
of Leadership, (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1961);
and Martin K. Whyte, small Groups and Political Rituals in China,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
2This idea is f~und in Schurmann, IdeologY and Organization;
Vogel, Canton; and Townsend, Politics in China, to highlight but a
few. It is generally recognized throughout the field.
The analytical alternative is to adopt a comprehensive
approach, presupposing not only that the regime behaves as "rational
actor", and maximizes the use-value of its zescurces , but also that the
goals it seeks to implement are pre-determined and non-negotiable. This
would underscore ideology and the programmatic content of Chinese public
policy -- its political, econanic and socio-cultural components, compre-
hensive1y conceived, and its provisions for combating both goal
displacement and the emergence of particular rather than universal
1nterests. However, if confined to this framework, researchers would
thus be forced to conclude that those incremental mechanisms which are
found in the Chinese policy process, for example., the regime's vague
policy pronouncements or campaigns which begin with great fanfare only
to fade away without comment, are compromises made due to deficiencies
or breakdowns in information and communication.
A comprehensive framework would not explain the positive
perspective in which the Chinese view class conflicts, often forcing
them to a head within the policy process itself. Moreover, as noted
above, a constant and immutable value consensus within the regime
1itself can no longer be assumed. The Chinese case thus presents the
lThe formula of dialectical development is inherent in Mao's
doctrine of "continuous revolution" and in his belief in the importance
of struggle between forces in contradiction to achieve a new social
synthesis. Schram, Political Thought, pp. 84-110. The interpretation
of Chinese policy processes as a function of the system's dialectical
nature was offered by Schurrnann as an attempt to make the study of
public policy organic to Chinese political environment. Schurmann,
Ideology and Organization, pp. 73-104. However, dialectics does not
contain a sufficiently rigorous explanation of the mechanisms which
determine the content and direction of Chinese public policies. Dia-
lectical processes are automatic, and they are progressive or
developnental "by definiticn". Thus, dialectics ignores the complex
and highly political process of evaluating and choosing from among
different alternatives for action.
researcher with a complex situation in which explicit and non-negotiable
ideological goals are pursued in a flexible and non-dogmatic manner.
'1'0 be sure, there is tension here, between "open" means to "closed"
ends, but this tension appears to be an integral and creative part of
the Chinese decision-making process.l
~e need for a framework which reflects institutional limits,
systemic inputs, elite preferences, group influences, long-range
planning and remedial adjustments has frequently led to cyclical inter-
pretations of Chinese policy. This analytical device stems fran a long
and respected tradition. Historians commonly present the entire
pre-19ll Chinese experience as a series of "dynastic cycles" spanning
centuries of socio-cultural development.2 The policy cycles of the
post-1949 period are invariably based on factors such as econanic
advances and consolidations, changing patterns of elite/group influence,
or on the degree of Mao Ze-dong's personal intervention, which'in turn
generate recurring periods of planned and experimental or conservative
and radical decision making.3
lAS policy studies turn increasingly to multi-dimensional
analysis, it becanes clear that the benefits of this approach may not
be limited to the Chinese case. See for example: Amitai Etzioni,
"Mixed Scanning: A 'Third' Approach to Decision-Making," PAR, Vol.
27, (Dec. 1967), pp. 385-392; Yehezkel Dror, Public Policy~ing
Re-examined, (Scranton, PA.: Chandler, 1968); and R.L.Curry and L.L.
Wade, The Elements of public policy, ~Columbus OH: Merrill, 1972).
2Edwin o. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, A History of
East Asian Civilization: East Asia: The Great Tradition (Vol. 1),
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), pp. 114-133.
3See for example: Alexander Eckstein, "Economic'Fluctua-
tions in Conmunist China"s Domestic Policy," in Tang Tsou and Pin-ti
Ho, eds., China in Crisis, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1968), Vol. 1, Book 1, pp. 691-729; also Skinner and Winckler, "Canpli-
ance Succession ••••" For a discussion of this approach see Andrew J.
Nathan, "Policy Oscillations in the people's Republic of China: A
Critique," China Quarterly, No. 68, (1976) pp. 720-733; and Edwin A.
Winckler, "Policy Oscillations in the People's Republic of China: A
Reply,~ Ibid., pp. 7~4-750.
Cyclical analyses operate within time frames Which are
very brief, often computed on the basis of months. As such, they
iqnore two very critical factors. The first is the Maoist definition
of "knovledqe" which demands that theory be tested against practice.l
This approach has been translated into decision making procedures
which make "investiqation" a necessary step in the "standard operating
procedure" of Chinese policy fomulation and impleIl1entation. In most
cases, policies are sugqested, debated and studied at the national level;
tested in limited and isolated caseS1 redebated and formulated again at
the center, then qenerally implemented. certain phases of this process
may proceed more quickly depending upon the policy area, the regime's
priorities, and the source of the original suggestion. But the over-all
process takes some time to evolve, with several opportunities for
readjustment at both the national and local levels.
From a developmental perspective, China's size and limited
level of institutionalization and technological skills have forced
decision makers to expect a significant time lapse between a policy
initiative and its final disposition. Cyclical analysis thus presup-
poses a sequential dynamic in the Chinese policy process which does
not exist. Instead, the Chinese intertwine policy formulation and
implementation in a process that is simUltaneously comprehensive and
incremental. Implementation is largely dependent on local conditions
and personnel, and may vary widely from area to area. Monitoring
procedures are not well developed. The regime does not re-evaluate
its policies within a short period of"time unless the results are
IMao Zc-dong, "Rectify the Party's Work Style," Selected
Works, (Peking: FLP, 1967), Vol. 2, especially pp. 39-43.
.obviously, immediately and generally catastrophic, as well as the case
during initial stages of communication in 1958-1959. Policy adjustment,
when it occurs, may often abandon the means but it remains directed
toward the original goal. It is this flexibility with respect to the
tools of decision making and implementation, combined with rigidity in
terms of ideological goals, which distinguishes the Chinese policy
process from both its western and Soviet counterparts. It can be
neither pragmatic nor dogmatic, and Chinese decision makers walk a
path which synthesizes the two.
Thus far this study has established certain characteristics
which govern the Chinese policy process. As noted, while the concerns
of Chinese decision makers may be similar to those in the Western or
soviet experience, tileprocess of operationalizing those concerns ~nto
concrete public policy is not the same. A closer look at the environment
and institutions in which the Chinese process operates suggests that the
critical variable may be under-development itself.
While often used descriptively, the functional role of under-
development in political processes such as public policy'making is just
as often ignored. The existing approaches to policy analysis were
formulated in and about industrial societies. But China is not. It
continues to fall into the no-manls-land of "developing nations", still
essentially agrarian and thus plagued by a scarcity of resources.
Policy making which operates in this environment is, there-
fore, governed by the "politics of poverty". This explanation,
formulated by Michel Iksenberq, pro~ses that the range of alternatives
open to Mao ze-dong' and to the Chinese regime was determined by and
dependent upon the amount of available economic resources, based in
1turn on the productivity of the agricultural sector. Following this
line of argument, economic solvency allowed the regime to keep
bureaucratic competition in check, to rely on material rewards and
incentives as a back-up for its policy initiatives, and to resolve
allocative and redistributive issues with minimal focus on class
distinctions. Policy making, while not devoid of ideology or planning,
could be more experimental and less dependent on economizing institu-
tional mechanisms for implementation. Resource scarcity, on the other
hand, found the regime over-committed and forced to take account of
costs and benefits in its public policies. Both bureaucratic
competition and class conflict were heightened in the shift from
material rewards to the use of symbols in order to effect compliance.
Policy making became more planned and.centralized, implementation of
policy more "regularized". Oksenberg1s analysis is cyclical. More-
over, it is based upon a tradition~l view of political economy in which
politics and thus policy is the dependent variable of economic factors.
He attributes the shift from incremental to programmatic processes to
the failure of the "socialist construction stage", (the Second Five
Year Plan, 1958-1962), to yield sustained and sufficiently rapid
economic growth in the agricultural sector. 2
The importance of Oksenberg1s formulation lies in its sugges-
tion of a political economy of policy makin~. As traditionally
1Michel Oksenbcrg, "Policy Making Under Mao, 1949-1968:
J\n OVerview," in John Lindbeck, ed ,, China: Management of a Revolu-
tionary Society, (Seattle: Unive~sity of Washington Press, 1971),
pp. 79-115.
2Ibid.
Understood, political economy means the politics of economic decision
making. The availability of economic resources is thus a determining
factor of policy. However, decision makers in developing nations are
faced with a scarcity of all resources: political, institutional and
informational as well as economic. The creation of such resources is
a goal of development and effects the content of policy. But the lack
of those resources effects the decision-making process with respect to
policy mechanisms. Lack of institutions means lack of information and
control over sectors of the population and the environment. It
necessitates some incremental decision-making and flexible, adaptive
implementing techniques, since a fully comprehensive approach is
impossible.
There is a demonsrable link between political development and
public policy within a Chinese ideological context. By giving
appropriate weight to the factor of under-development, it is possible
to explain certain characteris~ics of the policy process which appeared
heretofore as "contradictions" peculiar to the system. For example,
the "mass line" is the democratic element in the Chinese version of
"democratic centralism". It also legitimizes the regime's authority by
serving as the intellectual technology which substitutes for institu-
tional infrastructure in penetrating the various sectors of Chinese
society; and it makes access to informational resources possible
despite the a~sence of a communications network or other "modern"
organizational vehicles. The "mass line" was designed in and is
particularly appropriate to the rural/agrarian environment. By
employing it, cadres develop the levels of consensus necessary to
effect public policy. Although goal setting thus remains authoritative,
implementation is consultative and differs widely over space and time.
Unlike Western or soviet models of decision making, based on bureau-
~
cratic or group dynamics, this elite/.mass relationship is "transactional"
1but on a personal, decentralized level.
A policy model which weighs factors of under-development need
not be limited to developing nations. The functional role of under-
development can also be seen in those instances when "developed" nations
try to make policies directed toward the less institutionalized sectors
of their societies. For example, American attempts to formulate and'
implement comprehensive energy policies have been'crippled by factors
such as the monopoly of information possessed by oil-producing nations
and corporations; and the absence of mechanisms which would coordinate,
the spheres of energy-related authority and activity divided among
several government agencies. Thus, the approach maintains its'compara-
tive potential.
This research proposed that the availability of all resources:
social, political, institutional, as well as economic, determined
policy options and ultimately, policy choice in China. It is based on
a thesis which proposes an economic 9f political decision making,
lone critical study in the'Soviet field which demonstrates
the more general applicability of this concept is Jerry F. Hough,
The Soviet Prefects: The I~cal Party Organs in Industrial Decision
Making, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969). Hough stresses
the importance of the Obkom First Secretary in the policy process
not only in a managerial and regulatory role but also as the vehicle
for mass mobilization and normative inputs and as the advocate of
local interests. See especially pp. 101-125; and pp. 256-271.
·pursued and developed by Warren Ilchman and Norman Uphoff as the
1"new political economy".
iPolitical Economy and Chinese Public Policy
The "new political economy" model is a framework designed
to assess the comparative efficiency of policy alternatives and
formulate priorities under the limitations imposed by the scarcity of
politicized resources. All resources upon entering the "political
~arket" become factors of political production. These include
authority and legitimacy, 'status, information and coersion as well
as economic goods and services. The model is based on the premise
that resource exchange is the dynamic of politics.2 Political exchange
takes place between and among the regime (those who fill the authority
roles in a system) and sectors (groups of individuals who respond to
political issues in a similar fashion). The "regime" is viewed as a
"rational actor", usually monolithic in its values and goals.
Sectors may be seen as either formally organized or simply categorical,
lIlcbman and Uphoff, The Political Economy of Changei
Uphoff and lIebman, eds., The Political Economy of DevelOpment. All
definitions in the following discussion are based on these works,
which the reader may consult for a fuller explication.
2Ilchman and Uphoff note that their model was based on
trends in the field of political science which they considered
significant, amon them: the structural-functional approach to the
political system and to the allocation and distribution of resources;
Eisenstadt's concept of "free floating" resources created in the
mOdernization process; the conceptualization of politics as inter-
action and exchange, i.e., the pluralist model; and Huntington's
focus on structures and political entrepreneurship as the basis of
political order and political development. The Political Economy of
Change, pp. 18-25 •.
:but, like the regime, they are internally coherent. They become
~levant to the policy process when they use their resources to
secure political ends or when they are in sane way .coopted by the
Ireqime to achieve its goals. A regime's power is measured not only
by its possession of resources but also by its ability to ~ them
effectively and make them politically productive. Use value becomes
the criteria for defining "efficient" goal achievement.
In the trade-off process, the price of a resource, i.e.,
its value, is equal to its exchange rate and depends on supply and
demand mechanisms and on the opportunity costs of the alternative
uses to which the resource may be put. At a gi~n point in time,
resource values are necessarily relative, computed in terms of net
gains and net losses of other resources. OVer time, resource values
"are mutable. In analyzing the choice among alternatives for resource
utilization, a political economy approach assumes that the rational
decision maker seeks an outcome which maximizes the value of benefits
gained and mininuzes the value of benefits foregone and costs incurred.
Thus, the process may be at once comprehensive (with respect to goals)
and incremental (with respect to means).
The primary function of organizations and institutions
created by political actors is to increase the supply of information
lThe political economy model suggests five social o~
sectoral groupings of which decision makers should be aware: the
"core" combination, usually made up of those sectors which brought
the regime to power7 the "ideological bias", extending to those
sectors who are included in the regime's conception of the good
society, the "stability group", including all acquiescent sectors7
the "extra-stability group", which·is comprised of extremist sectors,
and the "unmob~lized group", made up of the non-politicized or
alienated elements of the political community. See Ibid., pp. 42-47.
.~ decision-makers and to increase the predictability and mobility of
political exchange, thereby economizing on the use of resources.
Party orqanization, local and reqional qovernments, bureaucracy, and
the communications network are essential infrastructural elements of
the exchange process. Certain aspects of ideoloqy and economic
planninq may also have infrastructural functions.l
Policy is the vehicle through which those in authority use
resources to achieve preferred ends. Policy is "public" when it
effects the environmental or institutional context in which the reqime
operates. Insofar as resources are scarce commodities of political"
exchange, the determining factors of public policy will involve the
production and distribution of resources and the assessment of the
costs and benefits of certain policies in terms of relative resource
values. The political economy model assumes that such relative evalua-
tion is possible within a framework of comprehensive planning~
Policy analysis in a political economy context beqins with
an evaluation of the "envirorunent of choice" within which a regime
makes public policies. This includes the institutional setting and
an accounting of the resources possessed by the regime and the
various sectors, the propensity of each for certain resource preferences
and types of political activity, and their expectations and aspirations
with respect to certain patterns of resource utilization. Then, the
lAll types of investments entail costs: direct costs in
binding certain resources; maintenance costs; opportunity costs; and
indirect costs in the form of unintended or unavoidable by-products.
This range of costs applies particularly to investments in political
and administrative infrastructure, usually related to long-range
goals. These investments are critical to any regime, but especially
to one engaged in development. Ibid., pp. 199-207 •.
·regime's production, accunulation, distribution and management of .
resources, in the expanded sense of that term may be analyzed on the'
basis of policies made and implemented. Within this framework, it is
possible to trace both the programmatic and incremental aspects of a
ment or for those aspects of political activity which are commonly
·viewed as developmental.l A political system is developmental in the·
context of this framework when an analysis of policies reveals that:
a) a regime has operated to increase its volume of political resources;
b) it has achieved a greater productive use of resources, through
efficient management and entrepreneurship; and c) the combination
increases the probability that the regime will achieve its goals.
The expansion of the concept; of "resources" allows us to put aside as
artificial the previous analytical distinctions between "economic
development" and "political development". The development phenomenon
can thus be treated in theory just as it appears to policy-makers in
practice a seamless web of inter-related socio-econ~ic, cultural
and political factors without pattern or sequence.
Political economy postulates that problems of resource
allocation and redistribution which arise when decision-makers attempt
to use scarce resources to create new resources can be controlled by
a program of political resource management. While choices must be
lIn the model, development is explicitly related to qualita-
tive structural changes which rne~t the criterion of resource
productivity. See discussion in Uphoff and Ilchman, The Political
Economy of Development, pp. 75-121.
.made between the consumption of resources to deal with immediate
problems and their investment to create change, these need not be
mutually exclusive. For example, the immediate legitimization of
authority requires the use of resources to cope with increased
demands and dislocations engendered by policies for change in infra-
structure or social and economic relationships. To remain in
authority, a regime must invest resources to create new authority
relationships, congruent with other changes and based on its
ideological vision of the "good society". Therefore, the most
economical and productive use of resources would treat this problem .
comprehensively rather than sequentially. Resources would be spent
in a way that would both maximize immediate legitimacy and minimize
the need for future investments.
To repeat and elaborate the hypotheses formulated at the
beginning of this chapter, a political economy framework best 'explains
the mechanisms and content of public policies in China if public
policies can be shown to:
reflect a trade-off of resources
with relative and mutable values
within a comprehensive plan
emerge in a non-linear fashion
over time
display inconsistencies and incon-
gruities which are functions of a
trade-off process and not of goal
displacement, cyclical patterns, or
abrupt changes in elite preferences.
It must be stressed again that the utility of a model for
policy analysis will be determined in part by the systemic setting.
The first question, therefore, is whether or not a political economy
·approach can be applied to China without avoiding or misinterpreting
the realities of Chinese politics. Certain a~cts of the framework
presented above require more rigorous definition in a Chinese context.
These include the nature and functions of ideology and other institu-
tions, and, qiven these constraints, the nature of the regime/sector
relationship and of the process of political exchanqe.
As defined by Ilchman and Uphoff, ideology is a hierarchy
of value preferences, belonging to either the regime or the sectors.l
This definition is rooted in comprehensive theory, and assumes a high
level of value consensus within the society in general and especially
wi thin the decision-making elite. Therefore, ideological qoals are
not treated as separate from the making of or content of policy.
Ideology is policy. This aggregate approach provides no basis for an
operating devinition of the role of ideology in the policy process.
It also does not address cases in which ideology has political
relevance beyond the policy process, as when it becomes a source of
conflict over basic philosophy and goals rather than over strategy and
tactics within a regime. For example, a conceptualization that would
limit the discussion of changes in basic Soviet doctrine after Lenin,
such as the rejection of "permanent revolution" or the adoption of
"socialism in one country", to a policy context would ignore the far-
reaching intellectual and value changes which precipitated those
decisions.
There is no basis for the assumption of a one-to-one
correspondence between ideology and policy. In a review article,
lIlchman and Uphoff, The Pol! tical Economy of Change,
pp. 239-241.
Willard Mullins defined ideology as:
• • • a logically coherent system of symbols,
which, within a more or less sophisticated
conception of history, links the cogni~ive
and evaluative perception of one's social
condition -- especially its prospects for the.
future -- to a program of collective action
for the maintenance, alteration of transforma-
tion of society. 1.
This definition implies that there are several components of ideology
and several levels at which ideology can enter the political process.
Changes in the components of ideology and discernible, significant
variations in the degree to which ideology is shared would, over
time, effect the nature of ideology in a manner which transcends its
function as a program of action.
In his treatment of ideology in China, Franz Schurmann
.attempted to deal with all its elements by differentiating the "pure"
ideology of Marxism-Leninism, which provides a certain concep~ion of
history, perception of social condition, and vision of the future; from
the "practical" ideology of Mao's Thought which links means and ends
in a program of action. This approach, like most other studies of
Chinese ideology, accepts certain aspects, particularly Marxiam-
Leninism, as given, and focuses on Mao Ze-dong's formulations, biases,
.concerns, and structural prescriptions. It also assumes that Mao's
Thought had been known and shared by.the regIme , with a few notable
exceptions, over the course of the Chinese revo1ution.2
lwillard A. Mullins, "On the Concept of Ideology. in Politi-
cal Science," APSR, Vol. 66, No.2, pp. 498-502. For an
look at the role of ideology as intellectual technology
of political change, see Michael Walzer, The Revolution..;;.;.,~~~;.;:..;~~;.;.....:..:;;.--::;=....;:;.=.;;.:..:~.A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics, (New York:
Harvard University Press, 1965).





In retrospect, the ideological issue in China was far more
canplex. Mao's Thought was itself comprised of both static and
dynamic elements. Certain political orientations, such as the belief
in the inherent value of struggle, the confidence in man's ability to
transform htmself and societY1 and the bias against rigid institution-
alization ("bureaucratismn), were formulated in the context of the
pre-1949 revolutionary movement and did not change. Other aspects,
such as the identification of progressive and regressive social
forces; and the determination of the pattern of mobilization/consoli-
dation, or struggle/unity, appropriate to a given stage, changed
several times after 1949. Thus, there was a continual need for the
reqtme to both ascertain and re-accept Mao Is "practical ideology" on
particular matters of policy. This necessarily created opportunities
for ideological divergence within the regime itself and at many other
levels.
Until the CUltural Revolution, it was assumed that the
problem of ideological divergence centered only in the program of
action and was largely confined to the masses and to the middle and
basic levels of Chinese political and administrative organization.
Periodic re-emphasis of democratic centralism, rectification campaigns
launched prior to embarking in new policy directions, and propaganda
campaigns to prepare the masses for impending change, were held to
be effective mechanisms for the imposition of value consensus on both
regime cadres and the society as a whole. The debates of the 1960's
upset these earlier premises.l They reflected ideological cleavages'
.which both transcended the program of action and found their locus at
lIbido Epilogue, pp. 506-531.
·the highest levels of the regime. Analysts of Chinese ideology now
sU<Jgest that a change in its nature and function occurred sometime
between the regime's accession to power and the eruption of political
hostilities in 1965. These analyses vary in their estimation of the
timing of the change and of those factors which precipitated it; but
the nature of the change they describe may be summed up AS the
differences between the Thought of Mao and Maoism.l
Mao's Thought is based upon two theoretical formulations
concerning ideology. First is the formula of unity-criticism-unity:
unity of goals, found in Marxism-Leninism; criticism of methods or
tactics; and unity of goal and method, a synthesis in a single policy
direction. Second is the belief that the ideology comes from the
masses rather than from elites. The role of leadership is to distill
the mass experience into theory, to combine theory and practice, and
to return to the masses a product which is organic to them. In
defining a course of action for a specific situation, the "correct"
synthesis of Marxist-Leninist goals and Chinese historical experience
is subject to debate and to change. The regime was usually willing to
accept Mao's interpretation, which existed within these ideological
parameters. But the option to follow some other alternative remained
open, and the expression of ideas was actively promoted.2
Maoism, on the other hand, is far less flexible or optional.
It replaces Marxism-Leninism as the "pure" ideology, establishes its
lSee discussion in Townsend, Politics in China, pp. 168-176.
2For a detailed analysis see Schram, Political Thought;
also, Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, Chapter One.
·own parameters, and becomes the only standard for legitimate participa-
tion of both elites and masses in the system. The focus of controversy
becomes ideology itself rather than the strategy and tactics of the
program of action; and the unity of goals can no longer be assumed.
Political authority no longer flows from ideology but rather ideology
becomes a symbol of comIllitment to' authori ty. Ideology is thus removed
from the hands of the masses and becomes the property of that particu-
lar group of elites who can establish themselves as the "true"
Maoists.
Ideology !!. dynamic, even if its goals are rigid, and there
1s no need to dichotomize or reify the concept. In order to deal with
Chinese ideology in a political economy framework it will be redefined
as both an institutional constraint and as a resource, which may be
exchanged for other resources in the policy process. From the latter
perspective, there are no ideological watersheds because there is no
uni-linear process of transformation from Mao's Thought to Maoism.
These are manifestations of the changing value of ideology over time.
The value of ideology is determined by the degree of
sharedness both withIn the regime and between the regime and sectors.
If the level of ideological sharedness were perceived as high, then
the regime's valuation of ideological resources would be low and their
creation would not be a major public policy concern. This does not
reflect on the importance of ideology to the regime. After all,
bumper harvests may drive down the price of bread, but this does not
detract from its universal position as the Nstaff of life". If
ideological sharedness were Perceived as low, then it is expected that
.the production of highly priced ideological resources would be
reflected in the content of policy. The regime, or elements of it,
~uld attempt to monopolize the ideological function, removing it
from open debate, approximating the "change: from Mao's Thought to
Maoism. Ideology could behave as a resource in this fashion with or
without the direct involvement or even the physical presence of Mao
Ze-dong himself.l
As an institutional constraint, ideology puts certain limita-
tions on the process of political exchange. The "new political
economy" model acknowledges the possibility of such parameters in
the regime/sector relationship. The constraints of ideology are
viewed in the context of the "environment of choice", which differs
in each political system.
The Chinese leadership defines sectors as classes and, in so
doing, invests each with a particular political as well as economic
status. The workers or proletariat enjoy the highest rank in the
political community. Peasants are their closest allies. However,
the peasantry has always been differentiated into rich, middle (upper
and lower) and poor categories, and their political status is held to
be in inverse proportion to their economic well-being. National
capitalists and intellectuals, both characterized as bourgeoisie,
are on the periphery of the political community.
lIn fact, the absence of Mao as an effective actor would
probably facilitate the process. Therefore, Mao's death in 1976, or
indications that he had been out of action for some time beforehand,
should not detract from the utility of this formulation. Mao has
always served as a symbol of the regime's legitimacy. The question
now becomes how his successors, as opposed to his colleagues, will
use the symbof.
'1'oqetherthese four classes comprise "the people". In the
parlance of political econany, they are the "core combination",
-1.deolO9'icalbias" amd "stability group" of the Chinese system. Other
classes include the landlords and "compradore capitalists". They have
a negative political status by definition, and to not belong to "the
people". 1 They are the "extra-stiu>ility" groups in the system.
The Chinese argue that classes continue to exist ideolo-
gically throughout the socialist stage.2 Insofar as class ideologies
differ from that of the regime, then their interests and value
preferences remain separate and particular. In China, the classes
cannot compete with the regime or bargain with ~e regime for
resources, but they can be identified with certain resource preferences
and thus with certain policy priorities. On-the other hand, in making
policy decisions the regtme cannot simply trade off sectoral rewards
and support: it must also produce the basic value consensus and shared
ideology which creates and maintains a single, collectivist political
community.
The Chinese strategy for social transformation (ideologically
set) establishes narrow bargaining ltmits between and among the leader-
ship and the classes. Before the process of exchange can begin,
lJohn W. Lewis, "Political Aspects of Mobility in China's
Urban Develorment," ~' Vol. 60, No.4, pp. 906-907. Lewis developed
a stratification system for China's pre-Cultural Revolution social -
hierarchy which clearly demonstrates the location of the "core",
"ideological bias", etc.
2For example, RMRB, editorial, April 5, 1956, "On the
Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,"
reprinted in Schram, Politica~ Thought, pp. 303-304. See also Schram's
discussion in ,Ibid., pp. 92-93.
resources are "politicized", i.c., brought into the national
·political market". Thus their use-value or productivity may be
assessed in common terms. Not all resources need to be brought into
the market. But the broader the definition of "politics" the more
complex, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the market becomes.
Resources which have become politicized in.the Chinese system include:






Political and administrative infrastructure
Socio-economic status
Local (i.o., sub-national) socio-economic structures
OWnership (of real property, especially land)
Production (relationships and modes)
Material output (industrial, commercial, and
agricultural
Money and other capital assets
Income, wages and prices
Education (facilities and content)
Politicization is not the same as ownership or control. It simply
establishes a common currency tor exchange.
The Chinese regime is limited in its prerogative to make
t~ade-offs by its own estimate of the propensity and capacity of a
class to resist a certain policy. Resistance, actual or perceived,
may be seen as equal to the degree of divergence between the regime's
ideology and collective class values. The regime seeks to eliminate
such potential resistance in two ways. First, it fosters conflict and
struggle among the classes, thereby eradicating "contradictions" by
universalizing value preferences. The objective is to ensure that.the
regime's interests and the society's interests become unified.
·Second, the regime counters resistance by the ~xpenditure or
investment of other, non-ideological resources. The configuration
of resource utilization is thus an indicator of the level of ideologi-
cal congruence between regime and classes, which in turn determines
policy priorities and the availability of options.
The model of public policy making advanced by Ilchman and
UPhoff focuses on political exchange and on the lines of cleavage
among sectors and between a regime and sectors. But the unity of a
regime, minor policy divergences notwithstanding, is taken as
axiomatic. This view echoes elite decision making theories.
However, it is supported neither by history nor by the Chinese
experience, which combine to suggest that a governing regime, as it
becomes functionally differentiated, may also become ideologically
. 1fragmented.
The Chinese regime has guarded against "sectarianism" and
the creation of "independent kingdoms" which pluralize rather than
collectivize the political community. For example, the "committee"
approach to both policy;-,making and implementing has been used in
preference to vertical chains of command.2 The Party penetrates and
lSoviet studies have relied heavily on analyses of both
elite competition and bureaucratic behavior, especially during the
Stalinist era. See for example, Robert V. Daniels, The Stalin Revo-
lution, (Boston MA.: D.C.Heath, 1965). Hough argues against the
utili ty of a monistic model of organization for "development adminis-
tration" because the goal of carrying out planned change gives rise
to different performance and recruitment criteria. See The Soviet
Prefects, pp. 294-297. For seme further thoughts on this subject
with respect to China, see Steven Andors' analysis, "Hobbes and
Weber vs. Marx and Mao: The Political Economy of Decentralization
in China," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 6, No.3,
(1974), pp. 19-25.
2Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, pp. 173-210.
monitors the activities of the PLA and the civil bureaucracy through
1its political departments and -fractions". And the Party itself is
periodically rectified. The rectification campaigns have been largely
intra-orqanizational and as such they failed to penetrate the highest
levels of the regime. 2 Even when the regime has resorted to extra-
organizational means of rectification, as during the 1957 -Hundred
Flowers· experiment of the SZ-Qing of 1963-1964, Party elites have
managed to retain their positions. 3 Still, the list of powerful
figures who have fallen from the pinnacles of the regime includes
some fODmidable names -- Kao Kang (1954), p'eng Teh-huai (1959), Liu
Shao-ch'i (1968), and Lin Piao (1971). This indicates long-standing
divergences within the regime and breakdowns in its internal
processes of trade-off and exchange.4
As this evidence suggests, political exchange operates
within the Chinese regime in a manner which is similar to the resource
trade-offs which take place between the regime and the classes. As
different members of the regime become identified with particular
institutions -- Party, State or Army -- they also become identified
with the interests and resources of those institutions and with
policies which would produce more of certain types of resources. For
lThere is evidence that such penetration was effective. See
F.C.Teiwes, "The Purge of Provincial Leaders (1957-1958)," China
Quarterly, No. 27, (1966) pp. 14-32.
2Mark Selden, The Yenan Way; Charles Neuhauser, "The
Chinese Canmunist Party ••••" pp. 3-36.
3Richard Baum and Fredrick Teiwes, Ssu-Ch'ing: The Social-
ist Education Movement of 1962-1966, (Berkeley; University of
California Press, 1968).
4Charles Neuhauser, "The Impact of the CUltural Revolution
on the Chinese Communist Party Machine," China Quarterly.
·example. Peng oe-huai criticized the policies of the Great Leap
Forward because they had failed to create the economic resources
needed for the technical improvement of the military. Lin Biao came
into conflict with Mao when he moved to protect the new political
resources of the PLA in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution.l
Aqain, the level of ideological sharedness constrains the flexibility
of trade-off mechanisms. Low levels of bureaucratic ~ompetition
indicate plentiful ideological resources so that the need to make
choices with respect to the creation and distribution of other
scarce resources is viewed as non-threatening by members of the
regime. When the level of ideological sharedness within the regime
is low, we expect intense bureaucratic competition for all resources
and a higher incidence of political risk-taking by regime members in
order to protect and augment their resource positions. Drawing again
on the examples of Peng and Lin, the former·gambled on the effective-
ness of a public criticism of policy and, by implication, of Mao,
while the latter presumably attempted a coup d'etat.2 Intra-regime ex-
Change mechanisms and resource trade-offs which occurred between the
Chinese regime and the peasant classes, necessarily effected the
content and process of agricultural policy. These will be the focus
of our analytic model.
The preceding discussion has outlined the parameters of
this research approach and has described sane of the over-all
linkages between the study of political development and public policy,
1 The Case of Peng Teh-huai: 1959-1968, (Union Research
Institute, Hong Kong: 1968), pp. 3-22~ Philip Bridgham, "The Fall of
Lin Piao, If China Quarterly, No. 55, (1973), pp. 427-449.
2Ibid•
and the study of Chinese politics. In order to place Chinese
Agrarian development policies within a political economy framework,
the following chapter will establish the particular institutional
and environmental limits which operated in the 1949-1964 period.
These include the ideological relationship between the regime and
the agrarian sector, its relevant structural correlates, and the
environmental or institutional reflections of under-development
(defined as resource scarcity) within which policy choices were made
and implemented.
CHAPTER TWO
AGRARIAN POLICIES: THE ENVIRONMENT OF CHOICE
Throughout its first fifteen years of rule, the Chinese
regime regarded the agrarian sector as a critical locus of social,
political and economic change. However, the politics ~f agrarian
development in an environment as politically and economically under-
developed as China contained built-in contradictions. These
complicated the formulation and implementation of any comprehensive
strategies.
In the final analysis, the goal of agrarian development
-demands the destruction of traditional relationships and modes of
agrioultural production. Functionally integrated, socio-economic
sub-units must be penetrated and transformed into efficient,
specialized, and technologically advanced enterprises. Peasants
become rural workers with a "modern" self-image.l In this process,
human and material resources heretofore entailed to the land are made
free and flexible, providing the basis for urban/industrial growth.2
~hese cost transfers work to the disadvantage of the agrarian sector,
which incurs losses in political and economic power, status, and
lBarrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy, (Boston, MA.: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 187-227.
2S.N.Eisenstadt, The Political systems of Empires, (New
York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 25-28~ also, Karl Deutsch,
"Social Mobilization and Political Development," APSR, Vol. 55,
-(1961), pp. - --
.values. If the regime is not dependent on the agrarian sector for
noxmative or material supports, then it is free to impose these costs.
But if the regime's future should sanehow become tied to an agrarian
'base, then its freedom of action becomes limited. Examples of this
dynamic abound in modern history: Between 1868 and 1945, Japanese
reformers (of the Meij~ and Taisho periods) extracted material
resources from agriculture to finance industrialization, but became
politically indebted to the rural elite and avoided policies which
might disturb the traditional social controls which insured stability
in the villages (the buraku). As a result, the agrarian elite was
able to.establish a power base from which it wielded considerable
and, ultimately, destructive influence over the Japanese modernization
process.l
The variable which most often intervenes to truncate of
displace goals of social change is under-development. The scarcity of
all resources makes the tensions inherent in the process of agrarian
devel9pment more pronounced. Because the modern sector is virtually
non-existent, the demands on agriculture are unlimited, dictating a
higher level of cost transfers and a faster rate of change. But at
the same time, the regime is more dependent on the agrarian sector
for political and economic support. It lacks the infrastructure
needed to penetrate the villages; the agro-technology necessary to
free-up human and material resources; and th~ industrial base which
would both create that technology and absorb the excess rural
lHoore, Social Origins, pp. 244-312; Thomas C. Smith, The
.Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan, (New York: Atheneum - Stanford
University Press, 1959).
population produced by its application. Such regimes are under
constant pressure to manipulate the coopt the agrarian sector rather
than to change it in any qualitative sense.
These contradictions were apparent in the "environment for
choice" within which the Chinese regime operationalized strategies for
Agrarian development between 1949 and 1964. Both the contextual
constraints of under-development (resource scarcity) and the Marxist-
Leninist elements of Chinese ideology impelled the regime toward a
total conquest of the agrarian sector. But, physical limitations and
Mao Ze-dong's interpretation of ideology, plus the decisional struc·
tures and process through which the regime operated, simultaneously
established parameters and generated conflicts which put constraints
on choice.
Mao and the Peasants
The Maoist interpretation of ideology Was a product of many
factors. These include. the Marxist-Leninist philosophical tradition,
the soviet experience, and especially the agrarian environment against
which these theories and models were assessed. Thus, ideology was
fluid rather than static, involving the interaction of philosophical
.and environmental parameters.
The transformation of agrarian society is, in its ideologi-
cal sense, a problem of social change. It focuses on class definitions
and the relationship of productive forces. The Marxist-Leninist
"proletarian" class orientation is not only anti-capitalist but also
anti-peasant. I The agrarian sector served as a temporary and tactical
ally in the Bolshevik's seizure of state power. But Lenin noted that,
after victory M ••• it would be ridiculous to speak of the unity of
will of the proletariat and the peasantry.":Z Possessing no ideological
legitimacy, the soviet peasantry became vulnerable to socia-economic
policies designed to manipulate it or to eliminate it as a class.
The Soviet experience, both in terms of its legacy and of
its function as a standard of comparison, was a significant factor in'
the Chinese approach to agrarian development. Two distinct Soviet
approaches to agreculture'-- the first under Stalin and the second
under Khrushchev -- influenced Chinese decision makers in their
perception of viable options. Underlying the Stalinist model (1928-
1953) was the belief that the agrarian sector could not'·function with
the industrial sector.on a co-equal basis for the purpose of
revolutionary change. After 1953, Khrushchev attempted to reformUlate
this aspect of ideology. But the evidence strongly suggests that he
was unable to overcome the combination of Lenin's legitimization and
3Stalin's institutionalization of an anti-peasant bias •.
IFor an analysis of the role of the peasantry in the Marxian
philosophical schema see David Mitrany, Harx Against the Peasants,
(North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1951); also,
Alfred C. Meyer, Leninism, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962)
especially pp. 107-144.
2Mitrany, Marx, p , 23.
3Alec Nove, "Ideology and Agriculture," soviet Studies, Vol.
17, No.4; Sidney Ploss, Conflict and Decision-Making in soviet
Russia: A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953-1963, (Princeton,
NJ.: Princeton University Press,.1965) , pp. 25-58.
To secure the conquest of the Russian agrarian sector,
highly centralized structures proliferated. These are often seen as
reflections of the anti-peasant ideological bias or of the Soviet
infatuation with Western organization theory in the first decade of
th~s century.l However, under-development was also a critical variable
in the Russian case. The CPSU was primarily an urban organization,
and lacked any significant rural base.2 Given the Marxian ideological
parameters and the Leninist organizational philosophy, the decision to
penetrate the agrarian sector with centralized, efficient infra-
structure can be seen in terms of maximizing communication and control,
while.minimizing investments of personnel and the risks of local
autonomy. 3
Since all peasants were "class enemies· by definition,
cadres during the stalinist period operated with little regard for
the nuances of agrarian politics. The policy of "dekulakization"
was carried out such that it expanded rather than delimited the
targeted category and thus contributed little to the development of
1a supportive political environment in the rural areas. Collectiviza-
tion was also implemented with coercion and terror, symptomatic of
the purely regulatory goals pursued by the stalinist regime with
respect to the agrarian sector. The bureaucracies operated, often
competitively and at cross pusposes, to manage planning, resource
allocation and distribution, production, and technology for the
collective agricultural units.2 The model was thus devoid of any
educative perspective on the relationship between elites and rural
masses.
In the mid-1950's Krushchev proposed an alternative model
which would restore the use value of both material and normative
resources by investing more in and extracting less from the agrarian
sector. For example, Khrushchev fought for the preservation of the
kolkhoz (collective) principal of ownership as against further
development of state-owned farms. At the same time, he advocated
the decentralization of d~tailed planning functions from Moscow to
the local level as well· as the liberation of equipment and technical
expertise in the countryside from central administration. Krushchev's
economic program was designed to shift priorities away fran heavy
industry and increase state prices for farm products. He also seemed
to be moving toward a restoration of the Party's educative mandate
with a new type of rural cadre -- an ideologically reliable and
lFor insights into this process consult M. Lewin, Russian
Peasants and soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization, (London:
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1968); also, M. Lewis, "Who Was the •
Soviet Kulak?" Soviet Studies, VQ1. 18, No.2, Oct. 1966, pp. 189-212.
2Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, pp. 344-377.
technically competent role model -- able to maximize the production
of both political and material resources while keeping coercion at a
minimum. 1 Thus he hoped to "de-Stalinize" the rural environment and
end the political alienation, administrative inefficiencies, and
economic crises borne by the agrarian sector as the costs of rapid
industrialization.
The Soviet reformers discovered that agricultural policy
making was virtually fmmobilized by the vested interests of the
administrative, economic and technical bureaucracies. These forces
were reflected in conservative CPSU Central Committee responses to
those changes which entailed decentralization, shifting investment
priorities into agriculture, and Party functionalism. Blocked at
the policy level, Khrushchev counter-attacked by escalating the
issues to a theoretical plane. In 1961 he declared that the Soviet
Union had entered a new revolutionary stage in the relationship of
classes, a state "of the entire people", the successor and bene-
ficiary of the "dictatOrship of the proletariat".2 By pressing this
new wrinkle into the fabric of Soviet ideology, he hoped to eliminate
the legitimizing factors of stalin's anti-peasant legacy, and to
substantially decrease the size of the "class enemies· category,
thereby deflating the use value of coercion and terror in the
Iploss describes Khrushchev's "retreat" on these issues
between 1961 and 1963. As a result, the kolkhozy decreased in number
through dismantling, Maalgamation, and conversion to sovkhozy,
Conflict and Decision Making, pp. 216-268. For aggregate data see
Robert C. Stuart, "Structural Change and the Quality of Soviet
Collective Farm Management, 1952-1966," in Millar, Soviet Rural
Community, pp. 123-124 •
.2plqss, Conflict and Decision-Making, p. 217.
,countryside. Ironically, the continuing crisis in soviet agriculture,
caused to some extent by those forces which opposed Khrushchev's
reforms, played into the hands of that same group. After Knrushchev's
retirement in 1964, reforms were scaled down to conform to the
coercive/manipulative approach of a more orthodox ideological line.
However, the evidence suggests that, since the mid-1960's, the soviet
regime has expended substantial resources in an attempt to rationalize
its agrarian policy approach.l
The strength of Mao's Thought originally lay in its proven
ability to make Marxist goals and soviet methods relevant to domestic
realities and interests.2 It departed from Soviet experience on
three key issues: the legitimate role of peasants in the process of .
social change; the educative as well as regulatory functions of admin~
istration; and the attempted substitution of mass mobilization for
.
technology in economic growth.
As a Marxist, Mao measured revolutionary social change in
tenns of transfonning class consciousness, from peasant or bourgeois
to proletarian. The "populist" elements of Mao's Thought sometimes
overshadowed this negative perspective on agrarian politics -- its
lRoger A. Clark, "soviet Agricultural Reforms Since Khrush-
chev," Soviet Studies, Vol. 20, No.2 (1968), pp. 159-178.
2This theme was often repeated in the early 1950's. For
example, in the addresses which marked the Thirtieth Anniversary of
the CCP in July, 1951, high ranking regime members consistently paid
tribute to the "vital and decisive" role of Mao's Thought in the
Chinese revolution. Yang Cheng-fang, "Review of Liu Shao-qi's
On the Party," People's China, Vol. 3, No.1, January 1951, in CB, 81:2;
Chen no-da, "Mao Tse-tung I s Theory of the Chinese Revolution Is the
Combination of Marxism-Leninism with the Chinese Revolution," RMRB,
.June 28, 1951, in E!!., 126:1-30. --
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backwardness, unreliability, and inferiority to a proletarian stand-
point. Revolution was seen as a continuous process, pushed in a
socialist direction by contradictions and struggle, especially among
social classes. But, in the Leninist tradition, Mao sought vehicles
through which to recreate the possibility of a Marxist-type revolu-
tion in a pre-industrial environment.l
Mao' s views on peasant revolutionary potential can be
traced over five decades. In the 1920's he defined middle and poor
peasants as a "semi-proletariat" and agricultural laborers as "pro-
letariat".2 Although he subsequently became more orthodox in his use
of terminology, Mao persisted in his emphasis on the rural locus of
social change. In 1949, the Party affirmed its agrarian heritage by
rejecting "proletarian dictatorship" for the more integrative "people's
democratic dictatorsh.ip", based on a four-class bloc which included
botti peasants and national bourgeoisie. The latter were eventually
abandoned to the needs of socialist transformation and construction;
but the "worker-peasant alliance" became a part of Chinese orthodoxy.3
lAlexander Eckstein, China's Economic Revolution, p. 36.
2Mao Ze-dong, "The Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Socie-
ty", March 1926, in Selected Works, (peking: FLP, 1967) Vol. 1,
pp. 13-21. Mao was in a sense beginning to evaluate the "core"
combination, "ideological bias" and "stability group" in the Chinese
political environment. Unlike Lenin and Stalin, Mao continually
refined these categories both within the society at large and among
the peasantry itself as "objective conditions" changed. However,
ideology would continually complicate the rural political calculus. It
dictated policies threatening those very sectors which a pragmatic
costs-benefits analysis might accommodate, especially rich and upper-
middle peasants.
3Mao ze-dong, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions
Among,the People," in Schram, Political Thought, p. 306; see also,
Mao Ze-dong, Speech at the Tenth Plenum, Eighth Central Cornrnittee,
September 24, 1962, in Schram, Talks and Letters, p. 189.
The agrarian sector was thus given the status and protection of an
organic as well as tactical role, not only in the seizure of power
but also in the post-revolutionary society.
In retrospect, Mao's approach to social transformation,
both before and after Liberation, was consistent with an ideology of
the "poor and blank" and with the"agrarian envirorunent in which it
was conceived.l But, given the proletarian political calculus,
temporary and tactical trade-offs did not abandon the revolutionary
definition or the ultimate goals of transformation. "Contradictions"
were confronted as natural rather than fatal outgrowths of the
~~velopmental p~ocess. In resolving contradictions, methods which
created new resources with minimal trade-offs of existing assets were
preferred. But in all cases, the progressive nature, even of the
most compromising situation, was to be sought and promoted.2 For
example, in the early 1950's the priority of class-related issues
was low in comparison to administrative limitations and the need to
secure the political loyalty of the rural areas. A policy line which
postponed COllectivization and supported a "rich peasant" (small pro-
ducer) economy was therefore adopted.3 But When, as a result of land
lA useful comparative study is N. Spu1ber, "Contrasting
Economic Patterns: Chinese and soviet Development Strategies,"
Soviet Studies, Vol. 15, No.1, (1963), pp. 1-16. An interesting case
study in the inforced application of the Soviet model to an agrarian
environment is Nissan Oren, Revolution Administered: Agrarianism and
Communism in Bulgaria, (Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1973, especially pp. 113-118 and pp. 143-148.
Mao Ze-dong, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, ,.
Selected Works, Vol. 4, pp. 411-424.
Mao Ze-dong, "Report to the Third.Plenum, Seventh Central
Committee," June 6-9, 1950, in~, 1:4-6.
redistribution and increased production, the relationship among pro-
ductive forces in the countryside had changed, the policy line became
more radical, permeated by ideOlogical issues.
From a decision-making perspective, this approach was not
easily implemented or maintained, for the path of least resistance
was to trade-off long-range class issues in favor or more immediate
resource benefits, for example, econanic growth. LOng before the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution {GPCR escalated all differences
over strategy and tactics to a zero-sum "struggle between two roads",
there were debates in Chinese ideological circles which had a
pronounced effect on the content of agricultural policies.
The first major debate occurred in 1954 over the rate at
which the regime should pursue "socialist transformation", escalating
the regulatory role of the State in socio-economic change to a more
direct, managerial function. The political posture adopted at that
juncture was seen as crucial to the future of the Chinese revolution.
In his report to the First NPC on the draft constitution in September,
1954, Liu Shao-qi summed up the case for those who were"pressing for
a more clearly socialist direction of change. He argued that
capitalist development would lead back to "imperialist domination"
and that the socialist road was the "law of China's historical develop-
ment".l
However, capitalism was not so much at issue as the choice
between socialism and a consolidation of the status quo -- the New
lLiu Shao-ch' i, "p.eport-on the Draft Constitution of the
People's Republic of China," NOlA, Peking, September 15, 1954, in
f!!., 294: 1-13.
Democratic order. To the latter position, Liu responded that it was
impossible for two conflicting relationships of production to coexist
without contradictions. The regime was anticipating struggle in the
forthcoming socialist transition, but the victory of socialism would
be assured, according to Liu, If ••• through the control of the
administrative bodies of state".l. For the agrarian'sector, this
resolution signaled the end of the regime's tolerance of privatism
as the price of rural stability and uninterrupted agricultural pro-
duction.
The new direction stepped up the pace of collectivization,
increasing the State's control over the prodjction process and at
the same time, generating class struggle. However, the debate did
not end there. within the broad rubrics of "socialist transition"
and "socialist construction" the rate and scope of change was left
open and flexible. Periodically, the leadership confronted contra-
dictions which arose from a shortage of resources. The temptatio~
to rely on material incentives to stimulate agricultural productivity
when administrative or normative methods fell short of their expec-
tations was especially strong. For example, in19~6/l957 and again
in 1959/1960, the regime opted for rural stability over rural trans-
formation. In these situations, class-related issues were
necessarily assigned lower values and priorities.
This recurring ideological debate reached a critical stage
in the early 1960's. Mao Ze-dong was unable to accept Khrushchev's
declaration of the "State of the entire people" in the Soviet Union.
lIbido
A'-doctrine of class unity, it escalated the tactical postponement of
class conflict (i.e., the transformation of consciousness among the
Soviet peasantry) to a theoretical and permanent level. After 1962,
Mao continually inveighed against Chinese "revisionists" who, like
their Soviet counterparts, would -forget class struggle", especially
in the agrarian sector. At the aame time, the Socialist Education
Movement (SEM), called for by Mao at the Tenth CC Plenun in
September, 1962, was aimed at counteracting the negative ideological'
effects of post-GLF rural policies. The Maoists opposed the reemer,:,
gence of privatism and small producer econanics in the countryside,
and refused to keep a low profile on class-related issues.
The terms of debate were set out as a conflict between the
analytical approach that "one divides into two" and the obverse
view, that "two combines into one".l The former, attributed to Mao
Ze-dong, argued for permanent struggle and revolution. Given any
contradiction, one divides into two, the two struggle, and a new
synthesis is formed. But, the unity of opposites is always temporary--
a situational or tactical unity--and must not be made permanent. In
the natural order of things, any new synthesis would again "divide
into two".
The latter view was attributed to Yang IIsien-chen, a CCP
intellectual and full member of its CC. He posited that unity rather
IFor the progress of the debate itself between May and
August, 1964, see CB: 745~ SCMP: 3294, 3296, 3316, 3337, and 3347~
and SCMM: 433-435-.- A summary-of the debate was presented in a five
part series in Nan-fang Jih-pao., Canton, between January 11 and 18,
1965, entitled, lOA Talk to Basic'Level Cadres on the Issue of lone
Into Two' vs 'Two Into one ",II in ~, 755:1-.16.
than strugg1e was the natural order and essence of the dialectical
process, and that the most significant aspect of contradictions did
not concern what separated them but rather their common denominators.
Despite the Obvious implications of this debate for post-GLF agri-
cultural poU.cies, the SEM, which culminated in a new victory for
Mao's Thought in 1965, resulted in no major changes for any sector
of the economic base. Instead, the issue came to be .fought out in
the super-structure of Chinese society, where "cultural revolution"
and the foxmulation of "revolutionary successors" dominated the
political agenda.l
An innovative approach to infrastructure constituted a
second major departure of Mao's Thought from Soviet precedent.
Again~ the interplay of ideology and the agrarian environment is
demonstrated in its effect on policy trends. Generally, Mao's
views on infrastructure reflected a tension between the need for
effective control and the desire to avoid the elitism and rigidity
which had characterized most of China's experience with administra-
tion. Specialized alien command structures could not achieve suffi-
cient geographical, intellectual or functional proximity to the
Wbasic levels· of the Chinese countryside to serve as effective
vehicles for either political communication or policY implementation.
For Mao, "bureaucratism" was a major evil, and its definition was
lBeqinning in 1964, the PLA became the role model for
national emu1ation, especially in the areas of administration arid
technology. see for example, "The Hhole Country Must Learn from the
PLA," R.'tRB..edito::-ial,February 1, 1964, in en, 732:1. The popular-
ization of Mao'n ihought also originated wi~the PLA, in a directive
from its General Political Department on May 6, 1964.
"divorce from the masses", especially in the rural areas.l Ideally,
the problem was to be resolved by recruiting and training cadres who
were politically "red" and functionally "expert". However, despite
the CCP's pre-1949 history of recruitment and activity in the
villages rather than the cities, such individuals were always in
short supply. Peasant recruits were not seen as politically reliable
despite their guerilla experience. And, they were experts of
neither the parts nor the whole of the agricultural process.
~erefore, in the early 1950's the Chinese regime tempora-
rily adopted the Soviet solution. Control mechanisms were centralized
and functionally specialized in order to distribute competent
personnel more effectively. But, as such, these structures failed
to penetrate the rural areas and integrate the agrarian sector into
the broader system. .This situation created a "divorce from the
masses" that was not only ideological but necessarily physical and
information -- a detriment to effective agricultural policy making
and implementation.2
The regime was thus placed in a position of having to choose
lSee Philip M. Raup, "Some Inter-relationships Between
Public Administration and Agricultural Development," in Uphoff and
!lehman, The Political Economy of Development, pp. 439-448. In the-
1960's the Tanzanian variant of agrarian development was launched by
Julius Nyerere and TANU. The "ujamaa village" reflects Hyerere's
appreciation of the need to adapt policy processes for development to
an underdeveloped, agrarian, African environment. See Julius K.
Nyerere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism, (London: OXford University
Press, 1968); and Henry Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and
Economic Development, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press;
1970).
2LeWis, Leadership in Communist China, pp. 132-134, Vogel,
Canton, pp. 188-190.
between the lesser of two evils. It could invest every available
political and administrative resource into an agrarian conquest which
would coerce peasant compliance to regime demands through centralized
physical planning and the expropriation of a collectively organized
peasantry. Or alternatively, it could accept the fact that China's
level of administrative and technical expertize would not support
Kadvanced" Soviet organizational patterns, and rely instead on
regulatory devices and market mechanisms, at considerable sacrifice
to its objectives.
The Maoist solution to this quandary is perhaps the most
illustrative example of a revolutionary perspective on development
in a rural society. Its basic elements were structural and functional
decentralization combined with collectivization. The integration of
these steps and their implementation according to "mass line"
principles of leadership (direct contact with and politicization of
the Chinese peasantry) was a radical d~parture from both the Soviet
experience and a reformist mentality. The approach was consistent
with the level of administrative resources available in.China and
with an educative rather than purely regulative outlook on the
functions of control. Moreover, it employed methods which insured
that the peasants were given a personal involvement in their ~
modernization and transformation, reflecting an approach to education
itself which was non-elitist and innovative.l
Both as a practical matter and as one of an ideological
lFor a provocative treatise on this issue, see Paulo Freire,
Pedagogy of the Oppressed, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972),
especially pp. 81-118.
nature, the new administrative model was a lesson in political
economy. From the perspective of the individual peasant households,
the various stages of collectivization pressed for by Mao in the
1950's resulted in the increased presence of structures which would
bind them to the world beyond their natural villages. Participation
in collective units of an increasingly socialist nature would have a
politically educative effect as well -- transforming the class
consciousness of the peasantry. From the perspective' of the regime,
the decentralization of planning and implementation functions which
accompanied collectivization meant that scarce administrative
resources could be devoted to the more modern sectors of the economy
without sacrificing either socio-economic or political objectives in
the countryside. The agrarian sector, politicized and reorganized,
could generate its own resources without relying cn external inputs
by "the regime.l
The Ultimate success of this combined effort hinged on the
ability of basic level cadres to perform the linkage and control
functions which would otherwise have been established by structural
penetration. In order to increase rather than deplete the regime's
political resources in the process of policy implementation, these
.cadres were continually cautioned to temper their unspoken coercive
lA similar organizational format has been attempted in the
Indian government's "community development" program for rural villages.
However, the indications are that, despite substantial administrative
investments, the local level continues to resist change and there is
little self-motivated mass mobilization for development. See Reinhard
Bendix, National-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing
Social Order, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), pp. 215-
298.
potential with persuasion and to emphasize voluntarism. The penetra-
tion of the agrarian sector with people rather than structures was
accomplished by increasing the recruitment of cadres from rural areas
and also by the "downward transfer" (xia fang) of personnel made
superfluous by administrative streamlining at higher levels.l This
force of regime agents, in constant contact and dialogue with the rural
masses, would facilitate the flow of information between the collective
production units and the center, increasing over-all policy effective-
ness. Thus, taken altogether, the Maoist approach was designed to
meet several resource needs simultaneously with fewer trade-offs of
critical resources. As such, it gained the support of the most
functionally-minded members of the regime.
The limits of the model were reached in the level of
combined collectivization and decentraliaation which characterized
the commune experiment of the GLF. This proved to be far in excess
of what the system could tolerate. After 1959, the regime made
adjustments which, as noted, again placed economic and political
stability ahead of class-related issues. Yet, the basic formula was
preserved and agrarian administration was institutionalized with
built-in controls against excessive coercion of bureaucratic rigidity.2
lThe.practice of xia fang, literally, "to send down", was
used regularly between 1955-and 1961. During that period, the regime
sometimes made these cadre transfers permanent and thus redistributed
its administrative resources. On other occasions, students and mid-
level functionaries were sent down to fulfill specific tasks in a
particular area, thus concentrating resources where they were needed.
For a further discussion of this practice consult John W. Lewis,
Leadership in Communist China, pp. 220-232.
2Steven Andors, to ••
tion ••• ", pp.2S-34.
.The Political Economy of Decentraliza-
�us the spirit of Mao' s views on the roie of infrastructure in the
process of social change was preserved.
The economic aspects of the Maoist approach to agrarian
social change, like the social and administrative elements of this
framework, show the interdependency of ideology and environment and
their effect on the "environment 'of choice". It also contrasts
sharply with soviet precedent in economic areas.
The Soviet model of sequential development dictated that
industrialization take priority over all other endeavors and that
cost transfers be made directly from agricult\rre to industry. However,
it was predicted on the existence of a modern sector that was already
sufficiently developed to provide modern agro-technology (chemical
fertilizers and pesticides, tractors, trucks, mechanized irrigation,
etc.) and on an agrarian sector that could in turn yield output
surpluses to finance further industrial growth. It also assumed
levels of infrastructure which could effectively control the process
of extraction and reinvestment from one sector to the other. Russian
miscalculations of their own level of development had led to frequent
breakdowns in this system.l Applied to China, it created even
greater contradictions.
lIn 1930, for example, the Soviet Union had only 72.1 thou-
sand tractors and 1.7 thousand harvesting machines' to supply 242,000
kolkhozy. By 1932, the supply had doubled but remained far from
adequate. However, the collective economy was predicated on mechanized
labor and quotas were set on that basis. Fritz Sternberg, End of a
Revolution, (New York: The John Day Co., 1953), p. 51. For a
descriptive analysis of the costs incurred by the Soviet peasantry as
a result, see Fedor Belov, The History of a Soviet Collective Farm,
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1955).
The door to Chinese economic development in the 1950's was
locked by the insufficient material productivity of agriculture. The
level of surplus available for cost transfer was simply not signifi-
cant. The solution required modernization and mechanization of the
production process •. But again, the modern sector itself was so
under-developed that this technology was out of reach. Resource
redistribution alone could not make up for this degree of resourch
scarcity and thus, growth potential was severely circumscribed.
Agriculture remained under-capitali~ed and over-taxed.l
Chinese decision makers who resisted a push for socialist.
transformation in the debate of 1953-1954 did so'on the grounds that
collectivization demanded a concommitant application of technology
in order to yield material benefits. Without a concrete rise in the
rural standard of living, collectivization was bound to be an
unpOpUlar policy, wasteful of the regime's political resources.2
But the distrust of agrarian politics and the fear that peasants,
left to their own devices, would choose small-scale private enterprise
over collective relationships of production, made the regime hesitant
to invest capital directly in the agrarian sector. However,
commodities such as grain and cotton were vital. To protect
~he skeptical viewpoint was expressed as: "Socialist
target above, but 'broken cart pulled by ox' below". Weng Ti-min,
"East China's Capital Construction in the Past Three Years and
Present Problems'," Jie Fang Ri Bao , Shanghai, November 10 , 1952, in
CB,227:ll.
2Administrative defects were the major problem, and not
the mobilization effort itself. This differed from the Soviet case
where both probl~s prevailed due to the CPSU's weak rural base.
Bernstein, "Leadership and Mass Mobilization •.;••", p. 8.
production, concessions were made to wealthier peasants. They were
allowed to remain outside of the collect! ves, and to retain individual
ownership and control over the utilization of land and labor. As
noted, one negative political by-product of this policy was the
preservation of traditional socio-economic hierarchies in the
villages. There were economic problems as well. Fiscal policies
left the investment of resources into agrarian development to internal
initiatives taken by producers' coops and rich peasants. But the
collectives were weakened by the non-participation of the most produc-
tive households, leaving them short of tools, land and capital. The
rich peasants, meanwhile, were both economically' and politically
insecure and thus preferred to hoard or consume surplus output rather
than re-invest it. Together, these factors kept the potential for
internally financed agrarian development low.l Although t.~eregime
strengthened its extractive capabilities to meet the increased demands
on agriculture, producti vi ty kept pace with neither the growth in
lThe cooperatives accounted for only 0.05\ of all capital
accumulation in 1953: whereas the individual economy accounted for
9.1\. One additional factor may have been the poor terms of trade
between the modern and agricultural sectors in the early 1950's.
This situation gradually improved, but not in time to provide
enough internal investment to serve as a base for FY.P-l. Through
cooperativization, the State not only increases its control over
the rural market but also over internal investments into agriculture.
Between 1953 and 1957, total investment is estimated to have been
33.15\ State and 54.3\ from within the agrarian sector. See Gurley,
China's Economy, p. 251; and Prybyla, Political Economy, p. 135 and
p. 138.
population nor the expanding needs of the modern economy.l
Applying his highly voluntaristic philosophy to these
environmental limits, Mao Ze-dong offered the regime an integrated,
cost-effective, solution. In a major address on agricultural policy,
presented in 1955, Mao argued that development could not be realized
OlD the basis of a small-producer ·ruraleconomy and argued persuasively
for a "high tide" of collectivization. The relationships between
and among the various economic sectors outlined in that speech,
reflected the first step in the formulation of a Maoist approach to
2rural development. Schematically, they can be represented as
follows:
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Source: Ten Great Years, State Statistical Bureau, Peking, 1959,
(Bellingham, WA.: Program in East Asian Studies-Western Washington
State College, 1974), pp.91-92. The population increased steadily at
about 2.3\ annually, so the drop in the growth rate was seen as critical
after 1956. Surpluses were too marginal. to keep up with increasing
demands, and even minor disruptions were disastrous.
2nowie and Fairbank, Policy Documents, pp. 94-105.
· As noted, the regime changed its administrative procedures to canbine
collectivization and decentralization, thus seeking to maximize the
efficiency of existing resource utilization. Mao'~ outline raised two
major questions with respect to the creation of new resources, i.e.,
agrarian development. First, was there an alternative to the sequential
soviet approach? And second, could collectivization, based on socialist
relations of production, increase the resource base without the
corresponding application of modern technology?
These questions precipitated yet another debate at high levels
which, although directed mainly at economic issues, had distinct
ideological undertones. The conflict came to public attention only in
the :'anti-rightist" atmosphere which accompanied the later stages of
the GLF. However, its substantive elements had already been debated
and decided in 1956/1957. These involved the notion of "balanced
growth" or "general balance" in development strategy as against the
concept of qualitative "leaps" effected by periodic mass mobilization.l
The chief proponent for the former position was Ma Yin-qu, a leading
economist, non-Party elder statesman, and the president of Peking
University. He argued for overall consistency in economic planning
across several economic sectors, taking into account their interdepen-
dence. He suggested making greater use of market mechanisms and ending
lIn February, 1958, the regime called for opposition to the
"vulgar theory of balance". ~, editorial, February 28, 1958, in
SCMP, 1731:4. Ma Yin-qu responded to criticisms of his articles in
November, 1959,· thus launching the debate. "My Philosophical Thinking
and Economic Theory," Xin Jian-she, No. 11, November 7, 1959, in
ECMM, 195:1-46. Subsequent instal~ents of the debate appeared in the
~s periodically until 1962. See ECMM, 201:1-10, 11-16; 203: 1-.
208:1; 213:24-34; 214:1; 219:1; 241:31-35; and 264:14-18.
the arbitrary neglect of agriculture and light industry. Ma stressed
that proportional development demanded attention to input/output
issues and choices between ~e consumption and investment of certain
resources. Accordingly, he proposed that investment in agriculture
should be increased both directly and indirectly. The former was to
be accomplished through a policy of capitalization. The latter
demanded that the regime raise prices for agricultural raw materials,
increase the availability of consumer goods (which would stimulate
peasant activism and production), and develop industrial and technical
fields which would directly benefit agriculture. As for the problem
of consumption, Ma strongly advocated population'control.l
Arguing from an entirely different ideological perspective,
Mao Ze-dong proposed a program of resource integration and substitu-
'tion, such tnat agrarian outputs could be increased without costly
political, infrastructural and economic inputs. The approach'was
based on three major formulations: the "correct" handling of "contra-
.
dictions among the people"; the simultaneous development of industry
and agriculture; and the possibility of a qualitative "leap forward"
in economic growth.2 The latter was to be accomplished, again,
,without investment in the agrarian sector. It relied on new forms of
IFor analyses of the issues consult Kenneth Walker,
"Ideology and Economic Discussion in China: Ma Yin-chlu and His
critics," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 11, (1963),
pp. 113-133; also, Sun Lung-kee, liMaYin-qu and the Problem of
Socialist T~·ansition in China." Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars,
Vol. 9, No.2 (1977), pp. 62-67.
2Mao Ze-dong, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions
Among the People," June, 1957, in Schram, political Thought, pp. 304-
.312.
·organization, designed to promote a continuous mobilization of the
masses. The new organizational model emerged in the Summer of 1958 as
-the "people's commune". Primarily, it employed the one readily
available resource in the agricultural economy -- manpower -- as a
sub~titute for modern technology.l
The ideological imperative of agrarian development--- the
transformation of consciousness -- was probably the major stumbling
block to the regime's acceptance of the "proportional development"
strategy. Large-scale investments in agriculture and reliance on
material incentives were not easily rationalized within this frame-
work. Yet, the inevitable price of protecting the priority of class
issues seemed to be economic stagnation, and the regime could not
long continue to bear this cost. At the Eighth National Party Congress
in September, 1956 the mood had been conservative, definitely favoring
a moderate and balanced course of development.2 Yet, when that
Congress held its second session in May, 1958, the political tone
was again open and flexible.3 It has been argued that the regime's
attempt to dialogue with Chinese intellectuals during the "Hundred
Flowers" period: the destabilizing effects of de-Stalinization on the
entire Communist bloc: and the Chinese position in the international
arena all combined to polarize the ideological debate during this period
lOWight Perkins, "Development of Agriculture," in Oksenberg,
China's DevelOpmental Experience, pp. 61-62.
2Robert R. Bowie and John K. Fairbank, Communist China,
1955-1959: Policy Documents with Analysis, (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1962), pp. 7-9.-
3Ibid., pp. 9-10.
1and made possible a victory for the "radicals". Although these
factors should not be entirely dismissed, it is more likely that the
proximate cause for this reversal was an experimen~ in mass mobiliza-
tion bking place in Honan province which came to light in the Spring
of 1958. A behind-the-scenes investigation by Tan Chen-lin, CC
Secretariat member, revealed the use of innovative mass-mobilization
techniques, and especially, high levels of cooperation among several
APCs and local Party and government organs to administer labor
exchanges and facilitate communications for large-scale irrigation
and flood control. The project was organized along military principles
due to its emergency nature, with provisions m~de for mess halls,
barracks, creches, etc. to fully utilize the labor force.2 Once
convinced that the integral "political econOmy" in Mao-s fomulation
could actually be operationalized, many regime members (including
those with special interests in developing China's strategic industries),
supported this radical attempt to cut the economy loose' from the
stagnant dictates of traditionally organized agricultural production.
Throughout 1958 and 1959, mass mobilization and nation-wide
emulation campaigns directed rural labor toward large-scale projects
such as water conservation, wiping out pests, fertilizer collection
and the development and popularization of tmproved faming implements
lVogel, Canton, pp. 218-243.
2References to this movement were made by Mao Ze-dong in an
address delivered at the Chengtu Conference, March 20, 1958, "The
Pattern of Development," in Schram, Talks and Letters, pp. 103-113.
See also the detailed description in Hofheinz, "Rural Administration .....,
PP·. 140-159.
and techniques. All relied on labor-intensive methods based on the
traditional knowledge and skills of the peasantry. Combined with
collective production, and exhortations from frugality and diligence
with strong normative and implicit coercive appeals, these were held
out as legitimate substitutes for capital, mechanical equipment and
chemical aids.
From the Maoist perspective, the logic of further decentral-
izing administrative functions while increasing the centralization of
agrarian organization and production in the communes was enhanced by
the assumption that this format would promote and, at the same time,
control "mass spontaneity". The intervening variable was, again,
under-development. Bringing policy making and implementation down to
the local level insured accessibility to information. For this reason,
central level direct~ves were broad during this period and a substan-
tial degree of flexibility was given to commune cadres. By putting
the responsibility for production and distributive justice in local
hands the regime sought to promote a higher degree of consensus for
its policies, thus obviating the need for more bureaucratic forms of
control. The immediacy of production and distribution was also meant
to increase incentives. Moreover, the new relations of production and
distribution, forms of ownership, were meant to have an educative
effect. The burden of success fell again on the shoulders of the
basic level cadres and the "mass line" leadership style. Xia-fang
thus served the dual purpose of penetrating the agrarian sector and
redistributing some available technical and administrative expe~tise.l
lChao Juo-chun, Agrarian Policies. of Mainland China: A Docu-
mentary Study (1949-1956), (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963)
p, xax,
The failure of these policies to resolve contradictions
between ideology and resource scarcity was quickly perceived. By
1959, the entire leadership seemed convinced that .theprocess had
gone too far, too fast. The post-GLF consolidation took place amid
anti-rightist ideological polemics. For example, Ma Yin-qu's
articles, printed by RHRB without comment in 1956 and 1957, came
under public attack.l Evidently, the regime's losses of political
legitimacy and authority as a result of the GLF demanded such attacks
on its critics. The "left deviations" of basic level cadres,
resulting mainly from procedural misinterpretations of an ambiguous
policy line, paled in significance before the barely controlled anti-
Maoist reaction of the CC's Eighth Plenum in the Autumn of 1959.2
In the early 1960's, agricultural 'policies continued to
reflect the goal of agrarian development conceived in an under-
developed environment. However, the leadership abandoned its efforts
to simultaneously resolve contrad~ctions between ideology and resource
scarcity. The Maoist formula of "simultaneous development" no longer
enjoyed general acceptability. On the other hand, there was no
"Soviet model" which could be utilized as an alternative. oe-Stalini-
zation had destroyed any preconceptions about the "superiority" of
:that approach; and, as noted, the direction of agrarian policies in
1959 was as conflictual in the Soviet Union as it was in China. At.
the Cc' s Ninth Plenum in January, 1961 an "agriculture firstil
IS "M Yi ..un, a n-qu ••••f pp.
2see Mao's self-criticism and defense in "Speech at the
Lushan Conference," July 23, 1959, in Schram, Talks and Letters,
pp. 131-146. .
strategy was officially adopted, reflecting a new sequential outlook.l
Agrarian development would precede further qualitative "leaps" in
the relations of production and their socio-political superstructure.
This decision had a profound effect on the policy line. For example,
the.regime made increased but selective capital investment in agri-
culture. Although the aggregate level of subsidization remained low,
the distribution of external resources was designed to maximize
.agricultural output in areas which enjoyed naturally optimal conditions
fo~ growth. Thus, agrarian development was still based on self-
generating rural resources. But it began to emerge in a differentiated
and uneven rather than in a unified and comprehensive fashion.
The economic logic of these policies was generally understood
and accepted within the regime. After 1959, even Mao Ze-dong
repeatedly stressed his earlier economic errors and the need to
struggle for production and technology.2 However, the lack of ideo-
logical content in the new line, especially the rejection of class
struggle as the driving force of agrarian development, again generated
a regime-level debate.
Differential development had dangerous political implica-
tions from the perspective of transforming class consciousness.
First, if agriculture continued to support the modern sector by
limiting its demands upon it, a long-term rural/urban dichotomy was
inevitable. Second, there were internal inequalities inherent in the
.
lLieberthal, Research Guide, p. 166.
2see especially, Mao Ze:"dong, "Talk at an Enlarged Central
Work Conference," January 30, 1962, in Schram, Ibid., pp. 158-187.
decentralized approach. Aside from the agricultural tax, most material
output remained in the countryside. Actual cost transfers occurred
only at the lowest levels"usually not exceeding the production brigade.
These units were roughly contiguous to the traditional agrarian sub-
units, the ~, which should have been destroyed in the process of
development. Decentralization threatened to extend the life of these
structures. Thus, "self-reliance~ in the agrarian economy was
exchanged for a substantial degree of local autonomy -- a high price
in terms of its disintegrative political connotations. Finally, in
the retreat from the initial stage of communization (1959), agricul~
tural production based upon a division of labor was abandoned in
favor of a return to functionally integrated modes of production.
Although the countryside remained collectivized, the peasant continued
to operate from a traditional perspective with respect to the use of
land and labor. This view point was not only non-specialized"but also
non-systemic in that it rested upon knowledge integrated within the
individual peasant. It colored both his self-image and his perception
of socio-economic and political relationships. These generally
worked against the creation of a "proletarian" political environment.
Because this particular pattern of resource exchange was
viewed as a long-term solution to agrarian economic development, it
had the potential to become institutionalized, and to legitimize
political interests which were not only local but also particularly
Uagrarian". To those who gathered under the banner of Mao's Thought
in the mid-1960's, this spelled the end of the revolution. The
alternative they fought for, beginning with the Socialist Education
Movement (SEM) in 1963, was an on-qoing poli ticization of the economic
1model to neutralize its "revisionist" potential. Class issues were
thus reinjected into economic strategy. During the GPCR, struggle
and continuous revolution became the standards by which all institu-
ti~nsf inclUding ieology itself, were judged. Only at that point was
Mao willing to sanction the decentralized model as the Chinese model
of agrarian development, and to let the whole nation "Learn from
Dazhai".2
In the Dazhai model, resource scarcity and ideology were
again combined within a single policy initiative. It incorporated the
"self-reliant" economic and administrative approach of the post-GLF
period with Maoist political methodology -- class struggle, collec-
tive production, and "mass research" for technological advancement.
In 1964, Dazhai became the national prototype.
Also in the case of earlier policy lines, the Dazhai model
was fonnulated within an "environment of choice" created by a synthe-
sis of Mao's ideology and the agrarian environment. Thus, the Dazhai
model was not an end point. It was, rather, a program for immediate
action and a political blueprint, providing direction for future
policies in the continuing -process of choice.
lMao Zc-dong, "Speech at the Tenth Plenum," September 24,
1962, in Schram, Ibid., pp. 188-196.
2The slogan, "Learn from Dazhai", refers to the Dazhai
production brigade in Hsiyang, Sh~nsi. The political, administra-
tive and economic import of the model will ~e explored in Chapter
Five.
· The Machinery of Choice
Thus far, ideology and under-development have been linked
as critical variables which establish the parameters of choice.
This study also views ideology and under-development as variables
which dictated the machinery of cho1ce, including both its structural
and behavioral elements. Policy making and implementation in China,
as elsewhere, is an art unto itself, requiring particular commitments
of capital, personnel, organization and information. Agrarian
policies between 1949 were made within and among three sub-systems:
The Chinese communist Party; the administrative organs of State; and
the rural production units. Although conceived as coordinated
structures with unified goals, these sub-systems generated different
and sometimes conflicting perspectives on the problem of agrarian .
development.
In 1949, CCP organization at the national level included
the Chaixman, Mao Ze-dong: the Politburo: the Central Committee, and
the Secretariat. The latter was the principle channel of command and
communication between the regime and the local Party apparatus. The
CC also directly administered six regional bureaus,· headed by high-
ranking Party members.l The ce's ~ral Work Department studied,
foxmulated, and directed agricultural policies. Below the national
level, Party organization in the rural areas reflected the regional
lThe six regions and their headquarters were: Northeast
(Mukden): North (Peking) i East (Shanghai): Central-South (Wuhan):
Southwest (Chungking): and Northwest (Sian). They were abolished
in 1954, with the exception of the East China region which was
dissolved only in 1958.
sub-divisions of sheng (province), xian )county), and xiang (adminis-
trative village). The lower levels had a role in determining the
content and implementation of agricultural policies to the extent that
the denter granted them autonomy in working out modifications of
general policy lines. The degree of flexibility within the Party was
considerable, but it was balanced. by "democratic centralism'~ and by
1:heuse of work conferences and written contacts (the baogao or work
reports), designed to keep local cadres aware of the regime's policy
intent, and the center aware of activities and problems at the lower
levels.l
The· legitimacy of the Chinese regime rested on the theory
of conflict. The political environment was perceived in terms of
·contradictions". Within a stability group defined as "the people",
class contradictions were "non-antagonistic" and could thus be
resolved through struggle. Beyond this group, there were classes
whose goals and values were, by d~fiiiltion, in "antagonistic;' contra-
diction to those of "the people" •. Struggle against these classes did
not end in conflict resolution but in their "elimination" from the
political environment.
The institutional expression of the stability group was the
-block of four classes" (workers, peasants, national bourgeoisie, and
intelligentsia) which appeared in Mao's outline of "new democracy".2
IFor an analysis of the effectiveness of Central/provincial
camnunication see Frederich C. Teiwes, "Provincial Politics in China:
Themes and Variations," in Lindbeck, China: Management, pp. 116-189.
2see discussion in Schurmann, Ideology and Organization,
pp. 175-190.
According to this formula, these revolutionary classes would rule
under the leadership of the CCP.
This distinction between Party leadership and State rule
separated the concepts of authority and legitimacy, with the State as
the symbol of the latter. Initially, the Chinese People' s Consul ta-
tive Conference was invested as the highest organ of State. The
"democratic parties, groups and personages~ which made up the CPPCC
However, the CPPCC was an inclusive body and brought together the
country's progressive "commanding heights". It also served to clearly
isolate the "non-people" in the first phase of social change -- the
landlords, foreigners, and compradore capitalists -- who were left
unrepresented and, by implication, unprotected. Below the national
level "conferences of people's representatives of all circles" were
convened by military control commissions in each region. Their
function was also to confer and not to make decisions.
After 1953, through the mechanisms of a new electoral system,
·people's congresses" replaced the conferences.;! This process
culminated in the election of a National People's Congress which
convened for the first time in 1954. Its first act of business was
to adopt a written constitution for the PRC, which in turn provided
that the NPC replace the CPPCC as the source of the state's
loonnithorne, China's Economic system, pp. 41-42.
2A detailed analysis or these structures, with particular
reference to the basic level, may be found ~n James Townsend,
Political Participation in Communist China, pp. 103-144.
1legitimacy. In practice, this signaled the end of the four-class
alliance and the period of "new democracy".
Within a bureaucratic hierarchy separate from the system
of consultative conferences and people's congresses, the regime
created the State adm~nistrative structures through which the Party
could nomitor and shape the process of policy implementation.
Although the Party was the indisputable locus of policy initiatives
in China during the 1949-1964 period, the actual formulation and
implementation of policies was complicated by the relationship
between Party and State organs. In order to preserve the ideological
distinction between the two, and the constitutionality of the system,
Party decisions were processed through the State. In the course of
transferring the authority of the Party to the legitimacy of the
State in the policy process, a numver of factors arose which infringed
on the policies themselves.
The Government Administrative Council (GAC) and its
.
subordinate ministries and commissions formed the backbone of State
administration. At its head was zhou En-lai, Premier and high-ranking
member of the CCP Politburo. Such high level linkages were common
and generally regarded as positive. However, the functional integra-
tion of Party and State at the lower levels was discouraged, since
the political recruitment criteria and behavioral standards for Party
lLieberthal, Research Guide, pp. 65-66.
cadres were presumably higher than those of State functionaries.l
Throughout late 1950 and mid-195l, the regime formulated and debated
cadre recruitment and training policies. The pre-revolutionary elite
was largely rural, unschooled, and accustomed to the highly personal
and localistic work-style of guerilla warfare. These ~ ganbu (old
cadres) had little urban experience, technical knowledge or adminis-
trative expertise. The ~ganbu (new cadres), recruited after 1949,
possessed the qualities which their counterparts lacked: but their
political values and loyalties were untested and often questionable.
At the ranks of the CCP became factionalized, leadership priorities
increasingly demanded the protection and promotion of the new ex-
2perts, over the often vociferous objections of the old Red. The
situation in the organs of State was somewhat less tense but also
IThere were two sources of recruitment for rural cadres:
progressive peasants and CCP members with some modern education who
could educate the masses in organizational concepts and operational-
techniques. However, the peasants usually had no technical or
administrative skills; while cadres with such attributes usually
lacked experience in agriculture or in problems particular to the
locality. As early as March, 1949, Mao Ze-dong noted, at the Second
Plenum of the Seventh CC, that: "The period of 'from the city to
the village' and of'the city leading the village has now begun."
Selected Works, Vol. 4, p. 363. The decision to increase che percent-
age of proletarian members in the CCP and to restrict rural
recruitment was taken at that time. Lieberthal, Research Guide, p.49.
2"Qua1ifications," Xue-xi, October 16, 1950, in CB, 180:11.
The question of basic level party rectification was debated at the
First National Organizational Work Conference in March-April, 1951.
The decision was taken to launch the rectification, especially in
the rural areas: and the process continued into 1954. See, "Errone-
ous Viewpoint of 'Seniority' Must Be Eliminated Thoroughly," FMRB,
March 15, 1952, in CB, 180:21; "Boldly Promote the Cadres," FMRB,
editorial, April 9,1952, in CB, 180:25; and Ezra Vogel, "From
Revolutionary to semi-Bureaucrat:. The 'Regularization' of Cadres,"
China Quarterly, No. 29, (1967), pp. 36-60.
more dangerous. In an effort to restore order after Liberation, the
regime had invited many former KMT officials back to their posts.
There, they functioned under more politically reliable eyes which
were watchful, but also administratively unpracticed.l
The new recruitment policies reflected a lower priority on
efforts to penetrate and reorganize the agrarian sector according to
the dictates of either ideology or material need. The CCP's rural
organization grew markedly weaker in the early 1950's. Peasants'
associations, which were the principle vehicles of political and
social mobilization in the ~ during land reform, were either
disbanded or became infiltrated with traditional'elites due to the
default in Party leadership. People's Congresses in the xiang were
also neglected. The state cadres, "sent down" to oversee policy
processes, had little rural experience and were usually ethnically
and linguistically foreign to the area. Tensions often developed at
the basic levels due to the conf~~ion over roles. Changing priorities
thus decreased the regime's political and administrative control over
the agrarian sector during the "new democratic" period.2 Between
lVogel, Canton, pp. 51-60.
2see for example, Dong Bi-wu, Vice Premier, GAC, "On the
Conferences of Representa tives of the People," ~' January 30,
1952, in CB, 162:3-6. Tung answered cadre objections to establishing
State administrative authority and delineated the "proper" Party/
State relationship in which the former would exercize leadership
over but yet remain separate from the latter. The explicitness with
which these instructions were given, and the fact that this speech,
made at a xian-level conference in North China in September, 1951,
was given prominence in RMRB, indicate a general confusion,among
cadres and masses on matters of organization, administration, Party/
non-Party relations, and the relative legitimacy of Party and
State authority.
1950 and 1953, production concerns had a stranglehold on the implemen-
tation of policies related to socio-political change. Land reform
in the new liberated areas, the marriage laws, elections or other
forms of participation in local government, and economic cooperation,
all threatened to disrupt the balance of power that former landlords
and rich peasants continued to hold in the natural villages. But
the counter-threat of economic retaliation was real, and local cadres
taking the path of least resistance were often corrupted in the
1process.
Different philosophies of organization also began to
separate the state and Party apparatus after 1949. The Party worked
through consultative committees ~~d its structures ultimately
devolved to cells in grass roots organizations. The State operated
through two separate patterns of organization: straight, ministerial
rule, also described as "vertical rul:e"and rule by coordinative
organs, identified as "dual rule""a combination of vertical and
horizontal controls.2 The ministeries and agencies of the GAC were
centralized, hierarchical structures; their branches extending into
the "people's governments" in the sheng, xian, and xiang. For
~he san-fan (three anti) campaign, against waste, corrup-
tion and bureaucratism, was directed toward increasing Party
functionalism while maintaining the proletarian standpoint in
behavior. It also sought to insure central control over local Party
organs, so that policy processes would not be subverted by mixed ,
loyalties. A recently published review by Frederick Teiwes develops
this theme more fully. See, "Elite Discipline in China, 1950-1953,"
Contemporary China Paper, No. 12, (Canberra: Australian National
University, 1977).
2schurmann, IdeologY and Organization, pp. 438-442.
in October, 1952 set up regional sub-units throughout 1953 for the
collection of information vital to effective policy making. In 1954,
supervision of capital investment for the new tasks of "socialist
construction" was delegated to the state Construction Commission •• By
19S7, central planning structures had proliferated. They included,
in addition to the SPC, SSB, and ·scc, a State Economic Commission,
which formulated and adjusted an.~ualplans~ a General Bureau for
Supply of Raw Materials; and a State Technological Commission, which'
drew plans for technical development.
These coordinative planning organs were, for the most part,
rudimentary and highly dependent on the cooperation of the central
ministries and regional authorities. They were themselves centralized
and hierarchical as the alternative of decentralization was politically
suspect until the mid-1950's. Thus, like the ministries, their
capabilities were debilitated by the lack of efficient channels of
communication and competent personnel.
In the State's view, the critical point in the policy
process was the xian people's government, as it occupied the middle
position between the central and provincial authorities on the one
hand and the xiang-level organs on the other. Improving leadership in
xian became a vital concern of the regime, but the shortage of
reliable and capable Personnel proved to be a major stumbling block.
Thus, there was no guaranteed funnel through which policies could be
reliably communicated and information retrieved., Moreover, because
of the overall lack of expertise and the limited dependability of
communications, the State system was truncated at the xiang level.
The xiang was the lowest point at which Party and State maintained
parallel structures.l As this infrastructure developed, there was
less reliance on Party organs at corresponding levels to directly
accomplish the tasks of implementation.2 Xiang people's govern-
ments were solidified, nation-wide, by 1954. Each appointed a
coordinating committee and established "finance/food work" and
"production/cooperation" committees responsible for the direction of
these policies which would reorganize and control Chinese agricul-
ture.3 But the effort to economize on scarce resources left the
traditional underpinnings of the rural socio-economic system, the
~, largely intact and unpenetrated by either Party or State.
Rural production units formed the third sub-system in the
agricultural policy process. After land reform, peasant households
were gradually organized into cooperative structures which linked
'them to mid-level political and administrative organs above the ~.
IFor a more in-depth treatment of these bodies and their
functions see Chao, Agrarian Policies, pp. 2-5i and Donnithorne,
China's Economic system, pp. 457-460.
2Vogel, Canton, pp. 173-174.
3By redistributing existing resources between 1949 and
1952, the regime had been able to offer tangible, material benefits
to the modern sector in return for compliance with its re-organiza-
tion policies.- The same was true for the rural areas undergoind land
reform. The need for normative and coercive inducements was thus
postponed, but not eliminated. Contrast this to the Soviet case, in
which land reform had been done under the Tsarist government. After
NEP, local administrative units were given the task of large-scale
collectivization, a policy which offered very little in the way of
material inducement and created a negative political environment in
the countryside. Bernstein, "Leadership and Hass Mobilization ••• ~"
p. 9.
Through cooperativization, peasant households lost some control over
decisions relating to agricultural production, but there was still
no effective integration of the cooperatives within the national
planning and administrative system. They were thus neither
economically nor politically reliable. Weakened Party leadership
at the xian and xiang levels, and specialized State organs which
stopped short of penetrating the countryside before the xiang people' s
governments, were definite factors in this failure. The rural produc-
tion process remained largely independent. Therefore, despite a
considerable level of investment in "state-building" between 1949
and 1955, and some efforts to rationalize the agrarian sector itself
through the creation of MATis and APC's, comprehensive decision-
making often took place in a vacuum without °asecUre and dependable
resource base.
These problems were most apparent in the drafting of annual
agricultural plans. The SEC invariably delayed its decision until
control figures, °based on the results of the Autumn harvest of the
previous year, were collected from the production enterprises,
evaluated, and verified. Meanwhile, draft plans were sent to the
ministries and local governments in order to elicit comments, recommen-
dations, and requests for revision. These were usually made
arbitrarily since the critical information was unavailable. At this
point, the temptation to substitute ministerial or local interest
for "reality" was especially great. Final plans for the current year
were rarely received at the local level before March, and often
arrived as late as July. Production enterprises, which operated on
·tthe basis of provisional plans until that time, found themselves on
some occasions under-utilized, on others unable to fulfill the new
plan, and generally, forced to fulfill quantity fi9ures at great
sacrifice to quality or to falsify results.l The cycle then began
anew, with an infomation base that was cumulatively unreliable.
Long-range centralized planning in the early 1950's was, understand-
ably, even more fictionalized than these annual efforts.
The First Five Year~Plan was based on an explicit and
ambitious commitment of resources for use and investment in the
modern sector. 2 The regime, seeking to copy a Soviet-style "big
push" for rapid industrialization, began to increase its demands
on agriculture, stepping up both the level and rate of cost transfers.
However, given the nature and degree of infrastructural development
between 1949 and 1955, the administrative requirements of this model
simply could not be met. Urban-centered concerns had left the rural
areas with a weak Party organization, atrophied peasant's aSBoaia-
tions, and "people's congresses: which lacked relevance or vitality_
The cun thus continued to represent an alternative source of
legitimacy. The State administrative system stopped far short of
penetrating production cooperatives and integrating them within more
comprehensive planning and control mechanisms. Extractive capabili-
ties, although better developed, operated within an environment which
lDonnithorne, China's Economic System, pp. 486-487.
2Steven Andors, China's Industrial Revolution:
Planning and Management, 1949 to the Present, (New York:
Books, 1977), p. 249.
Politics,
Pantheon
was essentially hostile. By 1955, Mao Ze-donq and other members of
the regime began to appreciate the inappropriateness of a Soviet-style
organizational format to China's ideological and developmental needs.
since centralized bureaucracies could never successfully make policy
~ the agrarian sector, they proposed a new tactic -- making policy
in the agrarian sector.
Beginning in 1955, the patterns of State administration
were streamlined and more discretion was granted to regional level
organizations, especially in the xien and xiang. Less planning and
management at the central level meant a shifting of these responsi-
bilities downward, where administration could be less complex and yet,
more effective.l At the same time, collectivization (in "high-stage"
cooperatives) was viewed as a logical organizational format for the
rural areas.
Collective production and management of agriculture would
eliminate the private land holdings which not only constituted the
basis of class identity but which also, in the hands of rich peasants,
had left the most productive enterprises beyond State control. In-
frastructure generated by collectivization would facilitate the
process of binding all production units to local state and Party
organs. This in turn would allow the regime even greater control
over the outputs of the production process by making the imp1ementa-
tion of its taxation, procurement and supply policies more ef~ective.
ISteven Andors, China's Industrial Revolution: Politics,
Planning and Management, 1949 to-the Present, (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1977), p. 249.
Collectivization would also create a favorable environment for
Agrarian development, since technology and capital could be applied
and controlled more effectively, and land and labor could be
utilized more efficiently. Therefore, for very diverse reasons,
members of the regime could find merit in the Maoist administrative
formula which sought to combine decentralization and collectivization
1in a single approach.
Most key regime members were involved in the adoption of
Mao's proposal. Changes in Party structures during the 1950's had
centralized such decisional authority. After the Politburo Standing
Committee was created in 1956, policy initiative was concentrated in
the hands of seven men: Mao, Teng-Xiao-ping (the General Secretary) ,
and the five deputy Chairmen of the Politburo -- Zhou En-lai, Liu
Shao-qi, Zhu De, Lin Diao, and Zhen Yun. The Party also moved to
limit the scope of activities of the Secretariat, especially with
respect to organizational control. The result was a consolidation of
decision making functions at the national level: a philosophy which
~as also reflected by interlocking personnel in the cCP's Rural Work
Department and the SC's Office of Agriculture and Forestry. Deng
Ze-hui, a member of the CC, directed both organs, assisted by Liao
Lu-yan (CC member and, after 1959, Minister of Agricultural Machinery),
and Wang Guan-lan (CCP member and vice chairman of the SPC).2 Policy
lAndorS, China's Industrial Revolution, p. 249.
2see chart developed by Lewis, Leadership in Communist
China, p. 217.
goals were thus comprehensively conceived and non-negotiable,
carrying with them the full weight of regime ideology and authority.
But with less power in the Secretariat, the Party's control at
levels of policy implementation became even more decentralized, and
the responsibility for adapting the spirit of policy goals to local
conditions was left to a disparate group of CCP secretaries and
basic level cadres.l
Throughout 1957-1958, this increasing shift of implementation
functions to the lower levels was accompanied by a greater reliance
on the Party in all spheres of endeavor. Recruitment policies
reflected a new emphasis on "red" rather than "e~ert" criteria.2
The SC gradually simplified its national bureaucracy with changes
which were less structU1-al than they were functional. The hierarchical
chain of command was completely severed in 1958 by the introduction of
an entirely new administrative structure -- the people's co~mune.
The communes consti;,tuted a de facto combination of xiang
administration and collective production units. In each xian there
were an average of fourteen communes, each comprised of approximately
five thousand peasant households and three to four former xiang. The
communes were in turn subdivided into ~roduction brigades roughly
IHowever, CCP recruitment policies were not keeping up
with this change in focus. Lewis notes a drop in peasant membership
and an increase in intellectuals be~~een 1956 and 1957. See
Leadership in Communist China, pp. 108-109.
2Ibid., pp. 117-120.
equivalent to the former collective production units (APes), and
their constituent production team~.l
The commune continued to have responsibi,lities to the state
as well as to its membership. For example, State cadres were assigned
directly to communes to insure that taxes and purchase quotas were
not "lost" in the maze of collectivization. However, beyond these
resource transfers, the primary obligation of the canmune was its own
self-sufficiency -- in food, capital investment, social services, etc.
The centralization of these functions above the basic production units,
combined with administrative decentralization in State structures,
often created a vacuum of responsibility. Party organs generally
stepped into this vacuum, and within a short time the CCP had become
the key coordinator of rural policy processes. In the communes of
1958-1959, local Party personnel effected a virtual merger of all
political, administrative and economic activities. Decision making as
well as implementation was decentralized so that the price of flexi-
bility would not be paid in efficiency.2
The short-term gains in industry and agriculture produced
by the policies of the GLF reached their optimal levels in 1959. Then,
political and administrative building blocks which had been overlooked
lH fh' " 1 Adm" , " 116o e~nz, Rura ~n~strat~on •••• , p. ~
2An often quoted editorial appeared in RHRB on February 24,
1959, "Take the Whole Country as a Coordinated Chess Game". The
regime was clearly attempting to strike some workable balance between
centralization and decentralization while combatting both "dispersion-
ism" and "organizational egoism".
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or ignored became more conspicuous. The Chinese peasantry was
alienated by radical government incursions into social and economic
areas that were formerly considered "private", especially since
these moves were buffered by neither political preparation nor
material consideration. National level planning organs, either out
of confusion or spite, failed to'provide the direction necessary to
counteract divisive aspects of administrative decentralization. The
commune, with its great size and multi-functional scope, was respon-
sible for virtually all activities below the county level. But the
same shortage of administrative expertise which had always made
centralization untenable in rural China, and which had even hampered
the effectiveness of larger APC's, was simply exacerbated by the
demands and responsibilities of communization. These political and
administrative deficiencies had a direct effect on economic
d .. 1pro uct].vaty•
When the lower le~ls proved unequal to the task of main-
taining control over the policy process, the new organizational format
was again re-evaluated. In the chaotic situation which emerged be-
tween 1959 and 1961, the CC reimposed its central authority. Its
Central Political Department, first created to oversee the PLA, was
extended into key economic structures, particularly the Office of
Agriculture and Forestry. In 1961, the six regional bureaux were
reinstituted, an indication of the extent to which political control
1References to these problems are found in Mao's speech at
the Lushan Plenum and in his addresses to the Military Affairs committee
and the External Affairs Conference after that Plenum. Schram, Talks
and Letters, pp. 131-157.
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.h ad disintegrated. However, local Party organs were withdrawn fran
the front lines of policy implementation and reverted to indirect
methods of political leadership.l Party organs we,re charged to .
correct independent, local variations of the policy line, but the
CCP left the actual process of implementation to the technically
competent State bureaucracy. Recruitment policies shifted back to
an emphasis on "expert" qualities.2 In the media, other steps were
taken to reinforce the State's legitimacy. The bourgeoisie was again
portrayed as an active political force and there were frequent
references to the CPPCC and the "bloc of four classes". In the rural
areas, where the legitimacy crisis was most ac~te, the regime simply
kept a low policy profile.3
Some central administrative controls were reimposed over
infrastructure in this same period. The centralized, self-sufficient
and highly integrated aspects of planning, production, distribution
and consumption were removed from commune control. Some were shifted
1Zhao Han, "Government and Commune May Be One But Party and
Commune May Not Be One," RMRB, December 24, 1958 in S01P, 1937: 6-9.
It was the earliest of many articles which focused on keeping CCP
organs separate from civil and economic administration in the communes.
Another-indication of this shift-was the lack of reference, after 1961,
to systems of direct supervision and control which cadres employed as
part of the xia fang movement; for example, the "three-five" or "four-
seven" formulae of work, travel and administration. See Leadership in
Communist China, pp. 222-228.
2Neuhauser, "The Chinese Communist Party in the 1960·s ......
pp. 3-36.
3See, for example, the "Later Ten Points" of September, 1963,
in Baum and Teiwcs, Ssu-ch'ing, pp. 72-94.
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b ack up to the ministries and planning commissions, while others were
1removed to the brigade and then to the team level. Hhere these
measures failed, some prerogatives were returned to individual
producers. Thus, while reimposing some central control, the regime
also increased the scope of activities in which peasant households
could participate without controls. This "reverse current" of central-
ization and decentralization saw the regime through a volatile
political and economic situation. It also helped to decrease the
control which provincial and xian-level CCP organs and the Party-
controlled commune administrations had over policy processes. By 1962,
the crisis period had passed. Communes were retained in principle,
but broad autonomy over both production and distribution were granted
to the team level. Since the teams were roughly equivalent in size
and population to the old~, the regime found itself in the position
of naving institutionalized rather than destroyed the traditional
infrastructure of rural society. Temporarily, this helped to resolve
the problem of control, but it created grave political and ideological
divisions within the regime over the future of the Chinese country-
. 2side.
lnonnithorne, China's Economic System, p. 488
2The power plays in the key decision-making organs of agri-
cultural policy are most interesting when viewed in this light. The
antagonists were Deng Z~-hui and Tan Zhen-lin. The latter, it will
be recalled, was reapons.•.}~i.'::l for investigating the Honan mas mobiliza-
tion experiments of 1957/1~58. He was elected to the Politburo by
the Fifth Plenum, Eighth CC in May, 1958. Deng, meanwhile' had
advocated a cautious line of agricultural development both in the
"high tide" of 19-5/56 and in the "leap" of 1958/60. He lost his
position as head of the CCP Rural Work Department sometime in 1960,
.and that body was disbanded in 1961. In a speech in August, 1964
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Taking a long-range view, the decisional structures and
pxocesses through which the Chinese regime operated during the 1949-
1964 period were characterized by the setting of broad comprehensive
goals at the center and specific, limited goals at the regional and
10cal levels. This system made Che regime vulnerable to the dis-
placement of its intentions by the injection of alternative needs,
concerns, and interests into the process. In the Chinese case, goal
displacement was not a product of institutional rigidity so much as
a symptom of the lack of administrative infrastructure and controls
which forced decentralization.l It was thus a reflection of under-
development. Goal displacement was mitigated only by the consistent
use of ideology to politicize values and behavior within those
structures.
Mao complained that the focus of the department had been on
individual production and on the "four great freedoms (i.e., to lend
money, engage in commerce, hire labor, and buy and sell land), rather
than on class struggle. oeng was also ousted from his position as
director of the SC's Office of Agriculture and Forestry by 1962. But
the fact that he was able to hold his State position longer than his
Party post was an indication of the organizational divisions and
spheres of influence which were forming at the time. Deng's replace-
ment in the SC job was Tan, now a Deputy Premier as well as a Politburo
member. Deng was formally dismissed from all posts in December, 1964.
Tan, however, also failed to survive the GPCR.
lAS Hao noted in 1956, "Everything on the Party Secretaries".
Schram, Talks and Letters, pp. 321-322. However, the "soviet prefect"
as described by Hough had no Chinese counterpart in the 1950's and
1960's. In fact, the model which evolved from development administra-
tion is one which operates within a cellul'arsystem, in which local
interests are given legitimacy; planning is decentralized; and produc-
tion is despecialized. But, as Andors points out, "self-reliance" in
an environment of poverty leads to tensions between local and national
perceptions and can, if uncontrolled, destroy community. Such tensions
may be seen as endemic to political processes in China for some time
to cane. "••••Decentralization in China •••," pp. 26-30.
This overview of the institutional constraints on the
Chinese environment of choice -- ideology and decision making and
implementing mechanisms -- suggests that agrarian policies between
1949 and 1964 were made within fluid parameters. Ideology and the
environment (rural and under-developed) combined to articulate broad,
flexible limits. Structures oper'atingwithin that same environment
also demanded some flexibility.
These "constraints", gave the system a degree of viscosity.
The "environment of choice" was as much process as it Was context.
The political calculus upon which the regime/sector relationship was
based expanded and contracted. Intermediate'goals, resource trade-
offs, opportunity costs and choices were all reflected in the rural
decisional matrix.
As proposed in Chapter One, such a dynamic can best be
understood in terms of political economy. This perspective is
especially useful in assessing the developmental nature of certai n
Chinese agrarian policies. The entry, maintenance and growth of
rural resources within the national political market~ resource
availability and changing use-values; and regime/sector resource
exchanges can all be located within such a framework. In the
following chapters, this format will be operationalized through the
analysis of specific policy formulations, processes and outcomes.
CHAPTER THREE
THE CREATION OF A "POLITICAL MARKET":
POLITICIZING THE AGRARIAN ENVIRONMENT
When the regime came to power in 1949, the agrarian society
which it inherited was certainly "poor", but it was far from "blank".o
Between the regime and existing resources there stood a system of
socio-economic relationships which had defied penetration for
centuries. In order to make those resources available for utiliza-
tion, investment and exchange -- in ord~r to make effective agrarian
policy -- the regime's first task was to politicize the agrarian
environment.
In the context of political economy, po1iticization
involves a total reconcuptualization of the agrarian resource base.
As noted in one study:
If the concept of development is too narrow,
important policy questions are often ignored
or not even recognized. Thus, development
must be broadly conceived as the expansion
of opportunities and the human capacities
needed to exploit them.l
In economic terms, agrarian reform involves the restructuring of the
traditional land tenure system such that it becomes consistent with
lpeter Dorner, Land Reform and Economic Development,
(Baltimore, MD.: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 15. A similar sentiment
is echoed in Huntington's discussion of land reform. See, Political
Order in Changing Societies, (New-Haven: Yale University Press,
1968), p. 299.
the requirements of economic development.l However, if viewed within
a political economy framework, land refo~ must also contribute to
the creation of a political market. The dichotomy of goals and values
between the regime and the agrarian sector has to be replaced with a
significant degree of consensus. At the same time, socio-economic
stratification within the agrarian sector, based on traditional
relationships and modes of production, must be minimized. Only when
this process has been initiated will regime and peasantry relate to
a common political market. Politicization, therefore, means: 1) the
acceptance of a new agrarian political calculus; 2) the entry of
rural resources into the national political market; and 3) the active
participation of both parties in resource exchange.
Within the agrarian sector, the traditional basis of socio-
economic stratification is the ownership of land. Income differentials
then depend on the relative quality of that land; the availability and
control of labor power; the knowledge and means to insure capital
formation as an outcome of the production process; and the opportunity
and willingness to defer the consumption of that capital for
reinvestment into technical innovations which increase material
productivity. 2 In a modernizing agrarian society, class issues are
further complicated by the existence of an expanding modern sector
which creates and maintains a rural/urban class dichotomy.
The Marxist orientation of the Chinese regime presupposes
an economic definition of "class" and the issues related to the
lDorner, Land Reform, p. 18.
2Dwi,ghtPerkins, "Development of Agriculture," in Oksen-
berg, China's Developmental Experience, p. 65.
transformation of class consciousness. Therefore, policies were
designed to minimize the material basis of class identity and differen-
tiation in the agrarian sector. But, in its approach to the transfor-
mation of agriculture, the Chinese regime also demonstrated a less
orthodox view of the concept of class, and often attempted to trans-
form political consciousness without the requisite changes in the
economic base. For example, the land refonn policy of 1949-1952 did
not qualitatively change the nature of ownership from a private to a
collective system. Moreover, as the data will show, it did not
result in expanded material productivity. Of far greater significance
were the political choices which accompanied land reform: the
determination of class status on the basis of economic "exploitation";
the expropriation and redistribution of property among rural classes;
and the organization of poor and lower middle peasants into functional
grass roots associations.l These activities, led ~y basic level rural
cadres under the supervision of mid-level CCP personnel, raised the
class consciousness of the peasantry and brought them both physically
and intellectually closer to the regime. Thus, land reform must be
seen as a critical ingredient in the generation and maintenance of
political resources which then became available for the achiev~~ent
of future regime policy goals.
Aside from the land itself, relative produc~ivity was ~lso
seen as a major determinant of class interest in the countryside.
lFor a detailed study see Victor
Economic Development in China: A study of
Lippit, Land Reform and
Institutional Change and
Development Finance, (White Plains, N.Y.:
Sciences Press, 1974).
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Surplus output from the land made it possible for some groups to hire
labor, lend money, and consume in the conspicuous and wasteful manner
ecmmon to agrarian elites. The same equation allo~d other groups to
subsist on the basis of their own resources; but placed others in
perpetual debt, vulnerable to still greater exploitation. The
agrarian market place was thus not simply an arena for economic
exchange, but also served as the vehicle~~rough which the fruits of
the land were transformed into the provileges or obligations of
class. Moreover, it was a closed system, with only minor seepage of
resources out of the agrarian sector.
1n terns of political economy, the politicization of
economic resources must be seen as another dimension of creating a
viable "political market". In order to tran"sformagricultural
products into usable resources, the Chinese leadership had to estab-
1ish control over theeconornic exchange process. The initial goal of
decision makers was to increase the availability of material resources.
These would be redirected toward financing goals in other policy
areas, for example, industrialization or administration. Therefore,
taxation and procurement policies were formulated, beginning in
1949, to increase the State's extractive capabilities.l
The evidence suggests that these policies cannot be logically
explained within a singularly economic context. Extraction was "not
IThe most detailed analysis of this policy was done by
AUdrey Donnithorne, "State Procurement of Agricultural Produce in
China,· Part I, Soviet StUdies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (July 1966), pp. 38-56;
Part II, Soviet Studies, Vol. 18, No.2 (Oct. 1966), pp. 213-224.
accompanied by an increase in capital or technical investment which
would have increased the resource base itself. Moreover, with the
exception of some data from the 1954 Harvest, statistics indicate
that only a small percentage of the procured resources actually left
the rural areas. A significant proportion of the receipts was
resupplied to households or production units operating at a deficit.l
If procurement was not based on an economic rationale, then
the calculations must have been made according to a broader set of
criteria. In redistributing land and mobilizing certain groups, the
regime created a sense of class consciousness among the peasants.
At the same time, by controlling the marketplace in taxation,
procurement quotas at set prices, and supplies channeled into areas
of demonstrable need, the regime began to minimize income differen-
tials which supported that rural class structure. As a result both
policies made a significant contribution to the development of a
political market.
The Politics of Land
Chinese leaders understood, far in advance of their accession
to national power, that appeasing the peasant' s hunger for land was
the quickest path to his heart. In the revolutionary base areas, land
IAccording to the CCP's own assessment in 1955, 18-43% of
all rural households were still "poor peasant", i.e., consistently
operating at a deficit. Over 50\ were at the subsistence level,
vulnerable to any slight disruption of the production process. Only
about 30\ of the peasants were assumed to be producing surpluses on
a regular basis. Yang, Chinese Communist Society, p. 232.
reform was a major policy initiative after 1947. Through this experi-
ence, the CCP and the rural population refined the technique of "mass
line" leadership -- the personal and educative transaction between
masses and elites which created a consensual basis for policy
implementation. Participation in land reform before Liberation was
a public and thus irrevocable act of defiance against established
social and political authority. It gave the peasants a personal stake
in preventing the reinstitution of that authority once a village had
been claimed by the guerillas. This granted the CCP a de facto
legitimacy which fostered compliance.
Peasants were also persuaded into compliance by two other
factors: the promise of increased material well-being; and the
institution of new socio-politica1 organizations which would mitigate
any personal political risks. Villages which underwent a fanshen
were left with a core of activists, organized in "poor and middle
peasants' associations", whose purpose was to keep the population
politically aware and mobilized against the return of traditional
elites. The wrath of these associations was directed against 1and-
lords and rich peasants -- groups which might attempt to maneuver the
village away from its newly acquired and poorly understood "redness".l
After 1949, the political meaning of participation in land
reform changed from an anti-regime act to one expressing acceptance
of the de jure authority and legitimacy of the new order. This was
1The term fashen means "to turn over". There are many first-
hand accounts of the revolutionary process in China pre-1949. The
most detailed is by Hinton, william, Fanshen: A Documentary of Revo-
lution in a Chinese Village. (Random~e, 1968, New York).
This was an important "plus" for the regime. In the Soviet case, by
contrast, the initial land reforms had been carried out under the
Tsar's government. However, despite the obvious appeal of land reform
to the peasants, economic considerations which had been less important
during the revolutionary movement now entered into policy calculations.
There were two options open in the Autumn of 1949. Chinese leaders
could, on the one hand, continue the hard line and rapidly swing the
rural balance of power toward poor peasants and the government,
drawing class lines sharply. This decision, puttins "politics in
command", would entail economic and stability costs which the regime
would have to absorb in the course of a violent struggle in the
countryside. 1 The alternative line was for a moderate and orderly
campaign of resource redistribution which would preserve and foster
a rich peasant economy, limit any disturbances of the production
process and maintain rural good will. This choice situation also
raised questions concerning the implementation process. Was land
reform in the newly liberated areas to be treated as a political mass
movement and given top priority; or was it to be a reorganization
measure, implemented in an "orderly manner", taking care not to
disrupt production?
The Agrarian Reform Law, promulgated on June 28, 1950, was
l"politics in command" is used by the Chinese to mean
either the giving of priority to ideological ~onsiderations, or reli-
ance on the organizational authority of the CCP. In this research,
"politics" will be used in the more conventional sense of describing
the relationship between the regime and the agrarian sector. Other
uses will be indicated by quotation marks.
formulated in an abnosphere of increasing rural instability. Reports
from Huna, Hupeh and Kiangsi in February and March, 1950 indicated
that fear,. suspicion and confusion in the agrarian sector had resulted
in a Spring famine. The landlords and well-to-do peasants, fearing
sanctions such as confiscation of crops, cancellation of loans, and
higher taxes on production, had ceased to perform virtually all of
their traditional activities, especially hiring labor and extending
credit. The poor peasants and laborers were left without employment
or funds to see them through the growing season. Riots and revolts
ensued, ending in the seizure or burning of public grain stocks. Lin
Biao and Deng Ze-hui, leaders in the Central/South region, employed
stop-gap remedies: they assured the population of the freedom to
make and collect on private loans, and to employ labor services at
terms mutually agreed upon~ guaranteed the harvest to the tiller; and
promised that taxation would be rational.l However, it was clear
that a coherent law must be drafted and popularized and the peasants
organized against the rumors and suspicions spread by consciously or
unconsciously misinformed rural elements.
As an economic policy, the Chinese land reform was contra-
dictory and somewhat dysfunctional. For example, the formula for
land redistribution was complex and yielded widely disparate results
throughout the country. In general, the share of land to be redistri-
buted per capita was equal to the quotient derived by dividing the
number of all persons eligible to receive land into the sum of confis-
cated land and all land owned by those same househc Ids , The extra
lReports from the Second Meeting of the Central/South Mili-
tary and Administrative Commission, (September 16-27, 1950), especially
Deng Ze-hui's ·report on the work of the Commission, in CD, 39:1-9.
shares were then added, when warranted, to any land the household
already owned. Officials attempted to redictribute the new land on
the basis of three criteria: its quality; its location; and its
tiller.l
The arithmetic of land reform, in terms of the actual size
of the new holdings, varied from xiang to xiang. Higher estimates
set the average peasant holdings after redistribution at 15.25 mou
(2.54 acres). Lower estimates suggest an average of 7 mou (1.16
acres) in the North, but less than 3 mou (0.5 acres) in the south.2
In a good crop year the average peasant might expect to subsist on .
the basis of such holdings without incurring serious debts.
However, as a general rule, redistribution often created, out of
tracts which were only marginally appropriate for modern commercial
.farming to begin with, units which were complete non-viable. Moreover,
when-the land was placed under the management of those without the
means or expertise to effect technical innovations, it tended to be
under-utilized.
Therefore, although rural real estate was redistributed,
there was no resulting rise in the aggregate material productivity of
agriculture and, thus, no real rise in the rural standard of living.
-Rather, consumption increased as a result of redistribution, creating
lYang, Chinese Communist Society, p. 149.
2These figures were derived from Chao, Agrarian Policies,
.p. 37; Prybyla, political Economy, p. 50; and Eckstein, China's
Economic Revolution, p. 69.
a net loss of agricultural resources available to the State.l Despite
the regime's rudimentary statistical apparatus these outcomes were
foreseeable. Therefore, the principle motivation behind the land
reform policy could not have been economic growth.
In retrospect, the economic dimension of land refoItnwas
its weakest element because the Chinese regime conceived of it, first
and foremost, as a political strategy. Its intent and its outcomes
are meaningful only when viewed in this context. The"Agrarian Reform
Law ser forth the ideological parameters of rural activity, and
reflected a combination of socio-economic and political objectives.~
It was based on the directive to, If ••• rely on-the poor peasants
and farm-hands, ally with the middle peasants, and struggle against
the landlords". 3 The law thus promoted class struggle, but reduced
the targets of struggle to some twenty million of the four hundred
and ·seventy-two million rural inhabitants -- a manageable level of
conflict. Once caught in the momentum of the mass mobilization
.
campaign, these few landlords had little hope of finding willing
allies in the villages. At the same time, the law explicitly protected
~zeng Shan, "Review of Financial and Economic Developments,
East China, January-June, 1950 and Tasks," (CB No. 11, p. 3) 1949
public grain collected = 98\ of the target. In the first half of
1950, after readjustments for errors, only 88.9\ of the target had
been collected. These figures appear to be symptomatic of a
nation-wide problem.
2For text sec, Chao, Agrarian Policies, pp. 41-43: or ~,
43: 1-8.
3Mao Ze-dong, "Report to the Third Plenum, Seventh Central
Committee," June 6-9, 1950, in .£!!., 1:4-6: Liu Shao-sh'i, "Report on
the Question of Land Reform," to cpec, June 14, 1950, CB, 43:1-13,
"especially P> 5. -
land owned by rich peasants and cultivated "by themselves or by hired
labor", as well as the property of all middle peasants, from
infringement. Portions of land owned by rich peasants and less than
or equal to the amount of land which they or their hired labor could
till was also untouched. Land in excess of that amount was subject to
requisition, but only with government approval at the provincial level
1or above.
Again, a contrast between the Chinese and Soviet cases is
useful in demonstrating the political productivity of the Chinese
approach. Landlords, like "Kulaks", totaled about five per cent of
the rural population.2 However, whereas the Chinese landlord was a
traditional authority figure, the soviet "Kulak" was more apt to be a
peasant's somewhat more affluent neighbor. 3 Isolation of the land-
lords was not only easier, but the symbolism which accompanied their
expropriation had far greater political utility. Li~e Soviet rural
policies during NEP, the Chinese law clearly sought to preserve the
economic role of the rich peasants. This was in some measure a
compromise born of material necessity, and it was suppo~ted by the
~CP's land reform experiments in the 1930is and.1940's. The latter
had demonstrated the potential economic dislocations involved in a
premature attack on the rich peasants. Moreover, in terms of
lChao, Agrarian policies, p. 32.
2Ibid., p. 34, quoting Chinese figures on rural class compo-
sition~ for Soviet figures see Lewin, Soviet peasantry, p. 72.
3Lewin gives a detailed description of Soviet peasant
categories in the 1920·s. He notes the arbitrary and confusing
criteria which separated one rural class from another. See Soviet
Peasantry, pp. 41-78.
political costs, this compromise was not ill-conceived since the
landlords were there to serve as the targets of struggle. But unlike
their soviet counterparts, Chinese decision-makers. did not avoid the
rich peasant issue in order to effect the temporary economic trade-
off. Instead, they addressed this both politically and organiza-
tionally, on the ideological basis of class struggle.
As an extension of the Agrarian Reform Law the regime formu-
lated policies which set out and operationalized a new political
calculus in the rural areas. The law itself stipulated that confisca-
tion and redistribution of property was to be preceded by a determina-
tion of class status.l A GAC directive on Augu~t 4, 1959, broadly
outlined the definitions to be used for class determination.2 Of
these, the distinctions between landlords and rich peasants were most
critical, since the latter would be protected while the former were
defined as class enemies.3 Other class distinctions were also
politically important.
Because concrete differences were not easily pin-pointed,
the directive contained a series of reducing categories. The regi~nte
was clearly interested in narrowing its "enemies list", first to
lChao, Agrarian policies, p. 43 (Article 31).
2"GAC Decisions Concerning the Differentiation of Class
Status in the Countryside," Ibid., pp. 46-51-
3This definition was included in the CCp's rural strategy
since the 1920's and was never challenged. Different views had
arisen on the status of rich peasants and middle peasants during the
period of the Kiangsi Soviet (1927-1931); and again at Yenan (1935-
1948). For a review see Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communi~ and
the Rise of Mao, (New York: Harper and Row Edition, 1967); and
Selden, The Yenan Way.
those who might represent a political threat and only then to those
whose economic position had to be protected but controlled. For
example, peasant households which owned land and means of production
did not engage in labor, and depended on "exploitation" (primarily in
the form of land rent but also through the employment of labor) for
their livelihood, were designated' as "landlord". Rich peasant" house-
holds differed from landlords mainly in that they took part in labor
themselves, and their exploiting activities centered mostly on
hiring wage labor. Between the two, there were "rich peasants of a
semi-landlord type". These households also rented out land. If
the amount rented was three times or more in excess of what the family
in conjunction with its hired laborers could till, or if the amount
of land owned by the family was relatively large and rent was collect~d
from an area two times greater than that tilled, then the household
was classified as landlord. Below these levels, it received the rich
peasant classification. I
The middle peasants were also divided into more specific
categories of "well-to-do" and "lower". The former generally owned
and worked their own land with same hired help. The latter owned
some but usually not all of the land they tilled, engaged in no forms
of exploitation, and were in some cases the victims of exploitation in
the form of land rent or usurious rates of interest on loans. Well-to-
do middle peasants were distinguished from rich peasants by two
criteria: the income derived from the use of wage labor was less than
INo such reducing categories existed in the Soviet case. The
Kulak was eventually defined as one who hired .any labor; leased out
land or rented out equipment. Lewin, Soviet Peasants, pp. 72-78.
�enty five per cent of the household's total annual income; and all
such labor was utilized for a combined total of less than 120 days
per year. However, households with two or more long-term laborers
might remain in the middle peasant category if there were many depend-
ents or if the income they derived from exploiting others turned out
to be less than the income which others derived by exploiting them.l
Again, the distinctions, while minute and often arbitrary or subjec-
tive, were politically important. A rich peasant designation would
bar a household from membership and participation in the peasants'
association, and adversely effect the future of all its members.2
Poor peasants were meant to be the political and economic
beneficiaries of the regime's agricultural policies in the early
1950's. In general, these households rented the land they cultivated
(although they might own something of a "kitchen garden" size plot),
they had poor farm implements, and were exploited by others, not
only through rent and loan interest but also due to their need to
sell their labor in order to make ends meet. This was the primary
distinction between the "lower" middle peasants and the.poor peasants.
The possession of any land, even if rented, distinguished all peasants
from the lowest category in the agrarian sector, the "agricultural
workers". These households had neither land nor farm implements and
existed solely through the exchange of their labor for a wage. They
IChao, Agrarian policies, pp. 48-49.
2Recent reports from China suggest that
once determined, were applied to a broad range of
rested on the class background of'the individual.
Ross H. Munro, "China Is Still stigmatizing. I Rich





· I'were Mao Ze-dong's "rural proletariat". Land reform policies elimin-
ated households of this category and, in awarding them land, led them
into the ranks of the peasantry, albeit at its lowest economic levels.
The directive on class determination could only provide
gU~delines. To make them relevant to the widely dispersed agricul-
tural environment of China, implementation took place at village-level
meetings. All peasants were involved in the process of "self-assess-
ment and public discussion", which was similar in both intent and
effect to the "speak bitterness" sessions of the pre-Liberation base
areas.2 The struggle meetings were conducted by rural cadres,
together with the local poor and middle peasants' association. Through
these vehicles the regime sought to penetrate and politicize the
rural environment.
Peasants' associations were set up at every level from
xiang through province according to regulations issued on July 14,
1950.3 They were made the "legal executive organ for the reform of
the agrarian system in the villages".4 Their membership was limited
to poor and lower middle peasants; but included local cadres as well
as cadres "sent down" from higher CCP organs to supervise rural
policy processes. Thus, the associations performed a variety of
functions. They established class identity; served as symbols of
lFor Mao's early and somewhat unorthodo~ class analysis of
the Chinese countryside, see Selected Works (Peking: FLP,1967),
pp. 13-59 and 137-140.
2Hinton, Fanshen, pp. 107-146; Solomon, Mao's Revolution,
pp. 195-197.
3Chao, Agrarian policies, pp. 44-45.
4Liu Shao-qi June 14, 1950, in ca, 43:12,
the new rural power structure; took advantage of the information and
local experience provided by peasant activists and "basic level"
cadres; and facilitated supervision by "leading cadres", thereby off-
setting localism.
This mode of implementation was designed to increase the
effectiveness of the land reform policy despite the lack of informa-
tiona! and infrastructural resources. Concrete regulations were
worked out by provincial authorities and disseminated to the ~
and xiang. The latter became the critical level in the network since
it was the jumping off point into the ~, the natural villages. As
one observer noted:
In this way, 'policy met the masses' and 'cadres
linked up with the masses' and correct execution
of policy was insured, making policy a weapon
for setting the masses in motion and not just 1
something that will restrict the mass movement.
From the preceding it is clear that proper cadre preparation
was crucial to successful implementation of land reform itself, and
more significantly, to the determination of class status and ele
organization of effective peasants' associations which would insure
a desirable political outcome. Basic-level rural ~adres were the
regime's major link to the villages. To reduce the potential for
goal displacement inherent in decentralized policy implementation,
training programs for cadres were conducted with great intensity
between May and OCtober, 1950. The leadership was on guard against
lou Run-sheng, Vice Director, Land Reform Committee,
Central/South Region. "Report on Agrarian Reform in the Central/
South Region During the Past Half 'Year," September 18, 1950, in CB,
39: 23-26. --
"left" deviations generated by the "campaign mentality", especially
since the peasants' associations encouraged a hostility toward rich
and well-to-do middle peasants. So, as an added precaution, results
were reported to the chu (district) level for ratification, with
provisions for appeal. Corrections of cadre excesses continued well
into 1953.1 At the same time, the regime was aware of the possibility
that land reform might reinforce rural conservatism. Deng Ze-hui
warned:
To isolate land reform or to detach it from • • •
struggle and look upon it as a matter of redis-
tribution of land, a pure technical matter,
would be committing a grave political error.2
However, the economic protection extended to rich peasants and orders
to interrupt the campaign during sowing and harvesting periods so
as not to disrupt production could have been construed by local
cad~es as a mandate to ignore the political aspects of the policy
which were so vital to the regime.3
To further clarify ~ts policy intent, the regime gave
cadres and peasant activist "on the job" training. Reports from
the East China region provide an enlightening illustration of this
process. Cadre efforts were concentrated on one or two xiang per
"district. Once the movement was launched, peasant activists and
cadres from other xiang were invited to view the progress first-hand,
lYang, Chinese Communist Society, pp. 140-145.
2Benedict Stavis, "China and the Comparative Analysis of
Land Reform," Modern China, Vol. 4, No.1, January 1978, p. 70.
3See reference to this problem by Mu Lin, New Observer,
Peking, Vol. 12. December 10, 1950. "Greet the Unprecedented Land
Reform in the New Liberated Areas," in ca, 63:"1-4.
and activists from the model areas were sent out to report (favorably)
on the benefits of the movement. The tempo of activity in the bases
was kept one or two steps ahead of the work in the rest of the dis-
trict; and the constant exchange of personnel and information
prevented deviations from the policy line, despite the absence of
dependable infrastructure which would have allowed closer monitoring
by provincial or central authorities. The movement was expanded
through entire ~ in the same way, using model districts as the
1base areas. In general, this "base area" approach, which had
worked so well for military conquest, proved equally useful for
political conquest as well.
The fact that land reform was intended primarily to increase
political resources is clearly supported by the design of the policy
itself and by the measures taken to implement it. But, having said
this much, it is also clear that the policy contained certain'
trade-offs which, when operationalized, made it politically counter-
productive. The protection of the rich peasant economy undermined
the ideological objective of social change and left the rural policy
matrix riddled with contradictions. While estimates of the change
in class status were used by the regime to prove the efficacy of
land reform, they also demonstrate its major weakness as a policy
for effecting real change. Before 1949, rural class composition was
said to be 70 per cent poor peasant and laborers; 20 per cent middle
peasant; 5 to 6 per cent rich peasant, and 4 to 5 per cent landlord.2
IRao shu-shi, secretary, CC's East China Bureau, "Experi-
ences in East China Land Reform Experiments Summed Up," NCNA,
Shanghai, December 19, 1950, in~, 39:43-45.
2Chao, Agrarian Policies, p • .34.'
In 1955, the estimates indicated that 70 per cent of the rural popula-
tion could be categorized as middle peasant as a result of the land
reform. The poor peasants, former agricultural laborers, and ex-
landlords, who seemed to have been left with the same size land
holdings, how constituted less than 25 per cent of the agrarian
sector. However, rich peasants, both those protected by the policies
of 1950-1953 and those who became rich peasants as a result of those
policies, continued to represent about six per cent of rural society ..l
The status and influence of the rich peasants traditionally
lay in the social fabric of the cun, Land reform, which had made the
xiang the basic unit of redistribution, should have upset the social
power base of the rich peasants even if it protected their material
base.2 However, the principles of redistribution -- quality, loca-
tion and tiller -- tended to keep existing farms and thus, the
traditional composition of.the cun intact. This unintentionally
compounded the negative effects of an economic approach favoring the
rich peasants by preserving the social and political unit which
nurtured the strongest and most influential rural force.against
change.
It has already been noted in this study that a regime's
limited ability to re-evaluate policy initiatives (in the course of
implementation) is an important constraint on "rational" (cost-
benefit) policy formula~ion. The Chinese leadership usually
attempted to minimize this problem by conducting localized policy
lIbid., p , 34.
2Ibid., pp. 42-43.
experiments during formulation, thereby obtaining some realistic
perspectives on potential outcomes. However, the Agrarian Reform
Law of 1950 was based not on limited, short-term experiments, but on
the sum of the regime's experiences with land reform before 1949. In
the North and Northeast regions, where most of the CCP's pre-
Liberation base areas had been located, there existed a ready-made
policy laboraty where land reform had been completed. By 1951 the
regional leadership in these areas was able to assess political as
well as economic outcomes. This gave the regime a singular advantage
during its initial ventures into agricultural policy making.
In 1951, the critical agrarian issue in the "old liberated
areas" centered on the content and direction of change after land
reform. Was the rich peasant economy a transitional stage of the
permanent basis for future agricultural development? If p~rmanent,
then on what political grounds could it be legitimized? If transi-
tional, then what was the preferred form toward.which subsequent
policies should lead; and how did the current policy line contribute
toward the creation of a favorable environment for such·change? The
answers to these questions led the regime to an early re-evaluation
of its land reform policies.
The key spokesman against the current policy line was Gao
Gang, leader of the Northeast region. Addressing the Northeast
Peoples' Government Council in February/March, 1951, he noted that as
a result of agrarian reform and the goals of the.New Democratic
economy, the position of middle peasants in the villages had become
predominant. But after bowing to this official interpretation, he
added that some elements of this class were becoming increasingly
richer, and that the peasantry as a whole was engaged in a struggle
for personal gain. These developments had precipitated "problems of
work" for cadres in the rural villages.l
As the leadership investigated the problem further, it
gained a deeper understanding of "the complexities relating to socio-
economic mobility in the rural areas, in particular, the tendency
toward restratification. The issue was seen as far more serious than
a temporary over-reliance on material incentives as a trade-off for
compliance. After redistribution, the majority of the rural popula-
tion was officially classified as "middle peasant" because the new
land holdings were of sufficient size to support a household using
its own labor power, eliminating both the exploiters and the exploited.
However, these calculations were based on political definitions, and
had not included other critical economic variables. Factors such as
the ownership of farm implements and draft animals, or the possession
of expertise, continued to differentiate peasant households in terms
of their capacity for production. Many of the new "middle peasants"
found themselves over-extended. The capital goods necessary to farm
their land were unavailable, even on credit. Moreover, land reform
had broken up larger holdings and thus destroyed a traditional source
of subsidiary income for poor peasants wage labor. To remedy this
·situation, many began to rent or sell the land acquired by redistribu-
tion to those who had the means and knOWledge to.till it. The
lNC~-lA,Mukden, March 8,.1951, "Northeast Peoples' Govern-
ment Council Holds·Third Meeting, Tasks and Plans for Current Year
Determined," in 501P, 81:23-24.
purchasers were most often rich peasants, protected by the regime, and
landlord families who had succeeded in buying such protection from
local cadres.
Bribery was perhaps the simplest and most common form of
cadre corruption. However, even the most well-intentioned cadres
were finding it difficult to impiement the contradictory political
and economic aspects of the land reform policy while using mass line·
techniques. Landlords and other rural elites were abie to convince
these cadres that policy could be implemented, with minimal disrup-
tion of the production process, by allowing the traditional leadership
to act as the regime's representative -- in return for protection.
Also, some of the rural cadres settled in the villages to which they
were sent, purchased land, and used their positions for personal
profit. Tha regime attempted to prevent and correct such abuses, but
.
cadre corruption was a cammon problem as long as the higher levels
lacked the administrative and communications resources necessary to
.
effectively monitor the implementation process.l
All the factors cited above worked against the spirit of the
land.reform policy. Therefore, when it looked into "problems of work"
in the old liberated areas, the regime found not "new" class distinc-
tions, but the re-emergence of old social divisions.2
lQiao Xiao-guang, Deputy Director, Agrarian Reform Committee,
Kwangsi Province, "Basic Conditions in the Countryside in Kwangsi
Province Today," Nan Fang Ri Bao, January 20, 1952, in SCMP, 271: 33:
Wen-hua, "Investigating Economic Conditions in Four Hsiang in Honan
Province," Chang Qiang Ri Bao, Hankow, December 14, 1951, in~,
250: 18-22.
2Evidence that this was the interpretation eventually arrived
"at by the regime itself is reflected in Mao Ze~dong's 1955 policy
address, "On the Question of Agricultural Cooperation."
The remedy advocated by Gao Gang and like-minded members
of the regime to this growing problem of re-differentiation was the
promotion of COllectivization in the countryside as quickly as
possible. In December, 1951, the CPPCC adopted "Decisions on Mutual
1Aid and Cooperation in Agricultural Production." Cooperatives had
been developed as pilot projects "inthe North and Northeast, with
membership limited to the increasingly impoverished poor and middle
peasants. The step from land reform to mutual aid should have been
popular among these groups. They not only-constituted the numerical
majority but they controlled, if they could hold it, the aggregate
majority of farm land. Moreover, they were already organized in
peasants' associations and furnished the largest proportion of
leadership in these bodies.2 Despite these positive factors,
cooperativi=ation efforts lagged behind the expectations of some
regime members. Ina preview of the legitimacy struggle which wo~ld
later occur between the Northeast regional organization and the Party
center, Gao Gang placed the blame on a lack of determination within
the CCP hierarchy. He noted that, although the Party should be the
"fundamental force" toward collectivism in the rural villages,
There is no visible sign that the Party is
leading the broad masses to shift gradually
from small-scale production and individual·
economy to collective economy.3
lAS a result of this directive, the percentage of peasant
households in MATis grew from 19.2\ at the end of 1951 to 58.3\ in
1954. However, only 1.9\ of all peasant households were organized
in semi-socialist APC's by the end of 1954. See Eckstein, China's
Economic Revolution, p. 71.
2yang, Chinese Communist Societ~, p. 151.
3Gao Gang, "Overcome the Corrosion of Bourgeois Iueology;
Oppose the Rightist Trends in the Party," delivered at high level
cadre meeting 'inMukden, January 10, 1952; reprinted in RMRB, January
24, 1952, ~, 163: 54-61. --
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In retrospect, the regime's early decisions on cooperativi-
zation were probably not limited by a lack of intent so much as by a
lack of political consensus in the rural areas. After researching
conditions in Honan, one member of a CCP policy research office
concluded that, despite ~e obvious need to promote production relation-
ships based on cooperation and mutual aid, the peasants,
• • • have little appreciation of the meaning
of organizations. Village cadres exert no
leadership over production work; the peasants
are bent on troduction and show little interest
in politics.
The vehicles for creating consensus were the basic level
cadres, working through the peasants' associations. However, viewed
within the overall system of political authority, the relationship


















lQuan, "Investigating Economic Conditions •••• ,..in ~,
250: p. 22.
As indicated by the preceding schema, there were two problems
intrinsic to the rural politicization process. First, the system of
authority and control which governed the relationship between the
basic level cadres and the Party organization was distinct from the
system which governed their relationship with the masses and with
mass organizations. Democratic centralism articulated a bureaucratic
command structure of organizational authority within which basic level
cadres occupied the lowest rung. The mass line, on the other hand,
demanded personal exchanges between the peasants and political
elites -- those same basic level cadres -- in order to establish and
maintain legitimacy and consensus. This leadership principle also
contained specific injunctions against both ··commandism: and
-tailism", forcing cadres to defend their behavior as neither coercive
nor accommodationist. Thus, the pressures on rural cadres originated
from two directions at once, each based on different philosophies
of control.l
The second problem which arose in the process of politici-
zing the rural environment involved the relative distance between
rural environment involved the relative distance between rural
cadres and the Party hierarchy. Compared to the proximity of the
village, it was usually a "long march" between the point of policy
formulation and the point of implementation. And, when "distance'· is
lA similar dynamic is described in thel955 period in a
study by Thomas Bernstein, "Cadre and Peasant Behavior Under Condi-
tions of Insecurity and Deprivation: The Grain Supply Crisis of the
Spring of 1955," in Barnett, Chinese Communist Politics, pp. 365-399.
viewed as having organizational and intellectual as well as geographi-
cal connotations, it becomes a critical factor in this policy process.
Rural cadres were often torn between a national and local perspective,
and between regime and village loyalties. Ironically, the mid-level
MworkteamsM of leading cadres sent down to forestall such center
versus periphery problems, sometimes served to increase the identifi-
1cation of their subordinates with local village interests. These
tensions were reflected in cadre behavior which varied almost
ach.tzophrenically, from a hard-line "campaign mentality" to episodes
of personal corruption and political conservatism.
During the implementation of land reform, the Chinese
leadership witnessed the effects which a scarcity of political
resources could have on the policy process. ·At the same time, the
problem encountered with cooperativization efforts in the old liberated
areas made it increasingly clear that the plans which the agrarian
sector still exercised over rural resources after land reform, would
limit the effective use of future policies aimed at politicizing and
developing those resources.
By Autumn, 1952 land reform was completed in the Northwest,
Southwest, Central/South and East China regions. Some 700 million mou
lCadres sent to the villages to implement land reform had
been allowed to become members of the poor and middle peasants associ-
ations. Moreover, policies such as the "three sames:, (same food,
house, and work as the masses), designed to help cadres to penetrate
the villages, contributed to the assimilation of rural cadres and
utlimately to the loss of effectiveness. For an account of the
regime's expectations see, "Leading Party Officials Assume Personal
Direction of l\grarian Reform in K·...angsi Province," Nan Fang Ri Bao,
Canton, January 30, 1952, ~, 27~:37-38.
(about 1.16 million acres or 43 per cent of all cultivated land), had
been redistributed among 60 per cent of the peasant population.l
At the end of that year, the CCP put forth, "The General Line for
the Period of Transition to Socialism", and NCNA reported that
China's coming large-scale industrialization was directly linked to
the successful completion of land reform.2 For the rural areas,
however, transition would require a new set of policy initiatives.
Land reform had placed the means of production in private hands.
Cooperation was experimental, based primarily on the "mutual aid"
which poorer peasants relied upon to distribute available labor and'
equipment during the sowing and harvest periods.'The individual
household remained the principle unit of agrarian decision-making,
controlling both inputs and the utilization of land and labor.
Moreover, the output from the land, the value of that output, and
the uses into which. it was channeled were all determined within the
agrarian sector.
Even if seen from a purely economic perspective, this
situation put the regi~e at a resource disadvantage. There was, as
yet, no State planning or commercial network capable of taking over
the functions of extraction and redistribution. The agrarian sector
utilized material resources without reference to national policy
goals. And, while taxation and market controls were available as
indirect measures, they were difficult to implement in a hostile
lYang, Chinese Communist Society, p. 204.
2NCNA, Peking, ~eptember 18, 1952, "China's Coming Large-
Scale Industrialization Links with Successful Land Refotnl," in~,
420:24.
political environment. The problem was thus not agrarian economics
but rather, the rural political economy. Land refo~ had heightened
class consciousness but had done little to upset the material bases
of class interest. Moreover, disadvantaged peasants, rural
"activists", and local cadres could not be relied upon to monitor
poliey processes for the regime, because these groups often fo~ed a
"united front" against the regime in the face of unpopular policies.
The solution, in terms of political economy, was two-fold.
First, the authority of local cadres and mass organization had to be
made subordinate to the state's political and administrative
apparatus. After 1953, poliey supervision was placed in the hands of
new cadres, recruited on the basis of their expertise in administrative
and economic matters, and their non-rural background. For the most
part, they were functionaries of the State and not the CCP. As this
infrastructure grew, the peasants' associations and rural party
organizations were quietly removed from direct involvement in the
poliey implementation process.l
The State simultaneously developed new methods for channeling
material output from the countryside. The object was not only to make
these resources available for transfer to the modern sector but also
to prevent their utilization within the agrarian sector to support
its traditional class structure. Mechanisms were both direct
(taxes) and indirect (prices). Thus, the next step in creating a
"political market" involved the reshaping of the.rural marketplace
lEzra Vogel, Canton, notes atrophy of peasants associations
after 1956, p. 174; but the process appears-to have begun much sooner,
especially in the old liberated areas.
· itself.
The Politics of the Marketplace
The procurement of agrarian material outputs in China
(primarily grain and industrial crops), is generally viewed as an
economic issue, related to financing growth in the modern sector.
However, as a rural resource, material output, the manner in which it
was extracted, and the uses to which it was applied also had political
meaning. An analysis of policies which created the "politics" of
the marketplace in terms of political economy offers a further illus-
tration of this conceptual framework.
In agrarian societies taxes on land are a major source of
revenue. After Liberation, the Chinese government depended on the
agricultural tax for nearly thirty per cent of its total receipts.l
When the regime took powez, it centralized all finance activities,
leaving the subnational units short on capital and without tax-
levying authority. Beginning in March, 1951 the regime took steps
to modernize its finance system, adopting a policy of "centralized
leadership and divided responsibility". The system authorized three
major fiscal sub-divisions: central, administrative region, and
provincial, with special status given to the few large municipali-
ties. Xian level finance was placed under provincial control.
Activities below that level were to be financed by separate budgets
controlled at the center. Thus, the center retained all financial
responsibility for the administrative expenses of agricultural tax
lDonnithorne, China's Economic System, p. 337.
collection and grain transport. In most cases, the disbursement of
the necessary funds was placed under local control. In return, the
center took charge of all revenue received from agricultural taxes.l
The regime adopted a distinctive approach to taxation in
the agrarian sector which made it a direct extractive mechanism and
simultaneously a stimulus to further production. The gong-liang or
agricultural tax was levied not on the land but on the produce, and
it was collected "in kind". Tax policies functioned as control
mechanisms over outputs in two ways: they promoted more output, and
they promoted certain types of output.
Taxes levied on the basis of a "set yield" rather than
the actual yield of the land unit. This was the expected, normal
yield, computed on the basis of the land's location and quality,
and estimates were expected to remain in force for a number of years.2
This theoretically served to increase the peasant's initiative to
raise productivity without fears of upward revisions in the tax rate
which would rob him of the fruits of his efforts. The regime further
promoted trust and rural good will through its tax policies by
lUCNA, peking, April 4, 1951, "GAC Decision of the Division
.of Goverrunent Financial System for 1951," in SCMP 91: 13-15.
2For discussion of tax policies over a three year period,
see Chen Yun, "Report to the National Committee of the CPPCC, June 5,
1950, CB 2: 1-12; "GAC Directive on the Agricultural Tax \-lorkin
1952,"June 16, 1952, in Chao, Agrarian Policies, p. 158; and "GAC
Directive on the Agricultural Tax Hark in 1953," June 5, 1953, Ibid.,
p. 162. The latter established 1952 assessments as the norm for
the next three years, i.e., to 1955 •.
reducing taxes when grain was lost as a result of natural calamities.l
The rural tax base was established by a program of land
classification and production evaluation. Land was graded, beginning
in the Summer of 1951, according to its productive ~ and its produc-
tive capacity with respect to its use. The standard normal yield for
each grade of land was worked out:at the xian level, allowing for
climactic and territorial differences throughout the country. After
approval at the provincial and regional level, the results were
recorded at the center by the Ministry of Agriculture.2
Agricultural taxes in China were applied on the basis of
the IIability to pay" principle. The rich paid more taxes than the
poor, regardless of the relative benefits each might receive from
tax revenues. The regime used both progressive and proportional
formulae for assessing agricultural taxes. A proportional tax is
.one in which tilepercentage remains constant as the tax base .
l"GAC Regulations on the Reduction or Exemption of Agri-
cultural Tax for Peasant Households Which Suffered Natural Calami-
ties," August 14, 195], SCMP, 399: 8~ also, Nrn~.,August 20, 1952,
'~Calamity Stricken peasa~Agricljltura1 Tax Should Be Earnestly
Reduced or Exempted," in SCMP, 399: 10. The scales of exemption
are given by Chao, Agrarian Policies, p. 181, as follows:






20 or less 0
2NCNA, Peking, July 5, 1951, "Central Ministry of Finance
Announces Program far Land Investigation and Production Evaluation
in Connection with Agricultural Tax," ~, 130: 14-15.
.increases. A prOCJressive tax, on the other hand, increases the
percentage rate on higher tax bases. Before land reform, landlords
in the new liberated areas might lose between fifty per cent and
eighty per cent of their produce in taxes, while poor peasants paid
less than ten per cent and in some cases were completely exempt.l
After land reform, all regions were placed on a proportional tax
schedule which fixed the rate, on the basis of the hypothetical
norm, and narrowed the range of difference among tax paying units
to between seven and thirty per cent of the assessed yield.2
The collection and distribution of revenue "in kind" was .
no small administrative burden. Collection usually took place twice
each year and the peasant households were held as the basic units
of accountability. It was their responsibility to deliver grain and
other staple crops to the State. The regime benefited in three ways
.
by taking direct possession of agricultural output. It prevented the
peasants from consuming rather than selling what they produced. It
limited the amount of private commercial activity in the agrarian
lSee, for example, "Regulations Issued on Levy of Agricul-
tural Tax in Shanghai Surburban Areas," Shanghai News, November 24,
1950, in SCMP, 19: 10-12. Shanghai, in the East China region, was
classified as a new liberated area, so tax was graduated on the basis
of the per capita average agricultural inc~~e of each household.
Households producing below 150 shi catties per member were exempt.
Between 151 and 190 shi catties per capita'" 3% tax
431 and 470 - 10%
991 and 1070 • 20%
1891 and 1990 • 30%
3131 and 3270 III 40%
Above 3411 shi catties per capita, the household paid 42% in tax.
2Donnithorne, China's Economic System, p. 337.
sector. And, it circumvented its lack of formal planning and control
mechanisms which would have been critical had the regime been required
to convert money taxes back into food and industrial crops.
Collection "in kind" not only decreased the regime's depend-
ence on market/price mechanisms but also allowed it some indirect
control over the production process. The regime needed staple,
industrial, and export crops in order to feed the cities and the army,
supply the modern sector, and better its balance of trade position.
By stipUlating the types of crops in which taxes must be paid, and
by promoting the production of certain crops through the use of tax
exemptions and preferred tax rates, it was able to affect decisions
with respect to land and labor utilization.l In general, the regime's
decision to limit its extractions from the .agrarian sector in this
manner was its most significant economic inves~~ent in that sector
during this period •.
It is probable that tax policies, like land reform, were
calculated to politicize the agrarian sector. Moreover, the data
indicates that this was achieved at the expense of increased material
productivity. For example, the "normal yield" which formed the basis
of tax assessment was computed well below actual harvest yields. And
tax formulae, whether proportional or progressive, assigned the
greatest liability to the most productive groups.2 Thus, from the
IPrybyla, Political Economy, pp. 204-205; S~~ 19:11.
2warnings not to over-estimate output and to take account
of war effort donations appeared in the press through 1951 and 1952.
Re-investigationssometimes resulted in reductions of 10-15\ of the
original estimates. See SC'W 189: 241 216:.81 359: 9 and 13; arnd
385: 12.
perspective of hindsight, the net result was a trade-off. Material
resources were exchanged for political compliance, especially among
poor and middle-peasant groups.
Agricultural tax policies also demonstrated once again that
rural political leadership, which is usually seen as China's greatest
asset in agrarian policy implementation, could become a liability if
not adequately controlled. Problems surfaces with particular
intensity on the eve of the First Five Year Plan, when CCP organs
communicated the regime's pressing demands for material resources to
the basic levels. In order to stimulate output, rural cadres over-
estimated the "normal yield". Many households .fell short of these
inflated norms. The tax they paid was thus a higher percentage of
the ~ gross yield than that provided for by the tax policy. All
too often, Western analysts have assumed that this was the outcome
intended by the regime. They impute sophisticated policy making and
implementation capabilities which simply did not exist. The regime's
response -- a rectification of cadre excesses -- makes little sense
within a "rational actor" C'lnalysis.And, it makes no sense at all if
the actor must be seen as not only rational but also devious.l
After taxing the agrarian sector to extract output, the
State also sought to siphon off material resources by manipulating
prices and markets. In general, "wealthy" peasants were peasants
capable of producing surpluses. This made the definition of "surplus" .
I"Difficult Situation in Autumn Collection of Grain Tax in
Kwei hsien Overcome," Kwangsi Jih Pao, Naning, November 21, 1951, in
SQ1P 234: 11. Refers specifically to errors in work and reductions
which followed.
and its extraction from the agrarian environment a critical factor in
the minimization of rural class distinctions. In a market economy,
the basic incentive for the sale of surplus output was profit -- the
fact that there was more to gain by selling than by consuming. The
size of the profit was, in turn, determined by price and by the value
of that price in terms of purchaslng power.
In setting price policies, Chinese decision makers had more
to consider than supply and demand. When the State sought to purchase
agricultural goods it had to offer prices that were high enough to
satisfy the peasants; and yet low enough so that the resale price to
the modern sector would satisfy consumers. The price also had to
cover processing and distribution costs incurred by the State. The
same was true of the transfer of goods produced by the modern sector
for sale in the countryside. Moreover, appropriate price differen-
.tials had to be set so as to encourage the production of certain types
of goods; and price stability had to be insured.l Often, the State
used advance purchase contracts for agricultural goods. These protec-
ted the peasants from adverse changes in price between planting and
reaping. Similar contracts were made between the State and private
manufacturing and commercial enterprises.2 Such advance transactions
protected the State from speculators and black market competition,
contributing to its mas cent planning' capabilities. 3
lvonnithorne, China's Economic system, p. 358.
2see for example, Zeng's account of the contract,relation-
ship between the State and China Textiles, Inc., "Review of Financial
and Economic Developments ••••," p. 7.
3prybyla, Political Economy, p. 44; Eckstein, China's
Economic Revolution, pp. 113-114, gives good analysis.
From the perspective of the peasant, the crucial economic
question was the relationship between the retail price of industrial
(consumer) goods in the rural areas and the procurement price for
agricultural products. When the domestic terms of trade moved agair.st
th~ agrarian sector, this precipitated a "scissors crisis", a pheno-
~menon well known to students of soviet economics.l In its simplest
terms, if the State's offer for agricultural goods was too low,
especially in a poor harvest year when high prices could be obtained .
on the open market; and if the price of consumer goods was too high
or if they were unavailable at any price, then there was no incentive
for peasants to sell their surplus produce to the State.
Peasant dissatisfaction or insecurity with the state of
China's rural economy in the early 1950's was most often expressed by
hoarding. This phenomenon had both positive and negative effects on
the economy. On the one hand, hoarding reduced the demand for consumer
goods and thus helped to control inflation. On the other hand it in-
creased consumption in the rural areas and made needed agricultural
lIn March, 1950 the regime took steps to es~ablish fiscal
stability by balancing the budget and ending inflation. These
monetary measures to eliminate "false purchasing power" crippled
trade and commerce both within and between the urban and rural markets.
In the Autumn of 1950, the negative effects of those policies were
reflected in the beginning of a "scissors crisis" .Ln the agrarian
economy. See, RMRB editorial, October 1, 1950, "Continue Readjusting
Industry and com;erce, stepping Up Agricultural Production and
Mastering the Art of Doing Trade," ~ 20: 10-13; also NCNA,
January 15, 1951, "Smooth Movement of Native Produce Important Factor
in Development of National Economy," in SCMP so: 12-14.
1. produce unavailable to the State.
~~en peasants did sell agricultural goods, it was on the
private market and not to the State. The network of supply and
marketing cooperatives, State trading companies and retail outlets
set up after land reform, controlled only a small percentage of the
purchases from agriculture: ten per cent in 1950 and under twenty-
five per cent in 1951-52.2 The problem, which can be seen in the
following table, lay in the relative instability of prices for agri-
cultural goods and in the regime's inability to correct the unfavor-
able scissors relationship between rural purchasing power and the
availability (rather than the price) of consumer goods.
commodity Price Index






































lIn July, 1951, RMRB reported that higher prices offered by
small dealers had slowed down government cotton stock purchases and
deposits. Stricter market control was advocated; in SC1P 14: 26.
2Prybyla, Political Economy, p. 44.
3program.in East Asian Studies, "Ten Great Years," Bellingham,
WA'1 Western Washington State College, 1974,· p. 122.
In the light of this continuing problem, the regime sought
more direct measures of control. In a scissors situation decision
makers have two options. They can better the terms of trade by
increasing prices and the supply of consumer goods. Or, they can
restrict or close the free market and forcibly extract agricultural
produce from the peasants at an arbitrary price. The latter approach
was adopted by Stalin in the Soviet Union after 1928. The Russians
used organizational methods (collectivization) and coercive methods
I"(dekulakization) to effect a "final solution to the scissors problem.
In China, although the demands for agricultural products
were equally important to the industrial/urban economy and the balance
of trade, ideology had also established the legitimacy of a rural
base. The regime needed to politicize the peasantry because its "
legitimacy rested on a worker-peasant alliance. Moreover, in 1953,
it did not have the administrative and economic resources to support
a full-scale collectivization drive. Short of such a qualitative
reorganization of ownership and rural labor, productive elements
(rich and upper middle peasants) had to be encouraged to produce.
Thus, while they could be politically isolated, they could not be
"eliminated as a class".
To reduce hoarding and liberate rural output, the regime
employed techniques such as rationing, limiting agricultural credit,
postponing advance payments on agricultural production contracts
between the State and individual peasant households, placing taxes
lFor a description of the dynamics of the "Scissors," both
in the soviet and Chinese contexts, see Donnithorne, China's
Economic System, pp. 447-448.
,on consumer goods, and initiating savings drives, especially in the
course of the Resis U.S.--Support Korea campaign.l The results of
these initial measures contributed to the formulation of an overall
policy for rural resource control -- the system of planned purchase
an~ planned supply.
The CCP Central Committee convened a national conference
on the planned purchasing and planned supply (PP-PS) of grain from
October 10-12, 1953.2 The problem discussed by that conference was
how to raise rural productivity while limiting consumption, grain
shortages, price fluctuations, hoarding of surpluses and other
factors which made the rural economy unpredictable and irrational.
The proposed solution involved central planning, and paralleled the
approach being adopted in the modern sector uqder FYP-l -- rationaliza-
tion through centralization and socialization. On November 19, 1953,
the GAC issued a ten point directive on the enforcement of PP-Ps.3
The most critical provision of the system was that peasants had to
sell a certain quota of their grain to the State, in varieties and
at prices fixed by the State. All private merchants were stopped
from dealing in grain unless deputized by the government to act as
its agents; and all grain processing enterprises (e.g., flour mills)
were no longer allowed to buy their own grain or sell their o~~
lNCNA, May 2, 1951, "Planned Supply, Marketing Linking Up
China's Individual Producers with State," in SCMP 101: 45: NCNA, May
15, 1951, "Credit Purchasing System Helps in Intfarchangeof Goods,"
in SCMP 105: 57.
2Lieberthal, Research Guide, p. 62.
3For text see Chao, Agrarian Policies, pp. 193-196 •.
· products without the State's authorization.
The benefits to the State were clear. It could now purchase
needed grain without having to compete with the free market, specula-
tors, and price fluctuations. Moreover, it could plan resource
investments in the modern sector on the guaranteed supply and
availability of agricultural output, barring only the intervention of
natural disasters.
In retrospect, the arithmetic of PP-PS benefited not only
the State but also the majority of the peasants, due to methods of
implementation and the regime's ability to make readjustments in the
policy. In its initial phase, the system met with little opposition.
It was, as one researcher has aptly noted, an "ex post facto" law,
which nullified contracts between peasants and private merchants after
advances had been paid and consumed. By taking their grain to the
State after the 1953 harvest, peasants made windfall profits.l
Moreover, the prices offered by the State were not grossly unfair,
and its agencies continued to make advance purchase contracts with
the peasants, tantamount to an interest-free 10an.2
The regime's attempt to coordinate the work of its agencies
in the rural areas also helped to maximize the bene!i ts which both
State and peasants might derive from compliance with PP-PS. The
-compulsory sales liability of each peasant household was determined
lVivienne Shue, "Reorganizing Rural Trade: Unified Purchase
and Socialist Transformation," in Hodern China, Vol. 2, No.1, Jan.
1976, p. 110.
2Ibid., pp. 112-116. Oonnithorne disagrees with the fair-
ness of State prices vis a vis the private market. Sec argument in
China's Economic System, pp. 363-364.
on the same basis as its agricultural tax liability. This greatly
simplified both bookkeeping and collection. Although there were now
two forms of delivery -- tax and sale -- there was a single system of
administration. Taxes were controlled by the Agricultural Tax Bureau
of.the Ministry of Financy, but were collected at the local level'by
the departments of Ministry of Food and Commerce. Sales took place at
the same collection points at the same time, administered by the same
.departments. To maintain the distinction, taxes were collected before
purchases were made.l The State also made banking policies supportive
to compliance by giving preferential interest rates on deposits from
grain sales. Most peasants could not avail themselves of this oppor-
tunity, but it did provide an added incentive to those least likely
. to cooperate with the State -- rich peasants with large surpluses.who
could afford to deposit their profits.2
The PP-PS system also benefited peasants who had no surpluses
to sell to the State and needed subsidies in order to subsist.
"Planned Supply" was designed to stem the tide of rural class stratifi-
cation which had begun after land reform. Classifications of "grain
surplus", "self-sufficient", and "grain-deficient" 'units were made at
the xiang level. The equation which served as the basis for these
categories was computed as follows:3
Fixed Production - (Needs for seed,
fodder, and human consomption + '
AgriCUltural Tax) = O.
loonnithorne, China's Economic System, p. 345.
2shue, ,,'ReorganizingRural Trade. ,••," p. 113.
300nnithorne, China's Economic System, p. 346.
Grain surplus units were usually required to sell between
eighty and ninety per cent of this surplus to the State. Grain
defi~ient units were divided into two categories and received subsidies
accordingly. Those engaged in the production of cotton or other
:economic crops" received rations equal to the standard consumption
levels of grain surplus households in the xiang. Those engaged
predominantly in grain production, but failing to produce enough for
their own needs, were issued rations somewhat lower than this norm.
Grain rations distributed for disaster relief were lower still, for
the regime believed in "self-salvation through production" as the best
remedy for such temporary setbacks.l Through subsidization, the
regime hoped that poor peasants could hold their land rather than
sell it to those who were better off and thus reconcentrating owner-
ship in the countryside.
Despite this effort to coordinate policy implementation. at
the center and to offer aggregate benefits in return for compliance,
the regime did encounter implementation problems which were, by now,
all too familiar. The campaign to mobilize the peasantry to sell
their grain to the state put still more pressure on rural cadres,
underscoring political weaknesses. The State had failed to achieve an
effective structural penetration of the agrarian sector, and this
exacerbated the limited reliability of local leadership. Cadres often
failed to understand and communicate policy content or to pressure the
population toward certain expected outcomes. For example, in 1954,
local cadres responded to the "campaign mentality", and emphasized
p. 231.
lIbid., p. 347; also, Yang, Chinese communist Society,
only the purchase aspects of PP-PS, ignoring supply. In some cases,
this worked to the regime's advantage, for most peasants were given
the ~pression that the State had completely monopolized legitimate
trading activities and abolished the rural free market. Therefore,
they sold surpluses to the cooperatives that were above their official
quotas. 1 However, cadre behavior also introduced disincentives into
the regime's carefully constructed incentive approach. They set
unusually high quotas and ignored local conditions, which forced the
peasants to sell at a loss and often left them "grain short". The
peasants responded to these incursions characteristically - they
hoarded, reduced crop area, bribed cadres, and misrepresented figures
so that they falsely appeared as grain deficient households, free
from liability.2
~nese pressures were communicated back to the regime in the
fo~ of a food crisis in the Autumn of 1954. The crisis happened to
coincide with the completion of a cadastral survey to update and
correct tax and purchase assessment figures. With this information
in hand the regime responded by making major alterations in the PP-PS
system. The changes, developed in 1954 and handed down to cadres in
March, 1955, were known as the "three-fix" system. The State "fixed",
that is, took out of the arbitrary hands of local cadres, the standard
production norm assigned to each piece of grain-producing land~ the
quota of that production to be sold to the State~ and the rations to
be supplied by the state to households whIch were "grain deficient".3
lShue, "Reorganizing Rural Trade •••," p. 114.
2Dernstein, "Cadre and Peasant Behavior •••," p. 397.
3Donpithorne, China's Economic System, p. 345.
2
There were enough loopholes in the "three-fix" policy to
allow the regime a virtual monopoly on the sale of agricultural
output. Therefore, as in the case of land reform and agricultural
taxation, the primary message of "three-fix" was the regime' s policy
responsiveness to economic pressure from the agrarian sector in order
to protect its political goals. At the same time, the PP-PS system
taken as a whole, resulted in sane positive by-products. Again, not
all of these outcomes were intended by the regime, and reflect
factors which came to light at the implementation rather than the
formUlation stage of the policy.
Viewed within a political economy matrix, PP-PS contributed
significantly to the creation of a political market in the rural
environment. For the poor and lower middle peasants, PP-PS had been
a mixed blessing. When it operated effectively it rescued them from
economic ruin. It also offered a certain amount of security through
price stability and a guaranteed ~arket for goods. However, abuses
in the system resulting from arbitrary implementation had been most
costly to those peasants who walked the fine line between surplus,
subsistence and starvation from harvest to harvest. As a result, many
of these households joined MAT's on a seasonal or permanent basis.
Some even joined the semi-socialist APe's which were beginning to dot
the countryside experimentally in 1953. In so doing, they were
treated as a collective unit rather than as individual units for the
assessment of tax and sales liabilities beginning in 1954. Most
benefited demonstrably from this choice.l At the same time, the
lShue, "Reorganizing Rural Trade •••,", p. 397. This argu-
ment will be examined more closely in Chapter IV.
regime's cooperativization policies also benefited.
PP-PS had its greatest effect on peasant households which
were .consistently able to produce surpluses on an ~ndividual basis.
When the rural economy was primarily in private hands, these peasants
had several legal options for disposing of surplus production they
could consume, hoard, speculate, sell to private merchants or
processing enterprises, or sell to the State. Their choices were
motivated largely by profit considerations. However, when the licit
rural market was circumscribed by PP-PS, and only a small percentage
of agricultural surplus (some 10 per cent to 20 per cent) was left
for private disposal, the opportunities for ra~al capitalism dis-
appeared. At the same time, the "socialist transition" under the
First Five Year Plan closed avenues for the 'investment of private
capital in all sectors of the economy. Banking policies helped to
channel some of that ,capital into the hands of the State by promoting
savings. The PP-PS policy contributed to this.general trend and
eliminated one of the last logical motivations for independent peasant
households to remain outside of the cooperative structures which were
advocated with every increasing intensity by the regime.l The only
real choice open to peasants of all income groups trying to increase
their income was to increase productivity. The regime was thus able
to use the promise of higher levels of agricultural output as the
selling point for collectivization. Within this environment of
declining rural capitalism, the peasants began to appreciate the logic
lIbid., p. 110.
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of rural socialism.l Land reform had delayed development in this
direction, but PP-PS provided a catalyst toward its realization.
From the perspective of the regime, the ~P-PS experience
also resulted in a consensus on the value of collectivization. Again,
the issues involved were both economic and political. The fonner are
reflected in the following table.
'49 '50 '51 '52 '53 '54
1. Total Grain
Produce
(Unprocessed 113.18 131.4 143.4 163.9 166.8 169.5
in million
metric tons)
2. Increase (\) 16.1 9.1 14.3 1.8 1.6
3. Tax Grain
(Unprocessed 22.6 19.7 24~3 21.6 19.5 21.2
in million
metric tons)
4. \\of 3 to 1 20 15 17 13.2 11.7 12.5
5. Grain Purchased
by State
(Unprocessed -- 7.2 14.4 25.5 20.7 30.7
in million
metric tons)
6. \\of 5 to 1 5.4 9.1 15.5 20.8 18.1
2
The substantial increases in total grain production between
1949 and 1951 are attributable to better accounting procedures as
well as actual gains. By 1952, the production level was roughly
1Ibid., p , 110.
2Ad~pted from Chao, Agrari~~ Policies, 1963, Table VII,
pp. 150-151.
constant. with the completion of land reform, large expropriations in
the form of a progressive agricultural tax were no longer available,
since landlords had been technically eliminated and the rich peasants
were protected. Grain purchases by the state rose most significantly
between 1951 and 1952, before the institution of PP-PS, but after the
completion of land refoon and coinciding with the growth of central
planning and administrative infrastructure. Purchases were also
increased in 1953, supporting the assertion made above that the pea-
sants did comply with the PP-PS policy in its initial stages. However,
1954 shows a decrease in State purchases. This loss was somewhat
compensated by a rise in the percentage of tax grain collected, but
the net loss in total procurement between 1953 and 1954 was still
about two per cent.
The rural economic picture is further illustrated by the
following data;
PRODUCT·ION, PURCHASE AND SUPPLY
1953/54 1954/55
Total Production





Total Resold to Rural Areas 34,240 47,360
\ of Total Requisition
Total actually Transferred
From Agrarian Sector







1Adapted from Cooununist China: '1949-1959, Vol. II, Hongkong:
Union Research Institute, 1961, p. 28 •.
As the data indicates, more than half of the output procurred had to
be left in the agrarian sector. More importantly, the purpose for
which it was used after redistribution was consumption (by grain-short
units) rather than reinvestment. On this basis, the regime could not
hope for agricultural development, increased production, and a change
in the socio-economic structure. PP-PS took sane of the guesswork
out of central plann~ng by increasing the State's control over informa-
tion regarding expected agricultural output and the output itself.
But the regime certainly understood, by the end of 1954, that the
benefits of PP-PS could not be realized on the basis of an individual
peasant economy. Effectiveness could only be maximized within a
collective infrastructure.
From a political perspective, concessions derived by the
peasants in the "three-fix" policy modification also put the regime on
notice. Mass-line methods would need the support of either material
or organizational/coercive incentives to canpliance. Moreover, local
cadres and peasants' associations, which had proven unreliable in both
land reform and procurement processes, would have to be supplanted by
new means of administrative control. Again, collectivization appeared
to be the appropriate solution. Finally, but most importantly, only
such a qualitative change in the relations of production would stem
the tide of rural capitalism and class re-stratification.
Having already defined class on the basis of land and
income, the regime had to reinterpret the rural political calculus
after 1955 in terms of collectivization and communization. The areas
.of agrarian policy which reflect this process include. qualitative
changes in the concept of ownership (from private to collective);
the creation of a rural division of labor; and the various strategies
of material procurement, redistribution, and utilization within
collective enterprises. In both APC's and communes, rural resources
which had been politicized were recombined so as to result in greater
productivity. For example, private ownership was gradually transformed
into collective ownership such that, by 1960, the land itself had
ceased to be an appropriate measure of class in China. But, despite
col~eativization, peasant incomes were still tied to land because it
varied in a~ount, quality and productivity among the various produc-
tion units. By 1957, central planning of procurement and sales had
been rejected in favor of a contract system, which established
liabilities and merit on an annual, case by case basis. After the
"Great Leap", this decentralized system began to work in favor of the
production units as the state had ceased to rely on agricultural
procurement for the bulk of its revenue.
Despite the organizational changes, those resources which
had been defined as political remained so. For exampLe', the State
continued to use procurement as the measure of its political strength
in the rural areas, equating compliance with delivery quotas to an
achievement of consensus between collective and national interests,
based on proper class leadership. Also, the size and status of the
"private plot" replaced land ownership per se as a focus for regime
campaigns against "rural capitalism".
It thus appears useful to reassess rural reorganization
(from MAT's to communes) in terms of how infrastructure maintained
and expanded the political market. Rural reorganization led to the
creation of more politicized resources as well as contributing to
their utilization. Such expansion represents an important dimension
in the developmental nature of Chinese agrarian politics. In the
political market, it is the equivalent of economic growth. This
process, in turn, made the decisional matrix more complex. New
demands for resource utilization continually challenged the limits
of the regime's organizational capacities, forcing decision makers to
explore new mechanisms of "development administration". For these
reasons, this study now turns to an analysis of the infrastructural
components of agrarian policies within a political economy framework.
CHAPTER FOUR
DEVELOPMENT Al:MINISTRATION: EXPANDING AND
- MAINTAINING THE 'POLITICAL MARKET'
Productive resource use, within a framework of political
ecomony, results in the creation of more highly value~ resources.
The story of Chinese collectivization and ccmmunization is one of
resource utilization. As rural resources become politicized and
"available", they were recombined and invested. The patterns of
resource use became increasingly complex, with overlapping linkages
and interdependencies which made the sequences of policy decisions
an exercise in political entrepreneurship.l This situation called
for.organizational mechanisms to control and distribute rural
resources within the political market. That market, in time, had to
be expanded and maintained in order to keep up with these demands.
As the Chinese regime funneled rural resources into the
political market, trade-offs at many levels arose simultaneously.
The productivity or use-value of those resources rests on two
criteria: an increased political consensus between the regime and
the peasantry; and a decreased attra~tion within the agrarian sector
for its own resources. When policy outcomes indicate a failure to
pry rural resources loose from their base and to redefine their
value in common political terms, then one of two possible
lHuntington, Political Order.
interpretations follows. There may be particular externalities
which entered the cost/benefit framework, causing trade-offs. If sO,
these can be pin-pointed in the content of the policies themselves
or in their implementation. Or, alternatively, there may be no
operative political economy, as defined by this study, in the
agrarian matrix.
Assuming the former as the more likely hypothesis, then
the trade-offs should be all the more obvious when viewed from an
infrastructural perspective. This necessitates a more complex,
multi-dimensional view of the political market than that presented
in the previous chapter. Although land reform politicized the con-
cept of real property, it was still based on the principle of private
ownership. This left rural resources, particularly the means and
relationships of production, under the control of traditional socio-
economic property and class structures. Similarly, procurement
policies had politicized the concept of rural income, but had also
fit into traditional patterns of production and distribution.
Collectivization was designed to change the ~olitical
function of real property and rural income so that they contributed
to the integration of the agrarian into the socialist political
calculus. In order to achieve this goal, the APC'.s reorganized
several aspects of the rural environment. The nature of land
ownership itself was changed from a private to a collective entity.
The incomes of individual peasant households were tied to collective
productivity. And in some cases, patterns of rural labor utilization,
which were functionally integrated (and thus still supported tradi-
tional socio-economic relationships within the cun), were reorganized
on the basis of functional differentiation and specialization (a
division of labor). This strategy thus appears to have addressed
both the issue of administrative efficiency and that of expanding
the political market simultaneously.
Once operationalized within a collective infrastructure,
rural resources could no longer slip out of the political market and
back into the villages, where they could be channeled into the
creation of an agrarian environment which was receptive to both
modernizat~on and social change. However, this process was neither
automatic nor guaranteed.
"Political markets", like their economic counterparts,
are maintained only through the action of the policy process. Thus,
maintenance and expansion becomes an important dimension of polit~cal
decision making. In the first stage of communization (1958-l959),
Chinese leaders again reorganized rural resources. However, if this
was an attempt to maximize the level of growth rate of resource
productivity, then the outcome was directly opposite to its intent.
The political market contracted, and resources began to·revert to
the agrarian sector. Both the process of expansion and the factors
which combined to cause unintended contraction of the political
market are analyzed below.
"MATs and APCs: Reorganizing Rural Ownership and Labor
Throughout the early 1950's, the Chinese regime emphasized
both the moral and economic superiority of cooperative structures.
Moreover, it worked out three orgOanizational formulae which
incorporated varying degrees of collectivism. The Mutual Aid Team
(MAT) was a seasonal or permanent vehicle of collective labor; the
semi-socialist Agricultural Producers Cooperative (APC-l) distributed
profits according to individual or family investments of private
capital and labor; and the Socialist Agricultural Producers Cooperative
(APC-2) distributed profits according to labor investments, while the
coop itself owned all capital (land, draft animals and tools). The
latter was similar to the Soviet Kolkhoz. However, unlike.their
Soviet counterparts, Chinese policy makers built up to the APC-2 over
a four year period; and only after having politicized the concept of
land o\\'Jlershipn the context of IIagrarian reform".1
Growth of Socialized Agriculture in China
(in peasant household units)
1952 1954 1955 1956
MATs 8,030,000 9,930,000 7,150,000
APC-l 3,640 114,000 633,000 268.000
APC-2 10 201 529 311,935
" of phh's 40\ 60.3\ 64.9\ 96.3\
2
The long-range goal of socialism in the countryside was
defined by ideology. But, even after "socialist high tide" of 1955,
the Chinese regime enforced collectivization selectively, according
to one or another of these models. Choice depended on intermediate
considerations: the regime's perception of its own resource position;
lBernstein, "Leadership and Mass Mobilization •••," p. 5.
2Townsend, Politics in China, p. 364 (Appendix C)
the probable effect in terms of agricultural production; and inter-
vening policy priorities. Such a multi-level approach defined Chinese
agricultural policy from 1951 to 1957.
The concrete factors which determined the regime's assessment
of its own resources are reflected in some of the earliest debates on
collectivization. In 1951 and 1952, regime moderates (now identified
with Liu Shao-qi) recommended that at least seventy per cent of the
rural population should achieve "middle peasant" status before any
qualitative property and labor reorganizations were attempted. In
their view, the poor and lower middle peasants, who placed the greatest
value on newly acquired land, would resist any policies which
threatened this resource. The regime's leadership resources were not
considered sufficient to effect an exchange of property rights for
the ideological symbol of the collective among these groups. And
clearly, the national level of industrial development was too low to
guarantee an increased economic p~y-off (through agricultural mechan-
ization) as an alternative to normative inducements among wealthier
1peasant groups.·
The table following further illustrates the factors upon
which this assessment was based. Steel output, although fifty per
cent greater than any previous production levels, was inadequate by
modern standards in both quantity and quality. The machine building
industry was largely non-existent, except for assembly and repair
work. None of the domestic firms were producing necessary capital
goods for agriculture such as tractors, trucks, and electrical
equipment, so these goods had to be imported. So to did 127,000 tons



















Tractors (15 hp units)--
154-166 million metric tons
21.7% of cultivated acreage
325,000 tons
2,006
Moreover, the transportation network was concentrated in the Northeast
and many regions were completely without rail connections. The only
positive note in this overall assessment was that grain production
had regained its pre-war levels and further increases could now be
1applied to narrowing the gap between food and population growth.
The moderates concluded that collectivization would have to wait upon
increases in the regime's political and administrative resources and
upon the ability of the infant industrial base to .support agriculture.
Otherwise, the reformist political consensus in the rural areas would
be destroyed among all groups.
The second position (now identified as "Maoist") called for
lAdapted from: Eckstp-in, China's Economic Revolution, p. 210;
Lippit, "The Commune ••• ,'"p. 224: Yang, Chinese Comnunist Society,
p. 216: and Perkins, "Development of Agriculture," p. 59.
immediate steps toward collectivization after land reform. It was
based on a different political assessment of the rural environment.
According to this analysis, entrenched class positions in the country-
side would soon become formidable obstacles to further social change.
The "rural capitalist" outcome of land reform could only be negated by
new organizational forms based on collective ownership and socialist
relationships of production. Advocates of this position argued that
the regime could utilize its rural leadership resources to effectively
implement collectivization.l They supported the mobilization of poor
and lower-middle peasants' associations and rural cadres to convince
disadvantaged peasant groups of the efficacy of mutual aid and produc-
tion cooperation. Using these vehicles, the progressive rural
classes could isolate wealthier peasants politically and, at the
same time, equalize the material discrepancies which made the latter
more productive. This would cut short the regime's economic depend-
ency on the rich peasant, and thus eliminate a major "contradiction"
in the rural political calculus.
As noted in the previous chapter, information- regarding the
outcome of land reform in the old liberated areas was filtering up to
the regime by 1951. In large measure, the assessments by Gao Gang
and other regional leaders settled the policy dispute over coopera-
tivization at the center. Thus, there was no Chinese "NEP period" in
lLiu Shao-qi, "The Victory of Marxiam-Leninism in China,"
RMRB, October 1, 1959, in CD, 595: 1-6. Liu's speech of May 7, 1951,
~hich he advocated postponement of collectivization, was not made
public until the Cultural Revolu~ion. See SCMM, 633:8. He made no
mention of his own opposition to Mao's approach in his 1959 summary
of the debate.
tbe soviet sense. Instead, as the land reform campaign was reaching
its peak, the movement to reorganize peasant households into MATs and
low-stage APCs was also picking up momentum.l
Labor teams for mucual aid were seen as the first step
toward establishing a collectivist orientation in the agrarian.sector.
In general, they were small (5-8 peasant households), local and
voluntary. The teams initially drew upon a history of familial labor
exchanges which usually occurred during the critical sowing and
harvesting periods of the agricultural cycle. The directive,
"organization is the proper course for turning poverty into prosperity",
attributed to Mao Ze-dong, was widely popularized in the Spring of
1951.2 Since this coincided with the Korean War Effort, a common
device employed to stimulate both production and the creation of MATs
was the "patriotic production competition". Teams would issue work
challenges to match their output. The Ministry of Agriculture
supported these campaigns, by picking out "model workers" as well as
successful teams, for national honor and emulation.3 As a result the
teams received much attention in the press in the latter half of 1951.
This served to prepare the way for implementation of mutual aid on a
national scale.
l"Ministry of Agriculture Issues Directive on Spring Sowing,"
~, March 23, 1951, in SCMP, 87: 17-18.
2"GAC Passes Decision to Increase Grain and Cotton Production
in 1951," NOlA, February 15, 1951, in~, 67: 16-17.
3The press made several references to this campaign in 1951
and 1952. See for example the articles describing "Patriotic
Production-Increase Emulation," in SCMP, 105:39-40; 107:21; 292:8
and 308:12. . --
On December 15, 1951, the CC issued its draft decisions on
mutual aid and cooperativization. These included definitions of both
seasonal and permanent MATs and low and high stage APCs. The content
of the policy thus reflected long-range expectations as well as short-
term goals. The draft was not officially adopted until February,
1953.1 In the interim, mutual aid was implemented on a wide scale
whi~e APes were begun experimentally.
Cooperativization developed most quickly in the Northeast,
both because of the early completion of land reform and because Gao
Gang was an ardent advocate of the policy. Also a well developed
industrial base in that region made it possible to accompany coopera-
tivization efforts with some inputs of agro-technology. On the first
anndvexsazy of the Revolution, Gao Gang referred to the "error" of
centering attention on establishing mutual aid groups while neglecting,
".0 •• such important aspects of work as technical improvements
water conservancy ••• afforestation, etc.". Gao set up three
experimental stations in the Northeast to instruct peasants in the
use of modern farming methods and tools. By 1952 there were eighty-
seven stations with plans for three hundred more in 1953.2
According to most assessments, some forty per cent of all
peasant households had joined MATs of one type or another by the Autumn
of 1952. This figure represents an average of sixty to eighty per cent
in the Northeast and other old liberated areas (of which some twenty
lBowie and Fairbank, Policy DocUI:lents,p. 92.
2Gao Gang, "The First Year of the Application of the Common
Program in the Northeast," ~, October 1, 1950, in ~, 20:9; see
also ~, 413:13.
per cent were in permanent MATs) and twenty-five to forty per cent
in the new liberated areas.l
The regime's early statement of lang-range intent was
probably meant to serve an educative function, especially for rural
cadres." It may also be seen as a response to evidence of confusion in
the agrarian sector over regime expectations on the rate and direction
of change. For example, a report from Hankow, in October 1951,
reflects general misunderstanding of a salient issue -- the nature of
rural socialism:
; • • • The socialist society will come into
being only if State industries are fully
developed. It will not do to rely solely
on agriculture. Eating together from the
same big pot of rice is an idea of 'rural
socialism'. It is erroneous and entirely
different from the 'socialism' into which
the Communist Party ~ill eventually lead
us.2
In November an article aimed primarily at basic level cadres appeared
in the Shanghai Jie Fang Ri Bao. Complacency among peasants (and
rural cadres) after land reform constituted a major theme~ a problem
which stemmed from a poor understanding of both "communism" and
"organization".) such articles demonstrate the regime's growing
awareness of leadership problems at the basic levels and of its
deficiency in controlling policy outcomes.
lyang, Chinese Communist Society, p. 158 and p. 205.
2RMRB, October 6, 1951 in~, 194:25.
3Zheng Su-yuan, "Prelirninai:yReport on Experiences in
Carrying out Education on Communism Among Rural Party Members and
Village Cacres, II Jie Fang Ri Bao, November 8,1951, in Sa-iP, 219:19-21.
As it was shown in the case of land reform, local cadres"
experienced most difficulties when policies~required them to place
Party interests before personal loyalties in their native villages.
Also the need to maintain control, while at the same time continuing
to employ the mass-line, often contributed to cadre tensions over the
definition of their authority roie.l The regime apparently expected
that both of these problems would become acute in the course of
"socialist transition". By speaking to specific instances of misunder-
standing, giveng concrete examples of the goals and issues involved
and their relationship to theory, and by showing some sensitivity to
the cadre's "problems of work", middle and upper'level CCP "line"
representatives, such as the authors of the articles cited above,
2hoped to facilitate the policy process. It was, at the time, the
only available means for monitoring and controlling implementation.
In the course of implementation, the regime was able to
verify some of its policy expectations and gain new insights. The
limited economic utility of MATs was appreciated almost immediately.
Because they were created either during or immediately following land
reform, these organizations entailed no change in the system of
individual property ownership or of individual management. There are
references, as early ,asMarch, 1952 to the combination of two or
three permanent MATs so that a systematized division of labor could
lIbid., p. 21.
2For example, the author of the report on rural socialism
headed the Propaganda Department of the Fukien CCP Committee; Zhang
Su-Yuan's report also indicates that he gathered his information in
the field.
be maintained. Workdays were counted on the basis of equal pay for
equal work; and modern farm machinery was used when available.l But,
when such levels of organization were attempted within the framework
of individual ownership, the combination proved untenable. Cadres
encountered problems such as poor collective care of draft animals
.
and confusion over remuneration guidelines. The quantity of labor was
relatively easy to compute, but definitions of quality, i.e.,
skilled/unskilled, were more subjective and created conflicts.
The political dimension of the MAT policy was realized when,
as a result of organization, class lines in the rural areas became
more sharply focused. Comprehensive labor exchanges contributed to
the stability and efficiency of the agricultural process only for
certain groups. Middle and rich peasants, with less economic need,
for labor exchange, usually refrained or withdrew from MATs. The
greatest advantages of collective production were clearly for poor and
lower-middle peasants who suffered from shortages of tools, animals
and labor. Thus, through the MAT, rural means of production and
relationships of production began to enter the politica~ market.
However, because the MAT failed as a replacement for the rich peasant
economy, the great rural class contradiction remained unresolved.
The CCP Central Committee's "Decision on'Mutual Aid and
Cooperation in China",· as officially adopted on February lS, 1953,
took account of the year-long experience generated by implementation
of the draft regulations. To minimize the disruption of production,
lKiang Chen-yo, "Mutuai Aid in Agriculture," China Honthly.
P.eview, Shanghai, March, 1952, in scnr-, 299-: 25.
it adopted a policy of consolidation with the middle peasants as the
principle target of collective organization and allowed the economy
of the rich peasants to continue its individual development. Moreover,
it called for the protection of private property belonging to non-MAT
and APe members. The directive stressed caution, both in the forma-
tion of MATs and in the push toward higher collective forms, especially
applicable in the old liberated areas.l In the aftermath of this
directive, the number of peasant households in MATs reached the 1954
high point of ten million. Thereafter, more cooperative forms of
organization began to dominate the rural environment and, by 1956-
1957, the MATs were entirely absorbed into agricultural producers
cooperatives.
AS suggested by both the draft cooperativization policy and
the official version adopted in 1953, MATs and APC were seen as
complimentary structures. Moreover, their development was not
necessarily sequential. Movement from one form to the other depended
on local conditions, and it was expected that the rate of change would
differ in various regions. Cooperativization of the production
process had been implemented experimentally in the old liberated areas
prior to 1949. Therefore, as in the case of land reform, the regime
was able to draw upon these experiences. Positive outcomes were
popularized as models for national emulation, giving cadres a better
sense of standards and expectations.
l..Ccp CC Decision on Mutual Aid and Cooperation in China,"
in CB, 240: 3-15. For an analysis of the text see Chao, Agrarian
PolICies, pp. 61-64.
In January, 1952, ~ re-published a report which had
already been made the subject of general discussion in all localities
1of the Northeast by Gao Gang. It eoneezned the development of the
-Kim Si-yong Agricultural Production Cooperative" and provided both a
message of regime approval and a lesson in methodology for the entire
nation. The report described the·following chain of events. In 1947
the families in a particular xiang were organized into a single MAT
on a compulsory basis. When this failed, the population was subdivided
2into five smaller voluntary MATs. The teams encountered typical
conflicts over assessment of labor quality, tinle,and production
policies (sowing, weeding, harvesting). In one~, containing twenty-
two peasant households, problems were resolved through a gradual
standardization of quality and quantity exchange values and of pzoduo-
·tion techniques. The difficult hurdle was that of output or
production distribution. This was resolved by the "guaranteed output
system", i.e., fixing production norms according to quality and size
-of land. Land owners were paid in relation to a "fixed quota". If
laborers over-fulfilled quotas, the surplus was shared by them.
This solution engendered still another conflict. Increased
production consistently surpassed original quotas. Land owners
·demanded revisions and many sought to pullout of their MATs and return
!wang Guang-wei, "The Si-yong Agricultural Production
COoperative," ~, January 22, 1952, in SCHP, 297: 25-31-
20riginally, one MAT was made up entirely of cadres since
none of the peasants wanted them in their team. They evidently
feared that the "bureaucrats" would not pull their own weight in
productive labor. Eventually, the cadres were integrated and the
special MAT was disbanded; another victory for the mass line.
to individual farming. The new solution was the critical step in
turning the MATs into an APC. Owners were offered capital shares for
their land, making the aggregate land of equal concern to the entire
collective. Sixteen of the twenty-two families exchanged their land
1for capital shares. The problem of withdrawal was dealt with by
ruling that, once land was contr!buted, the owner could withdraw its
value, but not the land itself. This effectively trapped peasants in
the APC. Valuation was kept low, making withdrawal a non-viable
alternative.
On this new basis of property management, which was still
short of collective ownership, output was divided on the basis of a
net profit, with seventy per cent alloted to laborers and thirty per
cent to share-holders. If output norms were over-fulfilled, laborers
shared fifty per cent of the surplus and the remainder was put aside
as "communal funds". The report noted that the positive aspects of
this organizational formula were ideological and political. Under
strong CCP leadership the masses were "enlightened" and led on a
"voluntary" basis; while socialist consciousness was raised. The
major drawbacks were economic: cooperative members were ignoring
secondary occupations such as animal husbandry and there was much
waste in evidence, probably due to a lack of familiarity with collec-
tive responsibility.
In the old liberated areas, conditions were considered ripe
10f the rema~n~ng households, 3 participated without making
land contributions; 1 family had only recently arrived in the Village
at the time of the report; and 2 were old rich peasant families. It
is not clear if the exclusion of the latter.was voluntary or imposed.
for the development of semi-socialist and even socialist cooperatives.
For example, at the twenty-third meeting of the Northeast People's
Government Cowicil in Hukden, on April 2, 1952, Vice Chairman Lin Feng
noted that there were already one or two collective farms per province
in,that region.l At the twenty-fourth meeting of that body, held
April 7, 1952, Gao Gang called for the establishment of at least one
or two collective farms in each of the one hundred and sixty xian in
the Northeast. These APCs would be placed under the direct control of
xian-level CCP organs to prevent "erroneous tendencies" (obviously at
the basic levels) , which might hamper the development of such organiza-
tions.2
The example of Kim si-yong is important for two reasons.
First, its organizational format was incorporated into national out-
lines for APCs from 1953 to 1957. And second, the nation-wide atten-
tion which it received in early 1952 suggests that collectivization
was already a certainty in the minds of Chinese planners at that point. 3
The factors involved in the concrete policy decisions which operation-
alized this goal were highly complex, involving political, 'economic
and administrative variables simultaneously. To be understood as
they appeared to Chinese decision makers, the alternatives for resource
use must be weighed within a single analytical framework. To avoid
lCB, 176: 2.
2CB, 176: 3.
3See comnent by ~u Jie-nung, Vice Minister of Agriculture,
People's China, l~ovember 1, 1951,- in CD, 176: 1; see also, "A Success-
ful Collective Farm in the Northeast: The' Spark' Farm, It ~, July
3, 1952, in S~w, 368: 31. .
confusion, it may be useful to first review the agrarian policies of
the 1953-1957 period in terms of their content and implementation;
and then return to pin-point these interactions retrospectively.
During 1953-1957, a balance was sought between organizational
and technical investment alternatives in the agrarian sector. At the
outse~~ three options were in evidence. The first, based on the
individual peasant economy which then predominated, called for a focus
on increased productivity, with investments in agro-technical
industries to promote the wide-spread use of chemical fertilizer,
electricity, and small-scale or semi-mechanized farm equipment.1 This
category included light tractors and transport, power-driven pumps
and wells, and improved (but still animal or man-driven) threshers,
2huskers, tillers, harrows, plows, etc. As a general approach, this.
alternative resembled the Japanese model, which had proven to be the
most productive in Asia at that time.3
The second option was based on the soviet model: rearrange
rural ownership, labor and organizational patterns; and apply equal
doses of large-scale mechanical equipment and coercive incentives.
This formula was also believed to result in increased productivity;
and the Chinese probably had little hard data from the Soviet Union
that would have contra-indicated their adoption of this approach.
lperkins, "Development of Agriculture," p. 59
2prybyla, Political Economy, p. 366.
3For discussion see Bruce F. Johnston, "The Japanese
'Model' of Agricultural Develo~ent: Its Relevance to Developing
Nations," in Kazushi Ohkawa, et. al., eds. Agriculture and Economic
Growth: Japan's Experience, (Tokyo: Princeton University Press and
University of Tokyo Press, 1969), pp. 58-102.'
However, the fact that their overall level of econanic development was
far lower than that of Russia in 1928 was well known to the Chinese.
Soviet railroads had been far more extensive, the industrial base
better established. Problems such as rural over-population, shortages
of.skilled personnel and the geographic concentration of industry,
which were common to both countries, were worse in the Chinese case.
Cultivated land per capita in China (0.188 hectares) equaled only
twenty-five per cent of the 1928 Soviet acreage, while ~e populatiori
was larger and its growth rate twice as great.l
Mao had noted, as early as 1945, that Chinese development
policies must necessarily be different from those adopted by the
Russians and not simply more limited versions of the same approach.2
The regime seemed to appreciate the need for innovation even without
a clear picture of the political and social costs which Soviet
collectivization had generated. Care was taken to prevent peasant
political alienation; and the regime relied upon its mass-line
intellectual technology to effect a favorable outcome. However,
similar steps were not taken to avoid the economic crises which had
occurred when industry failed to follow through with the large-scale
mechanical equipment called for in the Soviet agrarian development
model. 3
lprybyla, Political Economy, pp. 126-127; Bernstein,
"Leadership and Mass Mobilization •••,II pp. 8-10.
2Mao Ze-dong, "On Coalition Government," Selected Works,
Vol. 3, (Peking, FLP, 1967), pp. 283-284.
3see discussion in James R. Millar, "Soviet Rapid Develop-
ment and the Agricultural Surplus Hypothesis," Soviet Studies, Vol.
22, No. 1 (1970), especially p. 81 and p. 88.
The First Five Year Plan targeted only thirty-three per
cent of peasant households in elementary coops by 1957. At that rate,
the achievement of significant levels of cOllectivization would take
at least two plans. Mechanization was slated to take longer -- at
least three plans -- indicating a change from the soviet approach
which pursued these goals within "asingle time-table. This departure
from earlier assumptions about rural development was not yet signifi-
cant, since full-scale collectivization was still seen as dependent
on industrialization. I However, it does suggest an on-going flexi-
bility in the setting of intermediate-range goals. The same flexi-
bility continued to characterise implementation efforts. Here the
goal was to guarantee some increase in agricultural production while
refoDming the peasants' conception of private ownership within the
limits prescribed by the supply of available cadres and the level of
2economic development. In the MATs and APCs, cadres promoted produc-
tion and labor discipline, attachment to the cooperative, patriotism
and COllectivism. New agro-technical measures were popularized.
Progressive peasants were recruited to act as models and provide the
force of group pressure for those who remained outside the collective.
lpeter Schram, "Economic Management," p. 203. See for
example, the following reports by Deng Ze-huai, the highest authority
on rural work for both the Party and the State during this period:
"Mobilize All Peasants and Rural Youth to Struggle for Cooperativiza-
tion of Agriculture," China Youth Journal, April 1, 1954, in CB,
306:2; "Report to the Rural Hork Conference of the llDYL,"Jul~15,
1954, in Chao, ~rarian Policies, pp. 70-72; and "Rural Work During
the Transition Period" •••," China Youth Journal, September, 1954.
2oeng, "l-1obilizeAll Peasants •••," p , 3.
The goals which the Ministry of Agriculture outlined for
its 1953 plan are illustrative of both the regime's perception of
organizational and technical inter-relationships and its initial expec-
tations. They included the development of MATs; popularization of
scientific techniques; and a rise in per hectare production.l But in
the course of implementation, the actual role of MATs in technical
transformation proved marginal. since the teams had no permanent
common property assets, their technical improvements were limited to
.those requiring collective use of tools and labor, but no capital
investments. Such a contribution was insufficient to meet national"
economic needs.2 The choice was thus between two different types of
investment: increase the level of collectivization (infrastructure),
or increase government loans (material incentives). The regime opted"
for the former, ignoring the possibility that financial subsidization
might still be necessary at the early stages of collectivization.
The "Decisions on the Development of Agricultural Producers
Cooperatives" were issued on December 16, 1953. The directive
projected a target of 35,800 APCs by Autumn 1954, concentrated mostly
in Northeast, North and East China. By October, 1954, there were
114,000 APC-1 in China. Each contained about thirty-two peasant house-
holds and controlled ninety to ninety-five acres of land. But,
despite the fact that the pace had exceeded expectations, cooperativi-
zation involved about about two per cent of the entire rural population.
l"Report of National Conference on Agricultural Work,"
October 6-12, 1952, in CS, 221:2. The conference was called by the
Ministry of Agriculture~o summarize the 1952 situation and to plan
for 1953.
2Yang, Chinese Communist Society, pp. 210-211.
Another fifty-eight per cent were engaged in some form of mutual aid;
and the remaining forty per cent continued to operate on a private
1basis. Comparisons of these figures with the rural class breakdown
for 1955 (70 per cent middle peasant, 20 per cent poor peasant and
former landlord, and 6-7 percent rich peasant), suggest that most
rich and the majority of middle peasants still avoided cooperativiza-
tion. As a result, APCs were short of land, tools, and animals and
this threatened their viability. OVer-achievement of APC targets
indicates, therefore, what the regime specifically sought to avoid
"haste and adventurism".
In 1954, a policy debate took form at the center, triggered
by the results of the Autumn harvest. The issue was whether or not to
accelerate the pace of collectivization, and the arguments reflected
two different economic strategies and two different political concerns.
Those who advocated the status quo did so on the basis of the same
assumptions which had generated the 1953-1954 approach. The level of
industrialization was still too low to provide the mechanization
critical to successful cooperative farming. Administratively and
technically competent cadres were still in short supply and could not
be diverted to the rural economy. There were few urban outlets for
the surplus labor that would be created by large-scale rural coopera-
tives and no other conceivable solutions to the problem of rural
under-employment. And, finally, the probable peasant dissatisfaction
could not be neutralized within the regime's present pattern of
resource commitments.
lca, 278: 1-14; Chao, Agrarian Policies, pp. 66-68.
The counter-point was also familiar. Mao Ze-dong, speaking
at the Third Mutual Aid and Cooperation Work Conference in October
1953, a full year earlier, had stated that, "••• , one cannot straddle
the middle between socialism and capitalism in agriculture".l
,Xdentifying themselves with this position, proponents of a faster
pace in collectivization efforts stressed the political dangers
inhere~t in the re-emergence of class cleavages in the countryside.
This argument probably derived support from the most recent example
of the effects of political resource scarcity, the regime's retreat
on procurement policies (the "three-fix" system). The dual problems
of increasing the total yield and procuring th~ output were viewed
as reflections of the state's weak resource position vis a vis the
agrarian sector. Therefore, as a result of 'the 1954 Harvest, the CC
made the "three-fix" concession. But, at the same time, it called
for an increase in APC-1s from 100,000 to 600,000. This reflected a
belief that collectivization would yield immediate pay-offs in'output
(as seen by the fact that increased yields provided criteria for
jUdging a coop).2 It also assumed that rural reorganization would
:increase the State's planning and procurement capabilities.
The regime continued to debate agrarian policy through the
spring of 1955 and the pace of collectivization seemed to follow the
changing signals emanating from the center. The rush to form coopera-
tives was followed by a period of "drastic compression" in which the
�ovement retrenched and �any APCs were dissolved. Mao refers to CC
Disapproval of this trend as early as April, 1955 and the official
veto probably came at its Rural Work Conference in May. 1 However, the
reg~e was not unconcerned over the quality of rural crops. Of the
670,000 which were established, 20,000 were cut by June. At the same
time, the CC called for an additional 350,000 APC by October, 1956.
In his July address, "On the Question of Agricultural Cooperation",
Mao Ze-dong suggested that the target be raised, to insure that every
xiang had at least one APC to serve as an organizational rnodel.2
This address, delivered to a conference of provincials and local Party
secretaries, marked the final resolution of the 1954-1955 debate, but
it was not published in ~ until October, after the sixth Plenum.
That meeting resulted in the "Decisions on Agricultural Cooperation"
which officially sanctioned the faster pace. Evidence whieh emerged
duriitg the 1960's alleges that Liu Shao-qi made a self-criticism for
going too slow on APCs. Deng Ze-hui and the Rural Work Department
were also criticised for "rightist tendencies", which, in the context
of the "high tide", indicates that this organ had supported a more
limited expansion of the movement and had probably authorized the
dissolution of non-viable APCs in the Spring.3
Some useful insights into the regime's rationale for
speeding up the cooperative movement" emerge most clearly in the resolu-
tions of the sixth Plenum.4 The ideological element of class struggle
Iziao, "Agricultural Cooperation," p. 97; Lieberthal,
Research Guide, pp. 70-71-
2Mao, "Agricultural Cooperation," pp. 95-96.
3Liberthal, Research Guide, pp. 73-7~.
4chao, Agrarian Policies, pp. 88~92.
appeared as A contradiction between poor and lower-middle peasants on
the one hand and upper-middle and rich peasants on the other. The
former were to form the nucleus of the new APCs; and the latter were
to be barred from initial participation. There was also an economic
argument in support of this approach. The legitimacy of cooperatives
rested on their ability to increase levels of production and peasant
incomes. Since the more affluent peasants already possessed a certain
level of capital and technical know-how, they did not generally
benefit from joining APCs and their forced membership usually created
problems which made such enterprises unstable. Therefore, the new
approach was to exclude them, and to organize the poor peasants so
that they could compete with the private sector.
t~en implemented, this policy would have reversed the
tendency toward polarization and limited the costs generated by dis-
rupted production. The long-range expectations were that the bulk
of the peasantry would thus be prepared, economically, for higher
levels of collectivism in property ownership and the relationship of
production. Potential opposition would be clearly isolated and slowly
deprived of economic viability.
The strongest indication that such expectations actively
entered into these policy calculations was the change in regUlations
on the freedom of withdrawal from APCs. Whereas the 1953 regUlations
had allowed peasants to take back all goods and capital upon leaving
the APC, the CC now ruled that all contributions.to the collective
1were inalienable. The example of Kim Si-yong thus became national
lIbid., p. 92.
public policy.
Following the guidelines set out by the resolutions·of the
Sixth Plenum, the State Council drafted model regulations for APCs in
November, 1955. These contained both a statement of goals and
oPerational procedures. The purpose of the APC was to make "unified
use" of members' land-draft animals and farm tools, and to turn these
means of production into "communal property".l The APC was also
responsible for the organization of labor and the distribution of
income according to work. It became the unit of responsibility and
liability for taxes, PP-PS, and the fulfillment of other contracts
with the State agencies.2 The key distinction between APC-l and
APC-2 enterprises rested on a legal definition of property ownership.
APC-ls continued to pay dividends to owners based on their capital
shares; APC-2s did not, since property was collectively owned. However,
since the CC directive had made property rights inalienable, this
distinction between private and collective ownership henceforward had
little practical relevance. The "private plot", along with personal
property and minor resources such as a tree, poultry and livestock,
became the only assets over which peasants in APCs exercised any
real control. 3
These policy statements indicated that the regime had
revised its collectivization time-table. The change first appeared in
the Draft Twelve Year National Agricultural Program, proposed in
lIbid., p. 95.
2Article Seven in Chao, ~rarian Policies, p. 97.
3Article Seventeen in Chao, Agrarian Policies, p. 98.
January, 1956 which pushed the targets of the First Plan (33 per cent
of peasant households in APC-ls by 1957) upward as follows:
1956
1957
85 per cent phh's in APCs
complete transition to APC-2s in
advanced areas:
complete transition to APC-2s in
all areas.l
1958
The schedule clearly ignored the class composition of peasant house-
holds. Moreover, since the rapid creation of APC-2s was a critical
factor in the p'Lan, it must be assumed that this issue -- and not that
of organizing poor peasants into low stage cooperatives -- had been
the major point of contention in the regime during the 1954-1955
policy debate.
The model regulations designed specifically for APC-2s were
issued in June, 1956. They were similar but more detailed than those
of November, 1955. The APC-2 was managed by a central administrative
committee which was to coordinate the work of household teams
(twenty peasant households) and APC's resources for production and
capital construction. Beyond production itself, income distribution
was the most critical function of all APes. The wage system employed
was based on the soviet model of "work days" and "work points". The
APC fixed norms for various jobs. As a rule of thumb, ten work points
were equal to one work day. This system was designed to promote
production incentives and a rational division of labor. Work point
values were derived as follows:
lChao, Agrarian policies, p. 14•.
1. Gross Production
- Agricultural tax (about 10\)
+ Sale of purchase quotas to state or
receipt of State subsidies
• Gross Income of APC.
2. Gross Income
- Costs of production (about 25\)




• Thtal work points accumulated
.e by members 1
• Value per work point.
Each member received payments in cash and in kind, based on his earned
proportion of the net.
Collectives usually computed incomes annually or bi-annually.
Advances were made to peasant households from the reserve funds during
Spring and Summer and these were deducted from incomes at the time of
disbursement. Throghout 1956, the regime experimented with the idea
of increasing the centralization of agricultural planning. Directives
set sowing and output targets as well as purchase quotas, prices and
tax rates for APCs.2 Rural markets were closed, and cadres were
pressured to create more high-stage APCs. These policies touched off
a series of inter-related problems.
Both. the APCs and the State administration were in need of
cadres with management and accounting expertise. Higher levels of
collectivization combined with more centralized planning intensified
lPrybyla, Political Economy, p. 169.
2Eckstein, China's Economic Revolution, pp. 78-80.
the canpetition between APCs and State organs over the small pool of
available experts. The APCs often resolved the problem by increasing
the size of each enterprise. Thus, while APC-2s were intended to
include only eighty to one hundred and twenty peasant households, by
mid-l956 most gretlto an average of two hundred and fifty households.l
As the xiangs and APCs became roughly similar in size, de facto,
mergers of people's governments and APC administration beca=e
common. since production concerns were critical to both structures and
both were short of trained personnel, these unions were logical.
However, they weakened the political role of xiang people' s
congresses.2
The CCP organs at that level appear to have been unable to
prevent this trend. This was a direct result of earlier regL~e
policies which had ignored rural Party building. Efforts began in
1955 to strengthen Party work at the village level. By the end of
FYP-l, i.e., by 1957, basic level Party organs were to be established
in each xiang. These in turn were to set up branches in the production
1Figures vary as to the average size of APCs in 1955. Some
sources set the average at 75.8 households; others at 116. All seem
to concur that they expanded to the 250 household average within the
year. See Chao, Agrarian policies, p. 55; and Prybyla, Political
Economy, p. 170.
2schurmann, Ideology and Organization, p. 488; Prybyla,
Political Economy, p. 170; and Hofheinz, "Rural Aaninistration ... ,n
pp. 140-159. A SC directive on December 27, 1955 called for the
simplification of administrative organs and the amalgamation of
xiangs into larger units to accompany the re-organization of produc-
tion enterprises. The regime was aware of the confusion between
economic and administrative funct~ons caused by this directive and
the high incidence of over-lapping personnel. It sought to keep the
xiangs and APCs distinct.
·.units.l The targets themselves were representative of the extent to
which the Party I s rural organization had degenerated. Between February
and December 1956, the percentage of APC-2s rose fran fifty-one per
. .. 2
cent to eight-eight per cent. By June, 1957 ninety-seven per cent
of .all peasant households were collectivizedi ninety-six per cent of
these in high-stage APCs.3 But,· the results of the 1956-1957 harvest
were again disappointing. Collectivization had clearly outstripped
the capacity of both state and Party to manage the new production
units.
The technological component of the collective model also
failed to keep up with the organizational changes in the agrarian
sector. The National Agricultural Development Program, often referred
to as the Forty Points, was drafted in 1955 to accompany the socialist
"high tide". It was designed as a twelve-year blueprint for Chinese
agricultural modernization and mechanization. 4 But, because it under-
went some eight revisions before its formal adoption in 1960, it must
be viewed as a "working model" rather than a definitive policy state-
mente Coming just behind the resolution of the "socialist high tide"
debate in 1954-1955 i·and reflecting the high expectations of that
period, the original draft of the Forty Points called for many
lLieberthal, Research Guide, p. 67.
2Victor Lippit, "The COlnIllune••••," pp. 229-230.
3schurmann, Ideology and Organization, p. • The breakdown
is given as follows:
84,000 APC-l - 4,497,000 peasant households
668,000 APC-2 a 113,414,000 peasant households
4Lieberthal, Research Guide, p. 75. For text sec Bowie
and Fairbank, Policy Documents, pp.
improvements in the agrarian sector. For the most part these were
labor-intensive programs for forrestation,.pest control, road building,
and increasing literacy.
~ong the proposals was a movement to popularize a new semi-
mechanized farming device developed in the soviet Union -- the
double-wheeled, double-bladed plow. In 1956 six million of these
were mass produced in China, with disastrous results. Fulfilling an
unplanned order on·this scale created a shortage in the steel indus-
try. And, the plows proved to be so unsuitable for use in most areas
of the country that they were removed from operation within the year.l
This experience with rapid technical innovation on a mass-scale
chastened Chinese policy-makers. When they began to draft the Second
Five Year Plan (1958-1962), the time-table for the mechanization ~f
agriculture was moved up to the next plan, i.e., the mid-1960ts.2
From an administrative perspective, control and the means
to achieve it in a collective environment became the major agricultural
policy issue of the mid-1950's. In September, 1956 a new series of
CC and State Council directives signaled a shift away from central
planning of production and procurement in rural policies. The
strategy was to give detailed plans only for purchase and collection.
The output targets on the other hand would be subject to provincial
adjustments before being handed down to the xian; and'the APCs would
lPrybyla, Political Economy, p. 260.
2Zhou En-lai, "Report on Draft of Second Five Year Plan,"
September 16, 1956, in Chao, Agrarian Policies, pp. 22-27.
use them as guidelines in the making of production decisions. 1 An
article in the journal, Planned Econany, which appeared in February,
1957, discussed the possible changes in the agricultural planning
system at length. 2 The author described the nature of the problem as
a function of both environment -- too much variation in climate and
growing conditions -- and institutional under-development -- no
communications processes capable of articulating local needs quickly
enough for cogent decision-making. The alternatives were presented
as a choice between two different rates of change rather than two
potential directions of change. The first was an immediate shift to
reliance on planned purchases, leaving planned production entirely to
the APCs. The second was a gradual transition from the system of
planned production and procurement to one of procurement alone. The
danger of an immediate shift was that APCs would increase their pro-
duction of valuable agricultural products rather than those needed by
the State.3 The strong implication was that the State would have to
rely once again on price mechanisms as substitutes for the bureaucratic
planning which had not proven to be economically feasible.
Thus, despite the high speed collectivization efforts of
1955-1957, the regime found itself back in a matrix of choice
lTargets from the center to the provinces included: planted
area; production per unit area; total production of grain (but no
specific types); industria! crop production; area "for forrestation;
production of fish and other aquatic products. See Donnithorne,
China's Ecomic System, p. 486.
2Yeh Chun, "Discussion on the Possible Changes in the "
Agricultural Planning System of China," Planned Economy, Peking, No.
2, February, 1957, in Chao, Agrarian Policies, pp. 136-142.
3Ibid., p. 139.
resembling its 1953-1954 position. Yet, choice was now complicated
by additional factors. In the agrarian sector, 740,000 APC-2s ~
struggled to subsist while supporting an industria~ base which had
expanded its demands on rural capital. However, the modern sector
could neither supply agro-technology to release rural labor, nor
absorb the bulk of that labor. Therefore, the farm cycle shifted
from periods of labor shortages to those of critical under-employment.
During the former, mass mobilization efforts were required to substi-
tute for unavailable mechanical equipment. During the latter,
IIlillionsflooded into the cities seeking non-existent employment.l
By mid-l957, the regime appeared to be without realistic options.
Behind periodic but minor adjustments in the fractions of land which
might be devoted to private production, and the loosening or tighten-
ing of restrictions on local markets, loomed a policy impasse. A
critical question faced the regime leaders: could the course
articulated in the first planning period be altered? And, if so,
through what means and at what cost cost Could this be effected?
Between 1953 and 1957, the Chinese agrarian environment
changed from a patchwork of private units to a system of over
700,000 APC-2s. The preceding overview of the policy processes
which·directed this transformation suggests that several critical
variables were operating simultaneously. For analytical purposes,
it is sometimes useful to disaggregate these factors as political,
lRMRB, "Joint CC and SC Directive on Prevention of Blind
Exodus of Rural Population, "; and editorial, "Stop Blind Rural
Exodus," in~, 1682:2.
administrative, or economic. However, if the political economyframe-
work bas any utility, it must be shown that such categories are not
discrete. Rather, the variables valued' relatively and employed within
a common"political market". policy analysis, therefore, does not set
out to differentiate "independent" from "dependent" variables in
these processes. It looks not fo·r sequence but for interaction.
~e logic of collectivization had manydimensions. By
eliminating the obstacle of private land tenure, the basic units of
atricultural production were physically expanded, undoing the frag-
mentation effect of land reform. Viewed in terms of usable labor and
the eventual application of mechanized technology, larger units were
more viable. At the same time, the political message of land reform
the definition of class on the basis of property ownership -- was
taken one step further in the collectives. The system of capital
shares first introduced peasants to the concept of use-in-common.
In the APC-2s, this was transformed into cammonownership. Moreover,
the continued existence of individual plots not only assuaged the
peasants' loss of property; it kept alive, in a concrete sense, the
distinction between collective and private ownership and the
tensions or "contradictions" between the two.
The percentage of land allowed for private plots was
determined by two criteria. The ceiling was based on the average
arable land per capita in the village and the plots could not exceed
five per cent of this figure. Within this range, size was based on
the number of persons in the household whowere membersof the
collective.l There was also some evidence that the 1956 proposals
for the Second Five Year Plan would have raised the maximum size of
private plots from five per cent to ten per cent of the land per
2capita in each APe. However, this was not carried through. The
Peasants preference for work on private plots rather than the collec-
tive lands was not always tolerated by the regime. However, just in
terms of stmple arithmetic, this practice could not yield a favorable
outcome for the peasants on a long-term basis. The major portion of
their incomes were tied to collective productivity. Their own plots
were useful as supplements, but they were too small to function as .
substitutes for collective endeavors. Sooner or later, the peasant
would have to choose between privatism and collectivism, and there
was little doubt which had become most "rational". But because he
still controlled a private plot, that choice was not only rational
but conscious and therein lay an important political threshhold.
A second dimension in the move toward larger production
waits involved the organization and use of rural labor. Functional
specialization, and the resulting division of labor, was only
possible if the pool itself was large and flexible. From an economic
perspective, this combination of aize and complexity was probably
viewed as necessary for efficiency and for the growth of material
productivity. Although the levels of modernization and mechaniza-
tion would not be significant until the mid-1960's the reorganization
lFor detailed discussion of the private plot see Prybyla,
Political Economy, pp. 170-172; Eckstein, China's Economic Revolution,
pp. 70-71; and Yang, Chinese Communist Society, p. 229.
2prybyla, political Economy, p. 234.
of labor use prepared an environment to which agro-technology could
be applied as it became available.
Viewing this same variable from a political perspective,
functional specialization in the agricultural process and a rural
division of labor had certain real advantages. The most positive
by-product, in terms of expanding the political market, was that the
village class structure would become obsolete. When incomes were no
longer tied to integrated relationships of production within discrete
land holdings, the social as well as the economic fabric of the cun
would be destroyed. The peasants' class consciousness and the
political calculus of the agrarian sector could thus be transformed
before the process of economic development qualitatively changed in
the rural base.
The growth of State planning organs and administrative
capabilities in the 1953-1956 period also contributed to the logic
of collectivization. Planning favored production units whieb could
be linked to national agricultural targets. Individual producers,
who exercised discretion over the use of land and labor' and the
disposition of output, were obstacles to the control of both produc-
tion and procurement. A real increase in levels of production was
needed and it was the regime's sincere belief that"" ••• the
economy of the small peasant is not capable of coping with this
continually rising demand".l Using APCs, planners could make pro-
duction goals and processes reflect State targets. Also, APCs were
more easily controlled than individual peasant households in the
lneng Ze-huai, "Rural Work: Its Basic Mission and Policy,·
~, July 23, 1953, in CB, 225: 4.
assessment and collection of their tax and procurement liabilities.
l: With respect to the "politics of the market place~,
collectivization was a calculated risk. The first.efforts to create
APCs bad been aimed at poor and lower-middle peasants. Only fifteen
per cent of approximately onc hundred and twenty million households
were orqanized into APCs by 1955, and these were primarily of the
semi-socialist type. Both regime and peasants measured success by
the same criteria: increased production, yielding increased incomes.
However, as the pace quickened, the care to distinguish among the
economic needs of the '\7ariousrural classes was abandoned. When the
Eighth Party Congree met in June, 1956, 91.7 per cent of all peasant
households were already collectivizedi 52.6 per cent of them in APCs
of the advanced type. I The "high tide" was ·accompanied by the
closing of rural free markets and fiscal policies which discriminated
against the private fanner. Moral, social, and political pressures
combined with the disappearance of the private alternative to create
a climate of inevitability. Collectivization was thus effected on a
mass scale without a high degree of outward peasant resistance.
The costs of collectivization must be weighed against these
benefits if a complete assessment of the policy is to be made. In
attempting agricultural reorganization, Chinese decision makers
encountered a paradox. The definite benefits which collectivization
had for agricultural production were of a long-term nature. They
were based on a more rational division of labor and the efficient use
lyang, Chinese Communist Society, p. 159.
of that labor on a year-round basis, especially for capital construe-
tion projects such as irrigation, and for subsidiary occupations.
However, the short-tem effects of collectivization would be highly
disruptive to the production process.l Experiments such as the
efforts at Kim si-yong indicated that the APe stage, while politically
attractive, contained certain endemic econanic problems which might
interfere with increasing production. Reorganizing the process meant
investing political and economic resources only to lose necessary
economic gains.
Such a computation of the aggregate costs of collectiviza-
tion may well be the underlying factor in the periodic caution
exercised between 1953 and 1957. In general, however, the regime's
preconceived certainty of the long-term econanic benefits of
collevtivization eclipsed its consideration of short-tem losses. The
demand for an increase in output levels was never qualified or
reduced. At the same time, the importance of critical administrative
and technological components of large-scale collective planning and
production were often dismissed.2
An over-view of the investment and output figures for the
First Five Year Plan suggests the nature of the economic contradic-
tions which this approach had created for the regime by 1957.
construction investments in agricultUre, inclUding forestry, irrigation,
lBenedict Stavis, "How China Is Solving Its Food Problem,·
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, July-september, 1975, pp. 32-35.
2see for example the viewpoints expressed by Mao, 1955,
"Agricultural CooperationU address.
and meteorology, averaged 7.6 per cent over the five year period. 1
'technical change was left largely to self-financed investments by the
peasants.2 On the basis of that level of input, the growth rate in
output peaked to 7.7 per cent in 1955, and then began to decline
sharply. In 1957 it was down to 3.5 per cent, nearly equal to the
1953 level and not sufficient to keep up with the growth in popula-
tion.3 This situation of economic decline is also reflected in the
extraction figures for FYP-l. Agriculture provided 12.4 per cent of
total State revenues in 1953 and 1954; but this proportion had fallen
to 9.5 per cent by 1957.4 Since the output value of agricultural '
production was placed at sixty per cent of the tOtal industrial and
agricultural output value for 1957, this decrease cannot be entirely
attributed to substitutions from within the modern sector itself. 5
Iprybyla, Political Economy,








2prybyla, Political Economy, p. 138. Investments were also
made indirectly and are not reflected in the annual agricultural
budgets. For example, some industrial departments used a part of
their budgets for forrestry,and irrigation; the PLA received alloca-
tions to reclaim waste land (on which the majority of State farms
were established). There were also relief funds and agricultural
'loans for rural areas channelled through various State agencies. In
general, however, the needs of agriculture were so great and its
resource base so poor that development beyond the subsistence level
was impossible without a conscious policy of direct involvement.
3Ibid., p. 125.
4Ibid., p. 134.
5eomputed in "net value". See Union Research Institute
(URI) COOIJl1unistChina: 1949-1959, (Hong Kong, URI, 1961), Vol 2,
p. 167.
�he regime's minimal investments in agriculture during the
FYP-1 occurred primarily in three areas: electrification; mechaniza-
tion; and chemo-ferti1ization. In 1953, agriculture used only 0.5
per cent of the net domestic supply of electric power •. By 1957,
agricultural use accounted for 1.3 per cent of the net, almost triple,
but still woefully inadequate.1 . In the other areas, investment came
as much from imports as from the development of domestic industries.
Chinese production of chemical fertilizer increased dUring that five-
year period; but do did imports of that camnodity. In 1952, the
country produced 51,000 tons more than it imported; by 1957 it
2imported 442,000 tons more than it produced. Mechanization efforts
followed a similar pattem. In 1957, 24,629 units of tractor stock,
(in 15 hp units), were in use, of which 22,000 physical units had been
imported from the USSR.3 Moreover, not all of these units were
.
employed in the collective economy, since some were reserved for use
on State farms. Keeping in mind that there were 700,000 APC-2s in
China by the end of FYP-l, these achievements demonstrate not only a
dearth of domestic investment but also the extent to which rural
reorganization had outstripped rural modemization.
Because agricultural production is a multi-level process,
lDonnithome, China's EconOmic System, p. 135.










3prybYla, Political Economy, p. 162.
the substitution of organization for technology did not fail across
the board. There were areas in which the increasingly collective
nature of production contributed directly to raising the output levels.
For example, the effectiveness of proqrams such as Land reclamation,
irrigation and water control; expansion of double-crop areas; and
popularization of superior seed strains and cultivation methods, was
enhanced by added control over land and labor utilization. However,
collectivization could do little to increase the availability of
electrici ty, chemical fertilizer, and tractors, and new growth limits
were soon realized.l Output increased significantly through 1955,
and then began to level off.
In te~s of planning and administrative capabilities,
collectivization did not prove to be the panacea for under-development.
Even at the APC-2 level, production enterprises were highly disbursed,
creating ~perational difficulties for central planners and limiting
the Statels potential to control the production-procurement process
2at any stage but the latter. lienee, the policy focus on opening
and closing rural markets. In 1955, restrictions were very tight as
an incentive to both grain collections and coll~ctivization. Markets
were reopened after the 1956 Harvest in keeping with the moderate
line of the sixth Plenum. A year later, they were closed due to
procurement deficits.
By 1957, the combination of low investment in technological
IFor a discussion of this issue, see Yang, Chinese Communist
society, pp. 216-~223.
2nonnithorne, China IS Economic system, p , 486.
areas and continued demands on output had strai~ed the elite/mass
political consensus on collectivization almost to the.breaking point.
That consensus had originally been defined in economic te~s --
increased productivity, yielding increased incomes. However,
ag~regate increases in agricultural production for the period-of~the
First Plan were just 1.7 per cent above the original target.
Assumptions which had been made about the relationship between
collectivization and output increases were thus proven false. The
growth rate was declining with each harvest. Not surprisingly,
extraction became a serious problem. For example, by November 1957,
the national purchase quota was only 57.14 per cent fulfilled. In
a. Da Gong Dao editorial it was noted that:
•• • • The food grain problem is an ideological
problem, and so long as the ideological prob-
lems of the peasants are not solved, food grain
work must encounter obstac1es.l
The regime's analysis suggests not that it was unaware of
the cost/benefit matrix created by its 1953-1957 policy approach.
Rather, it was trapped within it. Given its ideological preccncep-
tions, the Chinese regime could not have foreseen that =any of the
socio-economic effects of collectivization would be counter-produc-
tive to the expansion and maintenance of the political market. The
situation was particularly ironic given the care which had been taken
to avoid the terror and political alienation which had accompanied
soviet collectivization. However, administrative and economic exter-
nalities had combined to produce undesirable results.
l"Grasp Tightly the Task of Food Grain Collections, Purchase,
and Marketing in Rural Areas," Da Gong Bao, .December 4, 1957, in
~, 1683: 1.
Individual peasant incomes were essentially determined by
state price policies and by the relative efficiency of the relation-
ship between central planning and collective manag~ent. The latter
suffered from the lack of personnel qualified to deal with the complex
financial and technical needs of production and distribution within
the high-stage APCs. The gross output of grain increased by about
fourteen per cent between 1953 and 1957, and an increasing percentage,
nearly ninety per cent of the total output, had to be left in the
countryside just to keep the large population at the subsistence level.
Therefore, the real incomes of peasant households did not increase
significantly. 1 Moreover, due to the minimal investments made
in both consumer and agro-technical industries under the First Year
Plan, peasant purchasing power also suffered.
The dynamics of class stratification were operating on two
levels. In the so.ciety at large, agriculture, through taxation and
purchase quotas, was contributing heavily to the industrialization
process while enjoying few of its benefits. This placed severe strains
on the worker-peasant alliance upon which legitimacy restedl and
created instead a rural/urban dichotomy which threatened to widen
geometrically. Among the peasants, the size and quality of private
plots and coop land and the number of able, income-producing bodies
per household, caused stratification even at the APC-2 level.
Peasants thus received few tangible benefits in return for having
complied with collectivization. Their resource position relative to
lJohn Sigurdson, "Rural.Economic Planning," in Michel
Oksenberg, China's DevelOpmental Experience, p. 69.
'the regime offered them only one viable alternative. They retreated
from the political market to a less threatening frame of reference --
the cun.
The continuous waves of collectivization between 1953 and
1957 had failed to significantly undermine the physical or socio-econo-
me integrity of the~. In fact, MATs, APC-ls and the teams which
comprised APC-2s were roughly equivalent to small natural villages or
neighborhoods of larger villages. These collective production
units remained, like the ~, functionally integrated. Collectiviza-
tion institutionalized the loyalties and production relationships
within these structures and extended their life. Thus, the Chinese
collective economy before 1958 was, for better or worse, built on
1the limits of the cun, In many cases, traditional patterns of
behavior probably acted as substitutes for absent or ineffective
In odern infrastructure and helped prevent economic crises in the
process of agrarian reorqaniz~tion. But, when the regime attempted
to introduce new behavior patterns, the cun became an impenetrable
shell within which peasants could withdraw, often taking local
cadres with them.
Given the potential which still existed for the agrarian
sector to isolate itself -- within the very structures (APCs) Which
lWilliam L. Parish, "China -- Team, Brigade or Commune?"
Problems of Communism, Vol. 25, No.2, (1976), p. 51. The author
establishes this fact by tracing the clan or lineage branch
(signified by the predominance of a single surname), or traditional
clan hierarchies (signified by long-standing multi-surname patterns) ,
from the original cun through the various administrative reorganiza-
·tions since 1949. ---
had been created to facilitate its penetration -- it is likely that
Chinese leaders were highly receptive to alternative solutions. In
1957 they began to redesign the rural administrative formula which
preserved the functional integration of agricultural production.
Ultimately, they challenged the concept of collective land ownership
itself, in the communization policies of 1958-1959. In terms of
political economy, both policies may be seen as high-risk strategies
atmed at maxtmizing available resources for the rapid achievement of
high levels of economic and political development.
The COmmune Alternative
The era of the "Gre~t Leap Forward" (GLF), from 1957 to 1959,
was one of considerable agrarian policy activity in China. AS factors
.combined at many levels, the mechanics of the political market
became increasingly complex. For example, while administrative
infrastructure was partially decentralized, rural Party structures
continued to operate on the principle of democratic centralism.
Thus, authoritative linkages were both horizontal and vertical, such
that they resembled lattice-work rather than direct lines of command.l
These structures criss-crossed the agrarian environment, producing
.results which were sometimes congruent but at other junctures highly
conflictual.
There is a functional difference between decentralization and
modernizing the modalities of centralized rule.2 In opting for
ISchurmann, Ideology and Orqanization. See discussion of
"Decentralization I" and "Decentralization II," pp. 175-178.
2Ibid., p. 194.
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decentralization, the regime severed the 'relationship between central
planning and collective management by removing planning functions to
the enterprise level. But at the same time the definition of what
constituted an "enterprise" was widened considerably. The amalgama-
tion of APCs and xiangs led to the conceptualization of a multi-
functional structure, which ultimately emerged as the "people's
commune-.l
Communization necessarily affected the structure and compo-.
sition of the "political market". For the agrarian sector, communes
meant not only larger collectives but also a real change in the social
and economic relationships which governed everyday life. In the
initial stages, the regime took from the peasants virtually every
basis and symbol of their class identity. Rural trade, private plots
and even distinctions based on personal property (in some cases
household possessions down to the last pot and pan) were eradicated.
Brigades and teams were designed to perform specialized tasks, not
only within the agricultural production process but also in non-
field endeavors, especially capital construction projec~. Many
peasants lost physical and functional contact with the land -- a
change which struck far deeper than previous losses of title and
ownership.
The ccemunes also began to make real incursions into the
cun. Once the production process ceased to be functionally integruted,
and the households were broken apart, the system of "private"
relationships became irrelevant. Peasants were separated from all
1Parish, to ••• Team Brigade or Commune?-, p. 62.
traditional frames of reference, enemies and friends, elders and
children. ~ey were then recombined into politicized, task-oriented
groups. It was not a new idea, but classic and proven military
organization, now applied to an entire sector of society.
The major weakness in this approach was economic. Invest-
ments of external capital and transfers of technology -- the
necessities of agricultural modernization -- were still limited. But
wi thout them the price extracted from the agrarian sector for further
development was ~ high. Such an exchange could not be effected
without coercion, which would threaten the fragile political
consensus and the legitimacy of the regime. T~e regime was not unaware
of these potential costs, as indicated by the innovative functions
incorporated into the conmune economy.
In the communes, peasant labor power was directed not only
into rural construction but also into rural industry. Mid-level
cadres with technical expertise were redistributed (through the
process of xia fang) to the communes to supervise "factories".
Peasants were directed to apply "indigenous" methods, not only to the
manufacture of consumer goods, but also to production of industrial
materials such as steel.
The first stage of communization ended in 1959 with a crash
in the Chinese political market, not unlike the Western economic
debacle of 1929. At its root was a loss of confidence in the regime's-
currency of trade. AS is characteristic of such phenomena, it was
preceded by an inflationary spiral (in the political value of rural
resources) and was followed by critical levels of deflation. Once
the process began, its momentum increased rapidly. The effect of this
dynamic on Chinese policy processes was two-fold. There was an
unprecedented compression of the time-span ordinarily allowed from
(policy conceptualization through implementation to re-eva1uation.
Moreover, the latter was done purposively, involving the highest levels
of leadership and backed by the fUll weight of the regime's power and
authority.
The reformation of agrarian policy began with the Third
Plenum of the Eighth ce, which convened in September-OCtober 1957.
Some evidence suggests that there was awareness of an impending
shift in the rural policy line prior to this meeting. For example,
the Party had conducted an "anti-rightist" campaign earlier in
1957.1 Also the CC held a national Rural Work Conference just prior
to the Plenum where decisions were taken to reverse the trend toward
centralized production planning. However, this conference also
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called for a reduction in the size of APC-2s. Thus, while these
events signaled a change in approach, the specifics of content and
direction were as yet unclear.3
As it turned out, the anti-rightist political climate and
the search for a new agrarian policy line were closely inter-related.
Mao Ze-dong's analysis of February, 1957, had defined the major
contradictions in socialist society as those between the relations
of production and productive forces and those between the
lFor documentary study and analysis of this campaign, see
Bowie and Fairbank, policy Documents, pp. 341-388.
2Chao, Agrarian Policies, pp. 151-157.
3Lieherthal, Research Guide, pp. 99-101.
super-structure and the economic base.l He demanded public policies
which would aid rather than hinder the resolution of such contra-
dictions in an increasingly socialist direction. In agriculture, the
problems as he saw them, centered on both production and distribution,
and necessitated striking an appropriate balance between the interests
of the State, the collective, and peasant household. 2 On a larger
social scale, the interests of the agricultural and modern sectors
were also viewed to be in contradiction.
'l"hedefinition of "balance" thus became a critical pOlicy
issue at this point. The choice among alternatives always reduced to
the same problem: the price of modernization. Until industrial
developnent, or more specifically, the proportion of modem industry:
to the combined value of industrial and agricultural output, reached
a certain level, both would be dependent on agriculture. But the
distribution of resources between the two sectors resembled a
"zero-sum" game. In order to end the dependency of industrial growth
on agriculture, Chinese decision-makers had to somehow end the
dependency of agricultural growth on industry. Policy advisors such
as Ma Yin-qu, who would later be accused of promoting a "rightist"
approach, advocated some tolerance of rural capitalism and slowing
the rate of industrial growth as one possible solution to the quandary.
others opted for the Soviet model, extraction without investment.
But in the USSR, this policy itself stood poised on the brink of
lMao Ze-dong, "On the COrrect Handling of Contradictions
mong the people," February 27, 1957, in Bowie and Fairbank, Policy
Documents, p. 280.
2Ibid., p. 284.
change under Khrushchev's leadership. It too had produced diminishing
economic returns. Moreover, both policy choices contradicted Maoist
ideological and political criteria with no guaranteed economic pay-
off in return. 1
It was in this context that the regime became receptive to
a third and more daring solution -- a rapid and qualitative "leap
forward" in economic growth and social change. Between late 1957
and the Spring of 1958, the criteria for policy decisions in all
sectors became, "more, better, faster, and more economical results".2
By investing all available resources in one accelerated spurt of
qrowth, the Chinese hoped to push both economy and society over the
critical threshhold which separated an agrarian environment with
finite and limited resources from a modern industrial environment
with self-generating resources for further growth and change.3 This
would, at long last, end the inter-dependent relationship betWeen
agriculture and industry. But,if approached "correctly" it could
preserve and even promote the philosophical tenets upon which the
lsee discussion in Chapter Two, supra, pp.
2Liu Shao-qi, "The Present Situation, The Party's General
Line for Socialist construction and its Future Tasks," May 5, 1958,
.in Bowie and Fairbank, Policy Documents, p. 422.
3The value of industrial production in proportion to the
combined value of industrial and agricultural output in 1957 was set
at 39'. See Wang Guang-wei, "How to Organize Agricultural Labor
Power," Planned Economy, peking, No.8, August 9, 1957, in Chao,
Economic Planninq and Organization in Mainland China: A Documentary
Study, 1949-1957, (c~~ridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), Vol. 1,
p , 143. A good summary of the regine's expectations from GLF poli-
cies in both the i.ndustrial and agrarian sectors was provided by Li
Fu-chun, "on the Big Leap Forward in China's Socialist COnstruction,"
Hong Qi, No. 19, 1959, in~, 598: 35-45.
. regime's ideology and legitimacy were based.
The new approach was not developed in isolation from the
agrarian sector. In fact, its rationale was based largely on the
growing perception that agricultural development could be pursued
through a more efficient use of internal resources, using innovative
foxms of labor organization. At the time of the Third Plenum, a new
emphasis on self-reliance in agricultural enterprises began to surface
in some official policy statements, linked to the use of labor in
the countryside. one article noted that the dense rural population,
which was, on the surface, a liability for agricultural development,
coult be turned into an asset through proper o:t;'9anization.lThe
author suggested that organized labor power would not only take up
rural under-employment but also absorb urban surpluses and stem the
flow of unskilled peasants from the villages to the cities. The
argument was based on the possibility of substituting labor-intensive
methods for all areas of agricultural development where modern tech-
nology was needed but unavailable. This had long been the policy for
the production of food and industrial crops. But now the concept was
expanded to include large-scale endeavors in fertilizer collection,
forrestation, pest control, rural consumer industries, and especially
capital construction projects for soil and water conservation.2
Dong Ziao-ping's report to the Third Plenum also contained evidence of
this ne", focus. He called fer an increase in the common funds of APes·
to reflect the rise in the incomes of individual members and noted:
lWang, "How to Organize.
2wang, "llowto Organize •
. . ," p. 144.
. . ," pp. 148-151.
"Gradual expansion of the capital construction
of the cooperatives by their own resources is
not only a reliable way to develop production
and increase income, but also constitutes the
material basis for the consolidation of the
socialist system... A campaign should be
launched this winter and next spring to accumu-
late fertilizer and build irrigation projects •••
Other appropriate capital construction work
should also be carried on." 1
The idea of using APC labor for large-scale projects was
not entirely new, but it had not proven to be successful. Hidden
disincentives were created by the APC wage system, wherein the JllOre
labor days were earned, the more their unit value declined. This
could be off-set only if the increased labor resulted in a direct
and at least proportional increase in productive output. Therefore,
participation in large-scale projects with long-range benefits, such
.as irrigation, did not payoff. Peasants were naturally unwilling to
inve~t time and energy only to have the value of all their labor
decrease as a result.2 In some APCs, time spent on such projects
was not included in the computation of wages, and this was equally
unpopular. A factor which contributed to the overall disincentive
problem was the need to exchange labor between APCs, or coordinate
the work of several APCs on a single project. The more removed the
.task became from the peasants' immediate benefit, the more they
resisted. Despite this prior experience, the new policy directive
sought a more efficient and rational division of labor in the country-
side. Since this did not seem workable within the structure of APCs,
loang Xiao-ping, "Report on the Rectification Campaign,"
(to the Third Plenum of the Eighth CC), September 23, 1957, in Bowie
and Fairbank, Policy Documents, p , 353.
2Eckstein, China's Economic Revolution, p. 79.
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the regime was open to sU9gestionson new modes of organization.
The keynote speech of the Great Leap Forward (GLF) WAS
given by Liu Shao-qi at the second session of the Eighth Party Con-
qress in May, 1958.1 Before this same body, TM Zhen-lin discussed
the changes which had been taking place in agriculture.2 Both made
special note of recent experiences in labor exchange for large-scale
irrigation projects in flood-stricken areas and called for a greater
Party role in such work. References to sending more cadres and
educated youth to the countryside increased in the Spring and Summer
of 1958, raising the issue of "red vs expert" once again into
political prominence. with the eels Resolution on People's Communes
on August 29, 1958, the official step toward a reorganization of the
agrarian sector was finally taken.3
Despite their obvious congruity, the concept of a "canmune"
and the link between communization and the GLF were not created
within a single grand strategy. But neither were they a resul~ of
pragmatic or directionless decision making. Rather, a series of
trade-offs occurred in which available resources were a~plied to the
problems arising from well-articulated political and economic goals.
In the agrarian sector, three separate factors were at work, shaping
a ndw organizational format. When centralization of production
planning and management was abandoned, more responsibility fell on
lLiu shao-qi, "The Present Situation •••," p. 417-438.
2Lieberthal, Research Guide, p. 110.
3"Resolution of the een~ral Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party on the Establisl-.mentof People's eOIIllllUl,\eSin the Rural
Areas," August 29, 1958, (hereinafter, "the'Peitaiho Resolution").,
in Bowie and Fairbank, policy Documents, pp. 454-456.
the APCs to meet purchase quotas. At the same time, the collectives
were cOmmitted to raising the incomes of their members. Both goals
could only be achieved by increasing output. Sinc~ no significant
funds for capital construction in agriculture were forthcoming from
extemal sources, the APCS had to rely more heavily on intemal
resources of capital and labor to improve the production process. As
the scale of needed projects, especially in soil and water conserva-
tion, became larger, a more efficient use of available labor power
became necessary. ThUS, while the size of APCS was being
-consolidated", the need for them to be able to work together was
becoming greater.
~e attendant administrative problems were passed up to the
xiang level. This resulted in a new wave of de facto mergers of
APCs and xiang government organs during 1957, again due to shortages
in capable personnel. This trend was still frowned upon officially,
but no steps were taken to prevent it.l Instead, as decentraliza-
tion liberated personnel at upper levels of administration, the
countryside absorbed them. Cadres sent to intermediate and basic
levels were granted a great deal of discretion in decision making.
The only means to monitor and control policy process was to rely on
local organs of the CCP. This brought the rural Party. apparatus
into prominence for the first time since 1953.
The nature of the rural situation created more than a
lThe national total of APCs decreased through mergers from
992,000 in 1956 to about 750,000 in 1958. The average size was 170
peasant households, which usually·translated into 300 full-time
laborers farming 2,000 mou (about 330 acres) of land, see Yang,
Chinese Communist Society; pp. 159-160.
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·watch dog" role for the local Party cadres. Mass mobilization
efforts were based primarily on moral suasion, for there was no way to
demonstrate any immediate economic benefits to the peasantry. Coercion
alone on such a scale could have been costly and dysfunctional. There-
fore, Party cadres were more often than not at the front line of the
production and construction projects. Their assumption of political
leadership led increasingly to civil and economic administrative
responsibilities as well.
In retrospect, the GLF could have been launched without
communization, and camnunes could have been created without the GLF;
but by 1958, each contributed to the possibility' and logic of the
other. The link was effected by the overall inflation in the political
value of resources which marked the development of both policies.
The regime's immediate expectations for communization were
at once both limited and open-ended. The official position was cautious
in comparison to the magnitude of change which was taking place in the
countryside. In the last five months of 1958, '·-740,000APC-2s were
converted into 26,578 communes with an average size of 4,637 house-
1holds (2,000 laborers), farming 6,000 ~ (about 900 acres) of land.
They were thus equal in size to three or four xiangs so that each xian
became responsible for an average of fourteen communes. Key members
of the leadership conducted inspection tours in the Autumn of 1958
and were apparently jolted by the rapidity with which change was
taking place.
lYang, Chinese Communist Society, p. 160; also, Schram,
."Economic Management", p. 203; and a reference in S01P, 1872: 14.
," When the conununes were formed, through the merger of
xiangs and APCs, the Peitaiho resolution had called for the creation
of a central administrative apparatus at the common level. According
to the resolution:
'l'hesize of the communes and the all-round
development of agriculture ••••as well as of
industry ••••demand an appropriate division
of labour within the administrative organs
of the communes; a number of departments,
each responsible for a particular kind of
work, should be set up •••• The township
90vernments and communes should become one,
with the township committee of the party
becoming the Party committee of the commune
and the township people's council becoming
administrative committee of the commune.l
commune administration was broken down into various levels which
ultimately emerged as production brigades (roughly equivalent to
"larger ~ and/or APes) and their constituend production teams
(small villages or intra-village work units). There were also
speoialized brigades reoruited from all villages within the commune
and specialized teams reoruited from each village for particular
types of work.2 This organizational pattern did not create problems
of itself. Functionally, however, the commune was a much misunder-
stood device • In the ce's "Peitaiho Resolution", the emphasis was
.clearly on labor organization and not on changing the nature of property
l"peitaiho Resolution," p. ·455.
2schurmann, Ideology and Organization, p , 487.
ownership or the system of distribution.l However, the scope of
functions set out for the canmuneswas not compatible with cooperative
relatio~hips of production. At the very least, the division of labor
required to sustain agricultural production, capital construction,
rural industry, education, militia, and social services demandeda
change from the proportional distribution system to a wage system.
Moreover, as managementof the rural property, labor and available
capital became centralized in the commune,the de facto ownership of
land and capital also tended to gravitate to that level. From these,
it was a logical step to the notion that income derived from the labor
of the whole, on the assets of the whole, for the benefit of the whole,
should be distributed on the basis of the productivity of the whole.
'rhus, many communesadopted a free supply system for income distribu-·
tion, linked to the delivery of social services such as mess halls,
meal tickets, sleeping barracks, creches, schools, hospitals,' and homes
for the aged. The militia function of the communecontributed toward
this egalitarian mentality; but so did the scale of the projects for
which communelabor would be mobilized and distributed. Incomewas
thus taken completely out of the hands of the peasants. 2
The decision to authorize the use of rural labor for non-
field work lay at the root of these organizational and fiscal problems.
l"peitaiho Resolution." p. 456. The exact working is as
follows: IIAfter the establishment of people's communesthere is no
need immediately to transform collective ownership into ownership by
the people as a whole •. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •.• •. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . ..
• • •it is not necessary to hurry the change from the original system
of distribution. • • ..
2For a more complete discussion se~ 'Prybyla, Political
EconomX, pp. 289-291.
Commune-level projects were focused on building local industries and
with meeting, for example, steel production quotas which were now sent
to the rural areas as part of the national economic plan. The xiang-
as-commune was responsible for the production and accounting as well
as .for civil administration. But the cadres were npt necessarily
more adept at planning. In order to meet all of the competing demands,
peasants were taken away from agricultural production and traditional
subsidiary occupations, and often from needed capital construction
efforts in soil and water conservation. This created labor shortages
and ultimately a decrease in output. Moreover, peasant dissatisfac-
tion with the rapid incursions which communization had made into both
their private and social lives decreased overall labor productivity.
state procurement also suffered, both because there was less to
purchase and because mismanagement had increased consumption in the
form of waste. Thus, the whole system was caught in a downward spiral.
Lower purchases meant less income. for the commune as a whole which
exacerbated resources problems.
From an economic perspective, the GLF and the'communization
drive combined to generate policies which involved high-risk invest-
ments for short-term pay-off. Despite the shaky economic picture of
1957, the regime declared "full steam ahead" on a "great leap
forward". Its general line was the simultaneous development of
industry and agriculture.l While the priority on heavy industry
remained, agriculture was to keep pace by "walking on two legs"
lRMRB, editorial, "Full Steam Ahead," January 1, 1958, in
~, 1685: 1, especially p. 5.
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one traditional and the other modern. The roots of this policy were
deep in Mao Ze-dong's developmental philosophy, best articulated by
two slogans which came into wide-spread use during' 1958-1959. The
first. describing China asa nation that was "poor and blank", was
an acceptance of the environment upon which change must operate. The
second. averring that "the masses can do anything", was a commitment
to a particular technique for overcoming physical obstacles to
1development.
This standpoint had a direct effect on the issue of technical
transfor.mation, because it too became politicized. Chinese decision
makers did not argue about the need for modernization and mechaniza-
lion, but they came into conflict over the method of achieving these
goals. For some, technology was viewed narrowly, as an extension of
a modern, industrial society.2 As such it belonged in the hands of
exPerts. The masses had no role in ~ts development but would have it
'brought to them from above, when e~ough resources could be set aside
for efforts at that level. This position was reflected in such concrete
ways as establishing centralized institutes for agronomy and agro-
technology, and in keeping farm machinery in.the hands of specialized
3"agriculture machine stations" (AMS), directed by a central agency.
For others, technology was not viewed as narrowly or as mystically.
~o Ze-dong in Schram, Political Thought, pp. 351-353.
2see for example, Wei Yi, "Some Problems Relating to the
Simultaneous Development of Industry and Agriculture," Da Gong Eao,
January 5, 1958, in~, 1702: 20-23.
3For a description of the development and operation of the
Agricultural Machinery Stations (AMS), see Donnithorne, China's
Economic System, pp. 112-120.
No pranethean figures would carry the fire of technology to the masses.
Instead the masses would plan a direct role in technological develop-
ment -- adapting and improving existing tools and methods and creating
new ones alongside cadres who were both "red and experts".l
~chnology would come fran the masses, and the energy generated from
letting "the initiative and creativity of the laboring people explode"
would reshape them as well as their environment.2
The Politburo's August 1958 conference at Peitaiho in
adopting the resolution on communes also authorized implementation of
the Forty Points, although it remained in draft form. The program was









These technical improvements and traditional methods were designed to
strengthen that leg of the rural economy. The SC directive which
allowed APCs to own or manage the AMS was issued on May 8, 1958, just
prior to the nation-wide communization drive.3 However, the direct
benefits to most enterprises were negligible. In 1957 there were
three hundred eighty-three ~-owned AMS in the entire country. Two-
thirds were concentrated in three provinces of the Northeast.4 The
lsee for example, RMRB, editorial, "Both Red and Expert,"
February 1, 19?8, in~, 1720: 12.
2Mao Ze-dong at Second Session, Eighth Party Congress, May
5-23, 1958, in Lieberthal, Research Guide, p. 110.
3Lieberthal, Research Guide, p. 108.
4Donnithorne, China's Economic System, p. 115.
AMS controlled forty-nine per cent of the total tractors in operation,
which at the time was roughly equivalent to twelve thousand units (in
15 hp units) at stock.l Therefore, decentralization alone could not
alleviate concentration or the nation-wide shortage of agricultural
machinery. This left the modern: limb of the rural econany in a
deformed and paralytic state.
To alleviate this problem, the regime began to promote
commune industry, including steel production, as a means to provide
modern capital and consumer goods for the countryside. So began the
campaign to produce steel (by indigenous methods) from scrap metals·
donated by and expropriated fran peasant households. The cadres in
control had little knowledge" of or regard for finer points of the
Bessamer process, but they understood that steel was the basic ingred~
"ient for agricultural machinery. The State actually included locally
prociuced steel in its annual plan. This campaign stands as the best
example of the "two legs" formula in operation during the GLF, and of
the masses-versus-nature ethic of that period. It also became a
symbol of "waste growth" for those who would later attack that ethic. 2
In hard fact, 2.5 - 5 tons of steel, in approximately four hundred
different varieties, were needed to produce a single tractorJ about
six hundred specifications went into a single truck.3 This level of
technical sophistication could not have been met by China's modern
steel industry in 1958-1959. The crude product of the commune enter-
1 "Ibid., p. 115J Prybyla, Political Economy, p. 162.
2Pryby1a, Political Economy, p. 307.
3Ibid., p. 365.
,;prises was soon discovered to be economically worthless. Moreover,
the high demand for non-field labor in the commune economy had devas-
tating effects on production. In January, 1959 NCNA reported that the
.1958 grain collection had only been seventy-six per cent complete
an~ that shock movements were being organized to procure the remainder.l
While claiming "tremendous achievements" the State struggled throughout
the year to stave off economic crisis.
Despite the information which has become available since the
CUltural Revolution, it is still difficult to ascertain the extent to
which the regime had already become alerted to an impending agricul-
tural crisis after the first three months of communization. In early
November, 1958, Mao convened a conference, which is now designated as
the First ehengchow Meeting, whereat he suggested consolidation of
the corn:nunes. Before the end of the month a second meeting at
Wu-chlang repeated the call for consolidation and reduced some
unrealistic industrial targets for 1959 which had been set in August.
Immediately following this conference, the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth
CC met in an enlarged session and Mao Ze-dong relinquished his position
. 2as Chairman of the Republic. The evidence indicates that the regime
was clearly attempting to keep a close watch on rural developments.
But, as had so often been the case, the means to do so were limited.
Two non-Party conferences on agriculture were held between
December 25,1958 and January 3, 1959, followed by a national conference
of the directors of the eels rural work departments at the end of
lSCMP, 1936: 15-16.
2Lieberthal, Research Guide, pp. 123-127.
January.l This three-month assessment of the rural situation revealed
defects in fiscal management, labor utilization, and production
planning in the communes. The evidence suggested ~at cadres were
2losing control of "mass potential". Output claims for the 1958
harvest had been exaggerated; State purchases were poor; and shortages
had increased since November.3
An enlarged session of the CCls Politburo, known as the
Second Chengchow Meeting (February 27-March 10,1959), took official
notice of these problems in commune organization and its functions.
Several remedies were considered, aimed primarily at decreasing the
scope of commune-level functions. They include.d: making the ~ the
basic ~ of accounting and of allocating labor and income; restrict-
ing commune responsibilities for industrial 'work; requiring fair
compensation for requisitioned private property; paying more in wages
while allotting less for accumulation; and stressing the need for
continued income inequalities and use of material incentives.4 Such
a decentralization of functions would have restored decision-making
authori ty to a level below that of the former APC -- to the cun itself.
It would also have neutralized the commune's effectiveness as a
"labor-capital mobilization and income-rationing devicc".5. The Polit-
buro met again in Shanghai from March 25 to April 1, 1959, immediately
lIbid., pp. 130-131.
2SCMP, 1953:1-3.
3Prybyla, Political Economy, pp. 294-307.
4Lieberthal, Research Guide, pp. 133-134.
5pry?y1a, Political Economy, p. 289.
·:preceding the ec's Seventh Plenum. These sessions resulted in specific
plans for overhauling the communes. The production brigades were
made the basic accounting units, rather than the teams as Mao had
supposedly proposed earlier, but this appears to have been the only
change from the Chengchow's recommendations.l
The policies formulated after mid-1959 are usually described
as reflections of the "retreat" in agricultural organization. However,
in retrospect, they can perhaps be more accurately viewed as rational-
ization rather than a retreat, since the developments of 1958-1959 had,
on their own momentum, gone far beyond the policy intent. 2 The regime
was in session almost continually between late June and August 16,
1959, at Lushan in the province of Kiangsi. The business at hand was
to rectify problems in the communes, and more critically, to arrive
at some consensus on future policy directions within ~,e leadership
itself.
In the leadership's own assessment of its goals and achieve-
ments in 1959, the terms of debate are already evident. The operating
economic assumption of the Great Leap, especially with respect to
agriculture, was that through mass mobilization, better results could
be produced with the same or preferably less financial inves~ent.3
:Reflecting this belief, the State's construction investments in
lLieberthal, Research Guide, pp. 134~138; Mao Ze-dong's
address to the Seventh Plenum, Eighth CC is translated in SCHP 4000:22.
2Lippit, "The Canmune •••," pp. 235-236.
3Li Xian-nian, "Tremendous Achievements of the people's
Republic of China in Financial A~inistration in the Recent Ten Years,"
~, September 28, 1959, in ~,598:56.
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agriculture for 1959 were consistent with figures for the previous
decade -- about 8.6 per cent. This represented a one per cent increase
over the 1957 level. Other State eXPenditures were concentrated in
-national construction" (70 per cent), national defense (11.2 per
cent), and administration (5.2 per cent). The State's revenues in
1959 originated almost entirely (87.9 per cent) in the State-owned
economy (i.e., its industrial sector, commercial enterprises and
farms). The communes contributed 11.3 per cent, including the usual
7.4 per cent in tax.l This was nearly two per cent above the 1957
level. The 1959 budget was thus in line with the continued priority
on heavy industry, with the canmunes both financing their own develop-
ment and contributing more than they received.
Despite the modern sector's domination of the fiscal picture,
the national economy was not free from its dependence on agriculture.
The availability of investment resources was predicated on two "givens".
The first was that agricultur?l output would assure self-sufficiency
in food, and continue to supply the bulk of industrial crops and
trade commodities, including those produced by subsidiary rural
industries. The second was that yield levels could be maintained
through self-generated resources, without increased external input.
Clearly, a drop in agricultural production could still create critical
shortages and force the regime to lower the proportion of investment
resources devoted to construction in capital and defense industrie3.
Although the cost transfers between agriculture and industry
had never been extractive to the full extent of a Soviet-style
1Ibid., p , 49.
developnental model, they had been completely one-sided. The agrarian
sector had derived little benefit from the economic growth achieved
since 1949. This fact was reflected in the regime's Tenth Anniversary
assessments. The Chinese claimed a forty-three per cent rise in
peasant incomes since 1952. Part of this increase was due to a drop
in the rural tax burden (fran 11 per cent down to 8.55 per cent
inclUding local taxes). The rest was attributed to reorganization
and socialist patterns of ownership. The average annual income for
rural households in 1958 was placed at one hundred eighty yuan.l
This was already far bel~ the average urban incane.2 Moreover, an
unspecified portion of that one hundred eighty yuan was retained for
commune production costs. Supporting the canmune, with its large-
scale and often wasteful constructional endeavors, had became a major
problem for the peasants in 1958-1959. Less than 2 per cent of the
national bUdget was earmarked for financial subsidies to the commune
economy, and the State's 8.6 per cent allotment for construction in
the countryside could not begin to match the resource needs generated
by the high expectations of the GLF.3
lIbid., p, 60.
2Prybyla, Political Economy, p. 186. In the 1953-1957
period, the ratio of per capital consumption of worker to peasant
families was placed at 2.3:1, indicating that the peasants' real
incomes had not kept pace with those in the modern sector. T'h'iS
compounded the effects of monetary differences which are present in
most societies.
3Li Fu-jun, "••• Financial Administration ••• ," p , 48.
The 1959 budget totalled 52 billion~. Of this, 4.48 billion ~
was appropriated for agricultural construction and 1 billion ~ for
canmune subsidies. If the agricultural tax, which had remained fairly
constant after 1954, is excluded as "seepage", the agrarian sector
actually got out more than it put in. But the commune econcmy could
not meet the high expectations of the GLF. The regime had this data in
hand by 1960; and it probably contributed to its policy decision to
put "agriculture first" in the canmune economy.
Zn his report on the 1959 budget, Vice Premier Li Xian-nian
noted that on a single, major rural water control effort, the Hurl
River project, twelve billion cubic meters of earth and stone work
were completed in 1958-1959. This was accomplished, he readily
admitted, by relying on the financial, material and manpower resources
1of the peasants themselves. The brigades and teams were contributing
to these projects with labor and capital which should have been devoted
to agricultural production and subsidiary occupations. The demands of
the camnune economy usurped the use of these resources, and the
discretionary income in peasant hands also became negligible.
It has been said that a crisis is a situation in which a
previously tolerable set of circumstance is suddenly, by the addition
of another factor, rendered wholly intolerable. The 1958-1959 pattern
of resource distribution clearly reflected the assumption that the
rural economy would be made more efficient through communization and
that it could not only generate its own resources for investment but
also do more with them while continuing to contribute "surpluses" to
the modern sector. As it turned out, this assumption became a threat
to subsistence itself, a fact which was belatedly discovered by the
end of 1959. In their frustration over the fact that five hundred
million people had been tied down "merely" to produce food, and in
their desire to free economic planning from the strictures of economic
under-development, the leadership had ignored a critical factor --
only this sheer force of human energy stood between marginal surplus
and famine.2 once set in motion, the downward economic spiral
1Ibid., p. 56.
2Liao Lu-yan, "Glorious Achievements on the Agricultural Front
During the Past Ten Years, ~, September 26, 1959, in CB 604: 6.
produced by these policies could not be turned back. The regime had
neither the economic nor the administrative resources with which to
intervene. Therefore, it had no choice but· to pullout of the
aqrarian sector.
~ fate of procurement policies is particularly illustra-
tive of this withdrawal. In one "report, which called for rationing,
shock tactics and a "mass movement"to aid in the process of procure-
ment for 1959, the Food Ministry IS inability to meet extraction
demandswas frankly admitted. An "austerity" campaign was conducted
throughout the Autumnharvest period, with repeated references to
rationing in urban areas, caused by procurement problems in the
countryside.1 After this point, procurement figures were rarely
mentioned. Later reports revised the agricultural output figures them-
selves, and most analysts agree that grain production dropped off to
famine levels until 1962, a period which the Chinese refer to as
"the three lean years".2 It is, therefore, unlikely that the regime
was able to enforce its procurement quotas during this time.
In the latter months of 1959, all hopes for a "great leap"
were abandoned. Rationalization took place within a less dynamic
strategy which, for the sake of continuity, was referred to as the
·continuous leap". 3 In a reaction to the "waste growth" of the GLF,
ISba, "Food Grain," p. 34.
2Prybyla, Political Economy,r~. 9, especially p. 347.
3Shu Tong, "Apply the Theoretical Weaponof Uninterrupted
Revolution and Promote a Constant Leap in Agricultural Production,"
RMRB,Febr~ry 6, 1960, in SCMP,2199:2; also, Shih Hsiang-sheng,
"Questions Concerning the Consolidation and Developmentof People I s
Communes,"~, March 14, 1960, in~, 2226:2.
the new emphasis was on "proportionate development" and the "harmonious
1resolution of relationships". Struggle and contradictions were
demoted, and so, necessarily, was the ideological essence of the Maoist
developmental approach.
The political crisis within the regime which developed over
the GLF and conununization has since been reinterpreted in light of the
CUltural Revolution. This has helped to clarify the issues. The
entire strategy of the GLF came under severe attack at the Lushan
Plenum, and division surfaced which went far deeper than a disagree-
l'IIentover the "general line". Mao's right to define the situation'
was itself challenged. This created a major control problem for the
CCP, for it had become a house divided against itself. The selective
enforcement of anti-left policies at the basic levels and anti-right .
policies at the intermediate and upper levels could not be accomplished
within the organizational ethic of "democratic centralism". ".rhus,the
Party's effectiveness was in serious jeopardy from Lushan onward -- a
basic theme of the Cultural Revolution. Chinese elites had, in the
"ten great years" since 1949, lost the political consensus which had
brought them through all previous tactical crises. Until the definition
of "politics" was again consistent at the elite level, the recreation
and stabilization of the political market was impossible.
In the aftermath of Lushan, changes in common policy involved
three key issue areas; the functional scope of labor utilization; the
lLi Fu-jun, "Hold Aloft the Red Banner of the Party's General
Line and Strive for Continued Forward Leaps in Socialist Construction,"
in ~, 602:20-21; also, Prybyla, Political Economy, pp. 302-307.
ownership of the means of production; and the basis of incane distribu-
tion. The most far-reaching decision taken at the Plenum was to re-
emphasize agriculture as the principle function of the communes. At
the start of the conference, Mao Ze-dong issued "important instruc-
tions" and is purported to have called for a policy of "agriculture
first".l At the Plenum itself, targets set earlier in 1959 for steel,
coal, grain and cotton were lowered. More significantly, rural
industries, especially those producing steel "by indigenous methods"
were removed from the State plan and placed entirely under local
control. 2 By the Summer of 1960, limits were being placed on the
amount of labor time which communes could allocate for non-field work.
In mid-1961, these were specified as two per cent of labor time for
production brigades and five per cent for the teams.3 The Eighth
Plenum also issued a resolution on developing the campaign for
"increasing production and practicing economy", aimed primarily at
the agrarian sector.
As an administrative concept, the commune was not entirely
abandoned. It remained, as Zhou-En-!ai noted, "••• a'good organiza-
tional form and a valuable experience for the future switch of the
rural areas from collective ownership to ownership by the whole
,,4people ••• However, the operational time frame for such a
lLieberthal, Research Guide, p. 142.
2 .Ibid., p. 147, Prybyla, Political Economy, p. 298.
3Prybyla, Political Economy, p. 299.
4Zhou En-lai, "Report on Adjusting the Major Targets of
China's 1959 National Plan and Further Developing the Campaign for
Increasing Production and Practicing Economy," August 26, 1959, in
Bowie and Fairbank, Policy Documents, p , 544. The same theme is re-
flected in the ~ editorial, August 29, 1959, in CB, 590: 19-22.
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transition became increasingly less specific while the definition of
appropriate objective conditions became far more demanding. By April,
1960 the criteria was set out as follows: an aver~ge per capita
annual income of one hundred fifty to two hundred yuan (or twice the
1960 level); a preponderance of commune ownership within the overall
commune economy; a basic income equality among all production brigades
in the commune; and the widespread mechanization of the countryside.l
The political ramifications of these policies, in terms of
the market value of rural resources, were devastating. The Lushan
resolutions, warning against over-centralization, made the brigade
the basic unit of ownership. The decision of the seventh Plenum,
which had returned only accounting responsibilities to this level, was
thus taken one significant step further. 2 In the brigades and
teams, land ownership, decision making, and the utilization of labor
were reintegrated and again· focused on the agricultural process.
Incane distribution was also re-conceptualized, from a "free supply"
to a wage system or a proportional system based on relative produc-
tivity. Policies were reformulated such that they returned to the
peasants the minimal accoutrements of their class -- the household,
private plot, and the freedom to trade. Having made these adjustments,
the regime's intent after Lushan appears to have been a partial return
to the mass-mobilization policies of 1958, with the focus on
lTan Zhen-lin to the Second Session of the Second National
People's Congress, April, 1960, in Lieberthal, Research Guide, p. 1571
and Prybyla, Political Economy, p. 298.
2"Resolution on Developing the Campaign for Increasing
Production anq Practicing Economy," August 16, 1959, in Bowie and
Fairbank, Policy Documents, pp. 536-537.
· agricultural production rather than "simultaneous development".l
But, when operationalized, economic and administrative externalities
combined to produce an even greater deflation of political values.
Private production and traditional social supports were, for at least
tWo years, the mainstays of peasant survival. Thus, rural resources
became de-politicized and slipped back into the domain of the cun,
The regime was unable to intervene; and most of a year passed without
a major policy redefinition. Beginning in 1961, attempts were made
to revitalize the agrarian political environment. It is to the
analysis of the policies which guided that process that this study
now turns.
lsee Lieberthal, Research Guide, for a summaryof the
Party and government meetings known to have been held at this time
and information with respect to their agencies.
CHAPTER FIVE
A MODEL FOR AGRARIAN DEVELOPMENT:
CONSOLIDATING A NEW POLITICAL CALSULUS
~e definition of development, in terms of political
economy, involves the creation and management of scarce resources
such that they become politically productive.l In the aftermath of
Lushan, the Chinese leadership saw its agrarian resource base
destroyed by economic disasters, administrative chaos and political
withdrawal. Not surprisingly, this situation precipitated a re-
assessment of the policy line in terms of long-term developmental
goals. This was the second such review, the first having taken place
just.prior to the GLF. However, the environment of choice was now
qualitatively different.
Whenever rural resources left the political market they
returned to the agrarian sector; more specifically. to the~. In
l~57, the regime had enough rural infrastructure (CCP organs, basic
level cadres, and APC-2s) to transcend the authority of traditional
structures. It traded on this authority in implementing communization
policies. But it did so with the expectation that eccnorad.cand norma-
tive benefits for the peasants would soon follow.2 They did not; and
as a result the leadership also lost on this investment.
lUphOff and llchman, The Political Economy of Development,
pp. 75-121. See discussion in Chapter One, supra, pp.
2Mao Ze-dong, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions
Among the People," in Schram, Political Thought, pp. 304-312.
In seeking to bring rural resources back into the political
market after 1960, Chinese planners had two options. They could try
to recreate the 1957 choice matrix including its political calculus,
and then proceed with alternatives which had been rejected or ignored
at·that time. Or, they could use the 1957-1959 experience as the
basis of a new political calculus, which might indicate some different
alternatives for resource use or investment.
From an ideological perspective, these two options
reflected fundamentally opposite world views. The former was a denial
of the inherent progressive dynamic in dialectical processes. It led
to a rejection of the use-value of class conflict and struggle in
policies for development~ and the assessment of such policies as
"left-opportunist" or "adventurist". By contrast, the latter view
constituted an affirmation of the dialectic. Its adherents sought the
"progressive" element which emerged after GLF. Once located it would
form the catalyst for further social change.l Solidification of the
socio-economic status quo on the basis of "common dencxninators':'was
rejected as "right-opportunism" and "economism". A conacdous return
to the 1957 political calculus and its choice m·atrix was "revisionist"
the end of revolution. And at the socialist stage, revisionism,
however expressed or disguised, could not be other than a "capitalist
road'.'.
All of these stock epithets of the GPCR emerged in the early
1960's, reflecting the growing ideological schism. They are relevant
lThis view was reflected in the "one into two" vs "two into
one" debate of the early 1960's. Eee discuSsion in Chapter Two, supra,
pp.
to the political economy of policy making on many levels. The lack of
unity over philosophical rather than strategic or technical issues
makes it impossible to speak of "the regime" as a .calculator in
either monolithic or consensual terms. The particular locus of any
decision taken at the center became a critical factor in terms of
policy intent. The vehicles through which certain elites would attempt
to implement their decisions also became important. For example,
by 1964 the Maoists were making use of PLA rather than CCP organs to
pursue rectification policies in the countryside.1 Failure to
establish an elite consensus also effected policy processes in that
it destabilized the parameters of choice. Ideology began to behave
as a political resource as well as an institutional and philosophical
constraint. ~oreover, in light of the competition, its political
value was inflated as factions vied for monopoly. In a short time,
it became the only legitimate currency of exchange, penneating the
process of resource valuation and all trade-offs in the system.
In Chapter One of this study it was stressed that the
poli tical economy framework, unlike other analytical approaches,
accepts and operates within particular environments on their own terms.
It does not contain a priori assumptions about systemic boundaries,
nor does it define ideology as dysfunctional. When the environment
of choice becomes fluid, and all the variables within it are in
motion, there is a temptation to equate the resulting instability and
conflict with confusion or with a lack of continuity. In a rapidly
changing situation, periods of indecision and institutional incapacity
lCharles Neuhauser, liTheChinese Communist Party in the
1960·s ••• ," pp. 3-36.
are inevitable.l However, it is precisely this type of political
crisis which calls for a re-definition of goals and values. It is,
therefore, neither "irrational" nor couneez-producedve to employ
ideology as a political resource and force tensions and contradictions
into the open. By employing a political economy framework, it will
be shown that while agrarian policies made between 1961 and 1964 were
necessarily more complex, there were certain continuities both in
tems of the variables involved and the dynamics throU<Jhwhich they
were recombined to increase resource productivity.
By 1964, rural resources which had escaped from the
political market in 1959 had been repoliticize~. More importantly,
a model for agrarian development was operationalized which was able
to combine th~ exigencies of undezvdeve Iopmerrt;wi th long-range
political and economic goals. The formulation of this model involved
resource trade-offs between the agrarian sector. The model was politi-
cized through a re-definition of the rural class structure. But at
the same time, it promised tangible material benefits to production
units based on "self-reliance". This model thus produced a self-
generating dynamic within which resource generation, availability and
productivity could take place. In this sense it may be defined as
"developmental".
A review of agrarian policies suggests two critical dimen-
sions in the development of this agrarian model. In the three year
period immediately following the Lushan Plenum, Chinese decision
makers did in fact attempt to recreate the 1957 political market.
lH~tington, Political Order. p. 21.
This choice was based on a reassessment of earlier political "contra-
dictions" • Some members of the regime now believed that these had
not been generated by the collectivization of the agrarian environment,
but rather by the failure to accompany that process with appropriate
inputs of capital and technology.l There had been no logical and
comprehensive economic evolution from mutual aid, through cooperatives
and collectives, to cormnunes. The lack of congruent increases in
modernization and mechanization at each stage had resulted in
diminishing economic returns for both the agrarian and the modem
sectors.
The fact that this produced a negative'political outcome
rural class restratification and a gap between the cities and the
~untryside -- probably underscored the extent to which GLF policies
.had wandered from any "orthodox" reading of Marxism. Both at Lushan
and at the Tenth Plenum in 1962, Mao was forced to defend his 'inter-
pretation. His "self-criticisms" indicate that several regime members
saw a pre-occupation with the superstructure -- resulting in a
neglect of essential economic factors -- as the basic flaw in the GLF.
Mao himself noted:
• there are many problems in the work of
economic construction which I still don't
understand. I haven't got much understanding
of industry and commerce. I understand a bit
about agriculture, but this is only relatively
speaking .••••..•..••••••.•.••...•....••.••.•.•
IThis assessment is clearly. expressed in the articles which
appeared in support of the "agriculture first" policies. See for
example, Jiang Wei-ging, "Unfold Widely the Mass Movement in Support
.of Agriculture," in S01M, 220:9.
.•........................................
Up to now, however, my knowledge of these
matters has been very scanty. I have paid
rather more attention to problems relating
to the system, to the productive relation-
ships. As for the productive forces, I
know very little.l
In order to remedy this situation, some changes in rural
organization and investment priorities were indicated. The former
were designed to bring the organizational framework of production
relationships back down to a level congruent with the existing
level of agro-techn6logy -- the team. The latter shifted responsi-
bility for agro-technology back ~ from the local enterprise to
central planning and administrative organs.2 For example, at the
Second Session of the Second NPC, in April 1960, the Forty Points
document was formally-adopted, its subject matter basically unchanged
from the initial 1955 draft.3 Nowhere in the Points or the Preamble
was the existence of communes mentioned. But Tan Zhen-lin, who pre-
sented the program to the assembly, stressed that the communes
conformed to the structural needs of the program's goals. He advised
that: "Each commune should, according to its conditions, adapt itself
to the requirements of the program for agricultural development". 4
In the struggle for production, the fruits of success would
lMao-Ze-dong, in Schram, Talks and Letters, pp. 175-176.
2Prybyla, political Economy, p. 366.
3"National Agricultural Development Program (1956-1967),"
the text as formally adopted, ~, April 11, 1960, in CB, 616:1-13.
4NCNA, "Full Text of Vice Premier Tan Zhen-lin's Report on
Program for Agricultural Development," April 6, 1960, in .f!!., 616:19-25.
be reaped almost entirely by peasants themselves; but the costs of
failure would also be theirs alone to bear. This reestablished the
pre-GLF consensus between elite and mass on rural economic goals.
Within it, the peasants remained at a resource disadvantage, but
regained more control over the use of land and labor and the distribu-
tion of incane. The regime trade-d this control for stability in the
countryside. Rural reorganization paralleled these changes, which
sanctioned a return to integrated functions and processes within
traditional structural boundaries.
The peasant household, one house plus private plot, remained
as the basic social unit, supplying labor to the teams. The cun
lived on in the production team, comprised of twenty to thirty peasant
households in geographical proximity, invariably affiliated by kin-
ship.l After 1962, incomes were based on the collective produc-
tivity of these unitS which differed on the basis of land quality,
management efficiency, and the quantity of available labor. Individual
household incomes subsidized by private plots again differentiated
classes among the peasantry. The production team was at the hub of
these social, economic, political and administrative relationships.
Since it contained the lowest rung of CCP rural organs, the
brigade became the basic political unit in the countryside. As such,
it supervised the teams in production planning, allocation of labor
and equipment, wage distribution, and meeting tax/purchase quotas.
As the center of political leadership, the brigades emerged as the
chief link between interests of the regime and those of the agrarian
lparish, "••• Team, Brigade or Commune?", p. 65.
sector. In contrast, the canmunes took no direct role of any kind in
farm production after 1961. Commune-level organs made tax and procure-
ment collections, supervised all rural canmerce (both State supply and
marketing or private trade), and managed local rural indUStry. Educa-
ti~n and health facilities, where they existed, were also centered in
the communes. Moreover, they took over responsibility for the innova-
tion and distribution of agr-technical advances.l The communes
retained the right to mobilize rural labor for emergencies such as
flood control and to regulate all rural industry and commerce. As
such, they became the official administrative unit of the State below
the xian.
By 1962, the GLF policies had been rationalized, the economic
crisis had passed, and rural organization was stabilized. In terms of
infrastructural development, the costs of the initial investment in
decentralization in 1957-1958 were beginning to be outweighed by
long-term gains. Under the broad rubric of socialism, each commune
pursued its own socio-economic blueprint for the future and retained
and employed the bulk of its own resources towards this.end.2
For some members of the regime, the tasks of the Tenth
Plenum,held in September 1962, were two-fold: to define in a broad
sense the "correct" relationship between short-term expediency and
long-term political and socio-economic goals; and to then repoliticize
lprybyla, Political Economy, p. 423.
2Audrey -Donnithorne, "China's Cellular EconomYi" p. 608.
agricultural policies according to that standard.l In the face of
this task, ideological interpretations began to battle for primacy
at the decisional center. Launching their attack against the
economistic approach to agrarian development, the Maoists reduced
their position to three issues: class relationships, production, and
technology. Characteristically, "these were presented as inter-related
"struggles", generated by the "contradictions" inherent in China's
socialist development.2 It was still assumed at this point that
the conflicts were non-antagonistic and could be handled "correctly"
by a unified Party committed to that end. Therefore, Mao's group
called for a Socialist Education Movement (SEM) directed primarily at
the countryside.3 In the course of this campaign, the rural cl~ss
structure was reassessed and there was a renewed emphasis on struggle •.
COnflicts thus took place simultaneously -- within the
elite, within the agrarian sector, and between the agrarian sector
and the regime -- from 1963 onward. The result was a long-term policy
consensus for the countryside. It was a model popularized by the
slogan, "Learn from Dazhai", and incorporated ideological, political,
organizational, economic and technological goals and trade-offs. The
Dazhai model -- economic self-reliance, mass research, and class
lThe sub-campaigns of the SEM, particularly those aimed
against such "feudal" practices as observing traditional holidays and
paying homage to deities, reflect the extent to which the cun had
endured the strains of revolution on the rural social fabric.
2Mao Ze-dong, "On Democratic Centralism," (1962),' in Schram,
Talks and Letters, pp. 158-187.
3Mao Ze-dong, Address at the Tenth Plenum, in Ibid., p. 193.
struggle at the production brigade level, within an overall commune
framework, became (and remains) the prorotype of Chinese agrarian
1development.
Agrarian Self-Reliance: the Pol!tics of Technology
In redesigning its administrative approach to the rural
areas after the GLF, the Chinese leadership adopted a strategy which
simultaneously combined centralization (of some planning functions) in
State agencies, with decentralization (of implementation functions)
within the communes. The latter included allowing production units
to negotiate targets and quotas in light of lo~al conditions.
There is some question as to how much of this strategy
evidence suggests that changes taking place at the local level were
directed largely by the imperative of survival. The leadership simply
made them "official". For example, after the Autumn harvest of 1960,
policy editorials appeared in RMRB which made the team rather than
lA discussion of the Dazhai model as a prototype will be
taken up later in this chapter. Two recent publications which summar-
ize the Dazhai experience and underscore its function as a role model
are: Hua Guo-feng, "Let the Whote Party Mobilize for a Vast Effort
to Develop Agriculture and Build Tachai-Type Counties throughout the
Country," (Peking: FLP, 1975); and Chen Yong-gui, "Thoroughly Criti-
cize the 'Gang of Four' and Bring About a New Upsurge in the Movement
to Build Tachai-Type Counties throughout the Country," (Peking:
FLP, 1976).
2union Research Institute, Documents of the Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee: september, 1956 - April, 1969, (Hong Kong:
URI, 1971), Vol. 1, pp. 173-176.
the brigade the basic accounting unit.l This further decentraliza-
tion of the production process shortened the distance between collec-
tive ownership, labor and income; and gave the peasants more immediate
control at a time of crisis. Officially, ownership of the means of
production remained at the brigade level; but the teams were given
use of the land, labor, draft animals, and equipment.
Usage soon developed intO de facto ownership when the teams'
shares of these entities were guaranteed by the system known as
"four-fixed".2 The teams' discretion over distribution was also
institutionalized by the policy of "three guarantees and one reward".
The team operated under a plan which stipulated the amount of work to
be done (labor efficiency); the output (based on a quota); and the
costs of production. The reward consisted of additional wage points
to members for overfulfillment of the quota. Together, these
guarantees and stipulations formed the basis of a contract among the
brigade, the team and peasant wherein each party gave assurances which
were accepted for planning purposes by the others.3 The State
tailored its procurement policies to conform to these changes, making
the team the basic unit of accountability for taxes and purchases.4
Some evidence indicates that the teams may have devolved these respon-
sibilities still lower -- to work groups or "small·teams", and even to
individual peasant households.S
loonnithorne, China's Economic System, p. 52.
2Lewis, Leadership, p. 239. 3ibid.
400nnithorne, China's Economic System, p. 486; Eckstein,
China's Economic Revolution, p. 60.
5Prybyla, Political Economy, p. 353.
In the year which had passed since Lushan the situation in
the countryside had deteriorated.l Agricultural production had
fallen off to such levels that shortages were turning rapidly into
famines. This crisis could not be attributed entirely to communiza-
tion since the country had also been plagued by a series of natural
disasters. However, the mismanagement and waste of resources which
had accompanied the initial stages of the commune experiment were
definitely seen as contributing factors. In August, 1960 a CC
conference of all provincial Party secretaries met at Peitaiho. That
body resolved to expand the primacy of agricultural production in the
communes to the economy-as a whole, with "agriculture as the base;
industry as the leading factor". 2 But what this meant in practice,
in terms of investment priorities, administrative models, and
political rationale was still unclear.
Again, there were choices to be made; trade-offs to"be
offered. Central decisional machinery, uncertain of its mandate,
proceeded with caution. The hesitation in translating a commitment
to agriculture into significant investments is reflected in the 1960
economic plan. Although agriculture was hailed as the "foundation" of
the national economy, its piece of the fiscal pie remained at 7.8 per
cent, and the priority for investment still went to the modern sector.
The plan did double the amount of steel set aside for the manufacture
of agricultural products over the 1959 level; and earmarked more of
lLieberthal, Research Guide, p. 160
2Ibid• The timing of the conference, in August, is also
suggestive since the harvest was imminent and projections could be made
.wit.h some certainty. In retrospect, these must have been poor.
the funds available through the People's Bank for agricultural loans.l
But as an instrument for the implementation of "agriculture first",
the 1960 plan cannot be seen as evidence of a serious commitment.
At the Ninth Plenum in January, 1961 it was noted that this
approach, combined with more natural disasters, had resulted once
again in an under-fulfillment of "agricultural production targets. Li
Fu-chun recommended still more support for the rural economy • There
followed a new focus on light industry: tolerance for free markets
and an emphasis on supply rather than extraction. The private plots
were fully restored. Most of these changes were contained in a
detailed document issued after the Ninth Plenum, referred to as the
"Draft Articles on Rural Communes", or simpty, "The Sixty Articles".
The rate of growth in heavy industry was slowed by a policy of
"filling out and raising standards" which focused on the quality
rather than the quantity of production.2 Capital investments were
primarily confined to agricultural support industries. The recommenda-
tions of the Ninth Plenum were implemented nationally after 1961.
In retrospect, the various factions developing within the
Chinese regime agreed upon the "agriculture first" policy. They
disagreed, however, on the issue of selective subsidization 7 and on
the level at which agro-technological research and development
ILi Fu-jun, "Report on the Draft 1960 Economic Plan."
March 30, 1960, in cn, 615: B and 137 and Li Xian-nian, "Report on·
Finance to the NPC,-"-March 31, 1960, in cn, 615:33.
~CNA, "Connunique of the Ninth Plenary Session of the
Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," January
20, 1961, in~, 644:2.
facilities should operate -- local, provincial, or central. Choices
concerning the use of external capital and technology in the agrarian
sector, although ostensibly "economic" also must be viewed within the
political cost-benefit framework. When the choices are seen in this
context, inter-relationships which might otherwise be ignored not only
become visible but also assume wider analytical importance.
Although the policY of "walking on two legs" was not
completely scuttled after 1960, there was a conscious 'attempt to
strengthen its modern technological limb. Two factors were at work
in this change of emphasis. Firstly, decision makers came to view '
agro-technology as a necessity rather than as a luxury and this forced
it into their budgetary calculations. Secondly, the break with the
soviet Union and the Eastern bloc cut off the principle source of
external supply and raised technical self-reliance to top priority •
.
one of the earliest examples of this new recognition was the creation
of a separate Ministry of Agricultural Machinery in August-september
1959.1 It reflected an important commitment to the development of a
domestic agro-technical industry for tractors, light transport and
mechanical power pumps for irrigation. It also indicated functional
specialization in an area which had heretofore come under the multi-
focused administration of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, due
to internal resource limitations, the machine-building industry could
not alleviate the shortage of agricultural equipment, which remained
lReferences to the creation of this body may be found in:
Agendy of the 9Ist meeting of the SC, August 25, 1959 and of an NPC
Standing Committee meeting on August 26, 1959, in ca, 637:1; ~,
'451; and Donnithorne, China's Economic System,'p. 112.
nation-wide. The same was true for danestic agro-chemical industries
which also began to increase their output of fertilizer and pesticides
after 1960.1
~e Chinese made great strides in aqro-technology~1n~the
early 1960's, but in every critical area they were building virtually
from the qround up. For example, in 1960, agriculture used only
1.7 per cent of the nation's net supply of electrical power (a rise
of only .04 per cent over 1957). By 1962, the figure had jumped to
23.8 per cent; and by 1964, to 17.1 per cent. This increase was
directly attributable to the availabili ty and use of power pumps for
irrigation. By- 1964, 4,000,000 of the 7,000,000 horse power in all
machinery employed by aqriculture was derived from these pumps.3
In the production of chemical fertilizers, the new strength of
domestic efforts is most apparent. In 1960, the amount produced was
roughly equivalent to the quantities imported. But by 1965, produc-
tion had increased more than 275 per cent and was three times greater
th th· ts4an e ampox •
Statistics on the availability of tractor stock for 1960 to
1964 also pinpoint the implementation of new investment priorities
lprybyla, Political Economy, pp. 360-361; Eckstein, China's
Economic Revolution, pp. 83-84.
2Donnithorne, China's Economic System, p. 135.
3perkins, "Development of Agriculture," p. 63.
4Ibid., p. 59. The production figures for chemical ferti-
lizer (in thousands of tons qross weight) are given as follows:
Production Import Total
1960 1930 1134 3064
1965 7300. 2500 9800
directed by the Ninth Plenum.
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The sharp drop between 1960 and 1961 is explained by the fact that
depreciation of existing stock was outstripping both domestic produc-
tions and imports. The large increase in 1962 could only be
attributed to new Chinese inputs, both in production and in recondi-
tioning the existing stock, since imports from the USSR were no longer
available.
Steel continued to be the greatest obstacle to domestic
2production due to the amounts and varieties required. But central-
ized and specialized production processes increased the efficiency
with which such scarce resources were utilized •. For example, separate
corPOrations were set up to manufacture tractor engines and spare
parts. These took over ag~icultural machinery enterprises from the
localities and operated them through branches in the eight regions,
under central control. As a result, State support to local industries
declined and they survived only in communes where the resource base
lAdaPted from prybyla, Political Economy, p , 1621 Donnithorne,
China's Economic System, p. 113.
2prybyla, Political Economy, p. 365.
produced surpluses for investments.l
since the purse strings were primarily in team hands by
1961 only communes which were wealthy across the board continued to
produce and manage their own machinery. In most areas, control over
both manufacturing enterprises and over the AMS was returned to xian
level or higher. However, since so much decisional control remained
at the enterprise level, there was an increased emphasis on coordina-
ting tractor use between AMS and brigades. This was usually
accomplished through a labor contract system and less frequently, by
2rental contracts. The contrast with the soviet case, in which
"tractor stations" and collective enterprises often operated at
cross-purposes, at great cost to peasant welfare, is striking. The
factors most responsible for the different outcome in China were
probably the smaller size of the production brigades~ and the lower
expectations of rural elites vis a vis the availability of agricultu-
ral machinery.3
In order to make the most efficient use of scarce resources,
the regime decided to concentrate its agricultural investments in
proven high-yield areas. In practice, this choice bifurcated the
approach to agrarian development. This is reflected in two different
patterns of resource use and exchange. In productive areas, peasants
would receive the necessary subsidization to develop output potential.
IIbid., pp. 364-365. In 1960,83\ of all state investments
in agricultural machinery was diverted to the local level~ whereas in
1963, only 23\ of these funds was distributed to local enterprise.
2Donnithorne, China's Economic system, p. 118.
3Ibid., p , 120.
The State would make more claims on output, but the combination of
organization, capital, and technology would also result in increased
individual incomes. Marketing policies would then insure that this
income could be translated into increased rural purchasing power. on
the other hand, in low yield areas, the State would promote self-
reliance rather than subsidization. Peasants would have almost
total control over resource use, but would for the most part continue
to rely on their own potential for internal investment to further
agricultural development.
There were seventeen "leading grain and cotton producing
1areas" in China, in the early 1960's. They received the most
benefits in fiscal policies and in the distribution of medium and
large-scale machinery. At the same time, investInent funds were denied
to land reclamation projects due to the high labor/cost ratios which
2marked such efforts. Moreover, it was made explicit that agricul-
tural loans were to be used for production and not consumption -- a
criteria which could only be met by production units which were
already grain-sufficient.3 Credit "for production expenses" was
extended to these units on a short-term basis, often less than one
year; while credit "for production equipment" was long-term, usually.
spread over three to five years.4 The Agriculturai Bank of China,
lUnion Research Institute, Communist China:' 1964,
(HongKong: URI, 1965), Vol. 1, p. 2.
2Prybyla, Political Economy, pp. 361-364.
3uRI, 1964, p. 3
4Donnithorne, China's Economic System, pp. 431-432.
revived in November, 1963 was placed under direct SC control. By
February, 1965 the Bank was in charge of State allocation to its own
fanns, to rural capital construction units, and to communes. It
made loans for production and purchases, and distributed grants for
relief and production in calamity-stricken areas. Its agencies also
assisted the teams in their financial and accounting work, performing
a control function in conjunction with administrative aid.l
Distribution of heavy agricultural machinery became
increasingly concentrated as a result of the 1961 policy line and
for most areas in the agrarian sector, this mitigated the benefits of.
increased domestic production. Before the GLF, tractor stock had been
used mainly in the North and Northeast regions, and a large portion
of it belonged to State farms. In the early 1960's, with the new
emphasis of investment in high-yield areas, this selective differen-
tiation was exacerbated. OVer forty per cent of the 100,000 units















!Prybyla, Political Economy, p. 38B.
Other areas shared the rest in smaller increments. As
more stock became available, these other areas received somewhat more
access to it. By 1964, more than seventy per cent of all ~ in
China were served by at least one AMS. They controlled the sixty-
eight per cent of the tractor stock which was employed in the collec-
tive economy. The remainder thirty-two per cent belonged to the two
thousand State farms which were now sixty to seventy per cent
mechanized.l However, as a general rule, the odds were against those
areas which were deemed incapable of absorbing external inputs of
technology and capital efficiently.
As a part of the general effort to re-centralize and redis-
tribute agro-technology, even research institutes working on more
traditional inputs such as the development of new seed strains or
"methods of cultivation, were removed from local control. Agronanists
looked increasingly "to the Japanese experience in implementing new
techniques, and success was seen as a function of the availability of
technically competent cadres and of the general level of education
among the peasants.2
The administrative relationship between the State and produc-
tion enterprises also differed according to their classification. In
productive areas, the State retained more control over both produc-
tion and procurement.3 But in most of the countryside, the State's
approach to procurement underwent a significant change. The policy
lDonnithorne, China's Econanic System, pp. 112-115; Prybyla,
Political Economy, p. 364.
2Donnithorne, China's Economic system, pp. 432-433.
3Ibid., pp. 488-490.
of central purchase planning (with production prerogatives at the
enterprise level) was not working in the less developed areas.
Peasants often under-rated actual production to a~oid State purchase
1quotas, aided and abetted by local cadres. With liability back at the
team level, and in, some cases to the peasant household itself, the
necessary control factors were r~oved.2 Therefore, it made more
sense to return to a more flexible system, based again on price
policies and on the rural terms of trade.3 In 1964, this was
accompanied by a minor campaign which stressed the normative link
between State plans and local conditions.4 However, extraction from
areas which were consistently grain sufficient.or deficient was both
economically and administratively wasteful. By allowing the teams
to distribute collective incomes through welfare funds and reserve
funds, the State avoided the costs and burdens of buying small
amounts of grain only to resell that and more, often to neighboring
enterprises within the same commune or brigade.
For these reasons, ~~e procurement system (with the excep-
tion of cash crop and high-yield areas) became a system of annual
contracts negotiated between the State and individual production
brigades. Central planning was used only to provide guidelines.5
Iprybyla, political Economy, p. 357.
2Union Research Institute, Communist China: 1964, (Hong Kong:
URI, 1965) Vol. 1, pp. 79-99.
3Donnithorne, China's Economic System, pp. 352-353.
4This was aimed against the "share more and sell less"
attitude. See URI, Communist China: 1964, pp. 96-99.
5URI, Ibid., p. 82.
In order to facilitate this change, commune boundaries were reorganized
to reflect population, terrain and traditional marketing patterns.
Those in flat areas with dense populations remaine~ large; while
those in sparsely populated, mountainous regions became smaller.l
By 1964, the total number had increased from twenty-six thousand to
2seventy-four thousand.
The Bureau of Commune Managemerit in Peking .itemized the
distribution of gross agricultural income in Chinese communes for
1964 as follows:














As this data indicates, the agricultural tax represented the only
remaining direct cost transfer from the commune to the State. But
the indirect costs of the new administrative and fiscal approach are
hidden in the thirty-eight per cent of gross income which supported
virtually all social services, inclUding relief from production
deficits, and all technological improvements.
IL' 't """ C1PP1, 'Iue ommune. • • ,"p. 232.
2Lin Guo, "70,000 People' s Communes in China," in ~,
3307: 14-16.
3Shahid Burki, A Study of Chinese Ccrnmunes: 1965, (Cambridge:
Harvard University East Asian Research Center, 1970), p. 19.
Another significant development in the communes after 1960
was the steady increase in land under private ownership. One study,
comprised of several communes in 1964, indicates that there may have
been a return to the 1956 proposal which would have allowed a ten
per cent (rather than five per cent) ceiling on land allotted for
private plots.l
The status of private plots had been the focus of some
debate since the Summer of 1960, when they were introduced into the
communes on a nation-wide scale. By 1961, private plots and
individual production were actively encouraged by provincial leaders.
Official approval came in the "Sixty Articles on Agriculture" later
that year. In the Spring and Summer of 1962, at high-level policy
meetings, the problem of tan kan (guaranteed production at the
household level) was dcbated.2 At one of these sessions and in
reference to this issue, Dong Xiao-ping is alleged to have commented,
"It does not matter whether a cat is black or white, so long as it
3catches mice." However, as agricultural production was rehabili-
tated, there was less tolerance of private plots. Warnings against
"rural capitalism" were backed up by policies which taxed produce
sold at rural trade fairs (an indirect tax on private plots), and
which placed limits on the amount of spare time peasants could devote
to their own land.4 But again, as in the case of procurement, there
lIbid., p , 35.
2Lieberthal, Research Guide, p. 182.
3Ibid., p. 188.
4Prybyla, Political Economy, p. 350.
the~e seemed to be little point in banning such insignificant fractions
of land once the policy of self-reliance had been adopted.
There were many political by-products of this approach to
technological development and distribution. In the recruitment of
rural cadres, criteria changed back from "red" to "expert". Similarly,
technology was again viewed as ell.te rather than a mass commodity.
But most importantly, as both financial aid and new equfpment;
gravitated to the most productive areas, they created pockets of
development in what remained a backward environment. Thus, when
Chinese decision makers began to differentiate agrarian policies among
high-yield, sufficient and low-yield areas, they added still another
layer of complexity to the rural environment of choice. There could
no longer be any single level of consensus nor, it seemed, any
single political calculus. This had ideological ramifications which
could not be ignored, especially in view of the growing tensions
within the regime.
Agrarian Development: The Politics of Dazhai
Although the development of a modern agrarian economy in
China Was statistically impressive 'in the aggregate, it was also
strongly suggestive of three major political or class "contradic-
tions: that between high-yield and low-yield areas within the
agrarian sector; that between the agrarian and modern economies; and
that between China and the great world powers with which she began
to compete for influence. The last problem is one that cannot be
/dealt with in the context of this researcli, but it must be kept in
mind as a critical factor in Chinese policy making, especially after
1960. '!'heother two areas of cost involve developmental issues
which are common to many modernizing agrarian societies.l These
generated the parameters of the political debate ~ver agrarian
policies which emerged in China after 1962.
The communes were originally designed to prevent the
redifferentiation of rural classes by equalizing socio-economic dis-
crepancies in the countryside; and, at the same time, to resolve the
contradiction between rural and urgan development on a long-term
basis. Within their operational framework, labor-intensive tech-
nologies were applied to a wide variety of modern and traditional
functions, including agricultural production.2. Such a division of
labor would have had the added social benefit of destroying the
peasants and their villages; replacing them with the rural proletariat
and their enterprises.
The weakest lirikin the commune model was the assumption
that rural labor power was a productive and exploitable economic
resource. For example, one of the principle initiatives of the GLF,
expanding irrigated acreage, was pursued by constructing local
facilities, using available materials and mobilizing manpower as a
substitute for machinery. Small-scale projects of this type had
been successful in South China in the early 1950's. However, it was
discovered that control over major waterways such as the Huai River
could only be achieved by placing large, technically sophisticated
d&~s at strategic locations. The local facilities which took up so
lsee discussion in Huntington, Political Order, pp. 72-78.
20ldham, "Science and Technology Policies," in Oksenberg,
China's Developmental Experience, p. 91.
much of the communes' resources were useless without the foundation of
a large-scale capital construction effort for the rural areas.l
It was also proven throughout the 1950's that extending
cultivated acreage is not a viable option for Chinese agricultural
development. Reclaiming areas which the Chinese define as "marginal
land" must be accompanied by large-scale inputs of irrigation and
water control, and returns on such investments begin to diminish rapid-
A third lesson was that increased yields from existing acreage
can only be achieved by the combined use of improved seed and chemical
fertilization, since the former proved to have little effect without
the latter.3 In these two cases as well, increasing manpower inputs
did not add significantly to productive capacities.
Because labor mobilization proved to have such marginal
economic value, the commune's scope of activities was reduced'and
agricultural output again became the primary rural concern in the
1960's. For the sake of efficiency, the production process remained
functionally integrated at the team level. This not only revitalized
traditional socio-economic patterns, but also maintained the cyclical
nature of rural labor utilization -- shortages at peak seasons and
under-employment during slack periods. Only those production units
in areas which could support double-cropping or diversified outputs




of Agriculture," pp. 61-63.
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on a year-round basis. Not surprisingly, regime policies supported the
development of these areas after 1960. The emerging picture was of a
geographically concentrated, capital-intensive, agricultural economy
whi, while modern and efficient, would leave millions of rural
dwellers unemployed and poverty stricken.
counteracting these negative effects of selective subsidiza-
tion became the new f\Ulctionof the communes in the 1960's. The
problem of class redifferentiation had taken on a new twist. While
the gulf between rich and poor peasants in any given locality was
closing, the gulf between rich and poor collectives was becoming larger.
The model for agrarian development could not come from among
prosperous areas which enjoyed the sponsorship of the State. Such
areas were, from an ideological point of view, unreliable as well as
atypical. Therefore, the model had to be derived frem an area where
environmental conditions were ~ optimal; technological benefits from
the modern sector filtered in slowly; and most any improvement was
financed by internal resources. The Dazhai production brigade, in
Shensi province, which had succeeded under such conditions thus
. Ibecame a national prototype. It reflected long-range goals, as well
as the current trade-off arrangements between the State and the
agrarian sector.
In the Dazhai model, economic self-reliance meant that the
responsibility for generating resources, distributing them, and
lA timely report on
Peking Review in JUI1e, 1964.
Hill Village," Peking Review,
pp. 28-31.
the Dazhai experience appeared in
See.ChenXue-nong, "Transforming a Poor
Vol. 7, No. 25, (June 19, 1964),
�investing them in areas which increase the potential for generating
still more resources, rested with the collective production units.
They continued to "walk on two legs", relying on mass research for
qualitative improvements and buying into more advanced agro-technologi-
cal levels only when their own resources would permit. The inequities
of this approach created in the iural environment and between the
countryside and the cities were the costs which the bulk of the
peasantry continued to pay for development. This arrangement worked
for many reasons, all essentially political.
In the ideology of Dazhai, the collective ethic dominated
and normative incentives often substituted for ,private gain.
Politics (as defined by national elites) was kept "in canmand" of the
production relationships and determined the 'balance between State
demands and local interests. In this manner, the levels of control
necessary for minimal planning were maintained~ However, the Dazhai
model, like the Yenan model of the pre-Liberation era, extracted a
price for these benefits, which the regime paid with authority and
legitimacy resources. The "mass line" (as defined by Dazhai) became
the standard by which the regime's authority and legitimacy were
assessed and valued. Local input and local control stood between
the peasants and the national bureaucracy. The peasantry might use
this to resist certain policies. If so, then national and local
elites entered into a process of binding arbitration, using Mao's
Thought as philosophical parameters and the "mass line" as intellec-
tual technology. "-
In the final analysis, the Dazhai model is productive,
both politically, administratively, and econanically, because
exchanges between the local and national level are made within a
canmon political calculus, according to which all resources are valued.
~e distribution of power between center and periphery, therefore,
does not lead to either national disintegration or a new withdrawal
of agrarian resources from the political market. This complex
system of inter-relationships was not created easily or without cost
to both the Chinese leadership and the agrarian sector. The story of
the Dazhai model underscores the fact that as in most endeavors which
require hard choices and calculated risks, there is no "easy" path to
development.
At the tenth Plenum in September, 1962 the CC attempted once
again to articulate a policy line for the countryside based on
political productivity. The forces set in motion in the 1959-1961
period had produced many benefits, especially in terms of economic
recovery. However, the Tenth Plenum was the first high-level meeting
since Lushan where costs could be assessed in an atmosphere of
relative calm. Certain issues were of general concern. The devolution
of production responsibility, often back to the household level, had
increased privatism to the detriment of the collective economy.
Peasants relied heavily on their private plots and tended to give
them resource and labor priority. This situation had been tolerated ~
during the economic crisis but it was viewed by some as a negative
and temporary outcome of the recovery policies.l
A second and related problem concerned rampant corruption
lLieberthal, Research Guide, p. 188.
among rural cadres. Practices such as gambling or speculating with
public funds, graft, nepotism, embezzlement, bribery, misrepresentation,
1etc., were widely reported. Cadre behavior also encouraged peasants
to return to traditional socio-economic relationships, evidenced by
an increase in "feudal" practices such as money marriages and witch-
craft. This general decline in political consciousness on the part of
both peasants and cadres probably stemmed from a common source.
Definitions of ownership, patterns of organization and authority, and
standards of behavior had changed fundamentally and rapidly since
1958, often in zig-zag fashion. Masses and local elites alike were,
confused over the criteria which currently separated the "public" from
the "private" realm, or acceptable activities from those which might
be judged as revisionist or corrupt. Such confusion is a frequent
,cause of "unhealthy tendencies" in most developing societies.2 Fran
the perspective of the political economy model, it is simply a further
reflection of the fact that rural resources had become depoliticized.
If rural resources were to return to the political market,
both basic level cadres and peasants would need to undergo a rectifica-
tion. But, national elites were divided over both the standards to
impose and the means to impose them. As noted earlier, Mao Ze-dong' s
analysis of the situation called for three great struggles -- to \
increase production; disseminate and'apply technology; and redefine
the rural class structure as a prelude to further social change. It
lCadre corruption was the focus of many press reports during
this period. See Baum and Teiwes, Ssu-ch1ing, pp. 14-15.
Zrhe issue of corruption in developing societies is explored
by Huntington in Pol! tical Order, pp. 59-61.
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Was the latter recommendation which fo~ed the basis of his call for
a "Socialist Education Movement" in the countryside.l
The SEM of the 1963-1965 period represents an attempt by
certain factions of the regime to repoliticize the agrarian environ-
ment on the basis of a ~political calculus. This goal is reflected
in a variety of policy moves. The CCP called for a re-evaluation of
class status; stronger restrictions on privatism; and a renewed
emphasis on the functional, political role of poor and middle
peasants' associations. These policies were accompanied by restric-
tions on rural free trade and enforcement of procurement contacts
with production brigades, despite the questionable economic need for
these measures. Two major sub-campaigns which were also launched
within its framework included, the SZ-Qing (Four Clean-Ups); and
"Learn from Dazhai". In the course of implementation, conflicts
between economic and ideological priorities at the regime level
became increasingly antagonistic, and in 1965 the SEM was subsumed
within the all-out pol~tical struggles of the GPCR.2
A brief review of the policy history of this period will
demonstrate the manner in which these conflicts effected policy con-
tent. In May, 1963, a ten-pOint CC directive on Party and rural
rectification was issued.3 It promoted the Liberation-era notion,
~ao Ze-dong in Schram, Talks and Letters, p. 193.
2The best western analysis of this movement, with documentary'
translations, remains Baum and Teiwes, S5u-Ching~
31lDraft Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party on Some Problems in Current Rural Work" (Hereafter,
the First Ten Points), May 20, 1963, in Baum and Teiwes, Ssu-ching,
pp. 58-71.
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that basic level cadres should be controlled by and criticized by
the masses, working through-.their.peasants' associations. As noted in
Chapter Three, the latter had been used extensivel~ as instruments of
struggle during land refonn; but had been allowed to atrophy after
economic and administrative considerations became more critical to
the regime than class-related issues. Now peasants' associations were
revived at the commune, brigade, and team levels. Their role was to
uncover and focus criticism on the local cadre-rich peasant collusion
which was theoretically responsible for irregularities in the
administration of collective property and funds (accounts, granaries,
work points and supplied). The peasants' asso~iations were aided by
visiting "work teams" from higher levels which would be less limited
by and more likely to spot village and family loyalties.l
A second idea underscored by the May, 1963 directive was
that local cadres should spend less time on bureaucratic work (gongdzwo)
and devote more time to productive labor (laodong). This politicized
the concept of the division of labor so that it did not simply reflect
functional specialization but also artiCUlated a particular elite-
mass relationship. The "mass line" demanded that cadres relate to
the peasants on an immediate level, and this necessitated functional
as well as geographical proximity. In the sz-qing campaign, a
"three-fix" (san ding) policy set work posts, minimum labor day
quotas and maximum subsidized work points for local cadres, with exact·
1Ibid., pp. 64-65.
. criteria to be determined by the peasants' associations.l
Even at the initial stages of the SEM, serious questions
arose on the advisability of challenging Party authority and cadre
status in the rural areas so soon after the crisis of confidence
which had marked the "three lean years" since 1960.2 The old fear
that unleashing political energies would disrupt the rural production
process remained. Therefore, in September, 1973 the CC issues a
second ten-point directive which spelled out the limited nature of
political goals.3 It put less emphasis on class struggle and more
on pzoductd.onr and it gave less authority to mass organizations and'
more to regular CCP channels. The work teams were instructed to
penetrate their check-up points on a long-term basis; to keep
contradictions among the peasants "non-antagonistic" ~ and to generally
reduce tensions and disruptions. This approach was further reinforced
by the "organizational Rules of Poor and Lower Middle peasant'
Associations" issued in June, 1954 which stressed their role in
lIbid., p , 68. The document refers specifically to ". • •
the masses of Hsiyang hsien, shanaL, •• ," who were later made
famous as the Dazhai production brigade. On this issue they were said
to have commented: "Cadres who joined in the production labor are able
to see and hear for themselves, to do what has to be done and say
.what needs saying. In such a case, how can production be bad?" The
document refers to these remarks as "correct and appropriate".
2prybyla, Political Economy, p. 419.
3"some Concrete Policy Formulations of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China in the Rural Socialist Education
Movement," (Hereafter, the Later Ten Points), September, 1963, in
Baum and Teiwes, ssu-ching, pp. 72-94. This document is believed· to
have been authored by Liu Shao-qi.
production as primary and their authority to supervise and criticize
cadres as secondary and clearly subordinate to xian-level CCP organs.1
The fact that these changes in focus were not the product of
unanimity within the regime became evident in the Spring of 1964.
A set of six criteria for evaluating the SEM was issued by Mao Ze-dong
asking, in order of his priority: Are the poor and lower middle peas-
ants truly mobilized? (#1); Are cadres involved in productive labor?
('3); and, Is production increasing or decreasing? (#6).2 In the
Maoist view point, mass mobilization and mass line leadership could
only serve to enhance mass productive energies and, more importantly,
channel them into collective rather than private enterprise.
By Autumn of 1964, the high-level divisions which had
brought ideology into question at every resource trade-off since the
Lushan Plenum, were finally in the open. In September, a second
version of the CC's September 1963 directive on rectification was
issued, re-emphasizing class stru~gle and mass mobilization for cadre
rectification. 3 At that point, support for mass political action did
not come from higher Party levels but from the PLA. Within the frame-
work of a "Learn from the PLA" campaign, political departments within
l"Organizational Rules for Poor and Lower Middle Peasants
Associations" (Draft), June, 1964, in Baum and Teiwes, ssu-ching,
pp. 95-101.
2Baum and Teiwes, Ssu-ching, p. 27.
3"some Concrete Policy Formulations of the Central Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party in the Rural Socialist Education Move-
ment," (Hereafter, the Revised Later Ten Points), September 10, 1964,
in Baum and Teiwes, Ssu-ching, pp. 102-117. This document is
believed to have been authored by-Mao Ze-dong, to correct the reserved
tone of the September, 1963 draft.
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:the military, worked with peasant associations, against local rural
cadres. This set a precedent which was to be followed in all sectors
of the society for the rest of that decade. In January, 1965, a new
document entitled, the "Twenty-three Articles" paved the way for a
nation-wide adoption of mass-mobilization rectification techniques
and opened the entire CCP organization, as far up as the Central
Canmittee itself, to criticism "from below".l
Just as in the land reform period, the political calculus
which emerged from the SEM must be understood in terms of class
analysis. The Chinese leadership still had a list of "class enemies"
in the rural areas which included landlords, counter-revolutionaries,
and "undesirable elements" as well as the off-spring of landlords.
To this blanket category it now added rich peasants and their off-
spring. By 1963, all these groups had been economically neutralized.
In fact, all of the directives dealing with class analysis noted that
more than ninety-five per cent of the peasant masses could be
"consolidated". These remnants constituted the other five per cent.
Proportionately the cut-off point was the same as it had been in the
early 1950's; but the class composition of the "enemies" sector Was
now wider.2
The directives also suggest the new locus of rural class
struggle. Of the ninety-five per cent, sixty to seventy per cent were
defined as "poor and lower~middle", while twenty-five to thirty-five
lBaum and Teiwes, Ssu-ching, pp. 118-126. See also,
Lieberthal, Research Guide, p. 216 for reference to the Central Work
Conference in December, 1964 where these articles probably took shape.
2The Later Ten points, pp. 91-94.
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per cent constituted the "middle peasant problem".l The quandary for
rural cadres was two-fold. What was the criteria for classification;
and what was the operational meaning of "consolidation". Unlike the
directives which had been provided during land reform, none of the
"Ten Point" series contained any hard and fast categories.
Cadres were told, explicitly, that classifications could not
be made on the basis of political attitude (whether good or bad) ~
the living standard of the peasant in question. Middle peasant status
was defined as " • possession of comparatively more production
facilities and commitment of only minor exploitations". [Emphasis
added.12 Therefore, if the peasant owned property over and above
the legal or the local standard, then economic criteria could be used
to determine his class. But, even in the absence of an economic
distinction, behavioral criteria might also be imposed. For example,
if the peasant had ever extended loans, or engaged in "speculation"
or "profiteering" he might now find himself as the target of class
struggle. 3
The rural class structure was further complicated by the
fact that many peasants had changed status since the last classifica-
tion. In general, peasants who began in privileged groups were frozen
in these categories "by definition". None of the directives provided
IThe Later Ten Points, pp. 82-83. For a reference to the
middle peasant problem during the Chinese collectivization of 1955-
1956, see Bernstein, "Mass Mobilization ••• ," p. 41.
2 The Later Ten Points, p. 82.
3The Later Ten Points, p. 83.
for any statute of limitations on past "crimes" or grievances. On
the other hand, those who had been raised from the lowest levels to
higher classes were afforded some protection by th~s policy.l
The greatest confusion occurred over the classification of
those peasants who had moved between very close categories in the
"middle" range. For example, the Later Ten Points (September, 1963)
contained the following guideline:
Among common old middle peasants, those
other than the old lower-middle peasants
are commonly called middle peasants. These
peasants should be distinguished from old
upper-middle peasants because they did not
exploit others. Therefore, they should not
be classified as upper-middle peasantis, Mean-
while, they are also different from old
lower-middle peasants. 2
Two obvious questions arise in light of this over-view.
First, why were the categories so open-ended in 1963, when they had
been so finite twelve years earlier? And secondly, what was the
nature of the new political calculus reflected in these guidelines?
The answers are inter-related,. and must be viewed in the context of
repoliticizing rural resources and bringing them back into the
political market. As a result of the new economic policies set in
motion in 1961, the agrarian environment was now characterized by
differential development based on self-reliance for some areas and
subsidization for others. Therefore, the need to define classes in
terms of local conditions was much greater.
lThe Later Ten points, p. 83.
2The Later Ten points, p. 83.
'l'hefirst directive left everything, including t.~esetting
of income and behavioral criteria, in the hands of local elites and
the poor and middle peasants' associations.l It trusted that the mass
line interaction would yield a favorable political outcome. The
second directive had tried to superimpose the authority of "leading
cadres" in work teams drawn from above the commune level, over this
political dynamic in order to keep the level of conflict low.2 The
third directive, in turn, revised this trend by promoting the
recruitment of activist elements into basic-level organizations and
hardening class lines.3 No matter which faction was sending down a
directive, it had to keep the categories open so-as to allow for local
distinction and thus apply the same political criteria to diffe~ent
socio-economic environments.
The new political calculus was based on a rural contra-
diction which had been side-stepped in the past -- that between the
collective and the potentially self-sufficient peasant. Poor and
lower-middle peasants were so·classified because they were rarely
able to survive on their own resources. These groups could usually
be persuaded to enter and remain within collective structures,
because the potential benefits were great while the costs were
-negligible. Once the latter were organized, landlords, the most
privileged class, became vulnerable because their resource base was
tied to the dependency of the poorest classes on traditional
lThe First Ten Points, p. 65.
2Baum and Teiwes, Ssu-ching, p. 23.
3Ibid., p , 30.
structures. However, rich peasants, and the large bulk of middle
peasants, could fall back on their own resources when threatened and
avoided change. In the early 1950's, the economic importance of the
rich peasants had given them disproportionate political power
despite the small percentage of the rural population which they
represented. Until collective enterprises were consolidated,
policies which threatened the productivity of the rich peasant were
costly and usually avoided. But, once the APC-2 level had been
operationalized on a broad scale, the cost-benefit relationship
turned against the rich peasants as well.
The middle peasant group, on the other hand, represented a
major political problem even after collectivization. They were,
invariably, unwilling participants in such movements because the
potential benefits of collective production did not always outweigh
the risks which such change entailed, particularly with reference to
losses in their autonomy. The middle peasants, inclUding the upper-
middle range, contributed the bulk of collective land and tools and
provided the income standard upon which successful coops and collec-
tives were judged. Their class identity depended on the continued
functional integration of the rural production process within the
APCS. Their land, tools, and households were kept· intact by rural
organization at that level. Communization, on the basis of its
initial division of labor policies, would have destroyed the middle
peasant as a class. But after a few months, this strategy was
abandoned.
When rural resources began to flood back into the
countryside, the middle peasants became their eager recipients.
~erefore, in order to repoliticize those resources, the new political
calculus had to consolidate the position of poor and lower-middle
peasants (through their associations) over that of the middle peasants.
~is became all the more critical in light of the regional differentia-
tions which were beginning to emerge within the agrarian sector.
Given the amount of local discretion and control which this entailed,
the politicization of rural resources within a progressive, collec-
tivist value matrix was essential to the maintenance of an elite/
mass consensus. Thus, the Maoist directives in May, 1963 and
September, 1964 were pre-occupied with creating a bond between basic
level cadres and the peasants' associations. In 1964, the failure of
the CCP to commit itself to establishing these types of political
linkages became a focus of criticism. By 1965, it had become an
ideological issue. For this reason, the Maoists began to employ the
PLA's political organs in the rural areas.to by-pass Party organs in.
carrying out the "class struggle".l
In 1964-1965, with the overall agrarian policy line re-
solved (at least temporarily) in the ideological direction now
identified as "Maoist", new criteria and models began to filter into
the rural environment. Production successes were no longer attributed
to the recovery policies of 1961-1963. Rather, comparisons were made
with the last pre-GLF year, 1957, and achievements were attributed
to the "great upsurge" which emerged with recovery as a single stage
Neuhauser, "The Chinese Communist .Party in the 1960·s. ,-
"Learn from the PLA" was a rebuke to the CCP as an organizational role
model. After 1965, PLA moved into CCP propaganda departments.
of growth. 1 The themes of "class struggle!, econcmic "self-reliance-,
and mass-research", were incorporated into a single policy directive:
"In agriculture, learn from Dazhai". The reference is to a production
brigade which became China's prototypical model of agrarian develop-
ment.2
Dazhai incorporated the "self-reliant" economic approach
which, by 1964, had become typical·in most of rural China. Only
recently, western research has begun to uncover the political as weli
as the economic and organizational lesson that was to be learned from
Dazhai. One author has described the politics of the Dazhai experience
in these terms:
Developing a new unity incorporating community
improvement and people!s consciousness of the
mode of change serving the needs and built on
the energies and propensities of the poorest •
members, carried out by innovative work in
the economic realm that 'proved' the practical
essence of the political unity, was a leadership
orientation carried out numerous times over -- a
Dazhai pattern. And it is to be remembered that
at times • • • the particular orientation was by
no means sought or assured by higher-level
direction or policy.3
During Dazhai's history, first as a village, then as an APC, and
later as a production brigade within the commune framework, there
were many instances when the application of Mao's Thought, as under-
lEckstein, China's Economic Fevolution, 'pp. 83-84.
2The directive was probably issued at the same Central
Committee Work Conference in June, 1964 where Mao issued his six
criteria for evaluating the SEM. See Lieberthal, Research Guide,
p. 211.
3Mitch Meisner, "Dazhai: The Mass Line in Practice,"
Modern China, Vol. 4, No.1, (1978), p , 38.'
·stood by the local Party leadership and the community, brought this
1particular unit into conflict with higher bureaucratic authority.
In late 1964, as the Maoist attack began to focus on those arms of
the Party and state bureaucracy which had attempted to lind t the
effectiveness of the SEM, the example of Dazhai's resistance to
policies, which the community had decided were illegitimate by a
Maoist standard, was hailed as the true meaning of the mass line
and continuous revolution. Ideological authority, emanating directly
from Mao Ze-dong, and "democratic" authority, the will of the
masses, were posed as a united front against "bureaucratic" authority,
2 .soon to be represented by the Liu-Dong forces. In the more
moderate post-CPCR climate of the 1970's, the organizational and
economic aspects of the Dazhai model have eclipsed its controversial
political role. But the precedent of establishing rural revolution-
ary base areas so far into the industrial/socialist stage remains
basic and perhaps unique to the politics of the developmental
experience in China.
The critical political factor in this developmental
approach remains the mass line. Chinese policy making and implementa-
tion continue to show a simultaneous rather than sequential dynamic.
They are coordinated but decentralized efforts, always involving
transactions between elite and mass. While the procedural aspects
of the "campaign" strategy are becoming more sophisticated, the
1Ibid., p. 48
2Ibid., p. 57.
mobilization approach itself is still apparent in the rural areas.
For example, in the development and dissemination of technology and
in the delivery of medical and other social services, cultural
pursuits, etc., the masses are often called upon to concretely
reaffirm their commitment to policy goals developed at the center.
However, the triumvirate of peasant activists, local cadres, and
outside work teams continues to operate as the arbitra~ion board for
the creation and maintenance of consensus. Thus, agrarian
resources remain as productive elements of a national political
market. It is likely that the policies which will push the agrarian
sector to higher political and economic plateaus will continue to
operate within this model of development administration. Their
"political economy" will, therefore, be judged by a comprehensive
and still essentially Maoist definition of social change.
CONCLUSION
~is research has demonstrated the utility of a political
economy model for the analysis of Chinese agrarian development
policies. The framework has embraced inputs and mutually interactive
linkages within the decisional processes sequences within a single
policy area. From this perspective the reasons for certain choice
have been explored.
One critical variable underscored by the preceding overview
of Chinese agrarian policies is the role of the.environment and of
institutions as systemic constraints on the decision making process.
Under-development (resource scarcity) placed agrarian policy making
high on the Chinese political agenda.l Ideology (as defined by Mao
Ze-dong) articulated the philosophic~l parameters within which
decisions were made. Its structural correlates provided both the
intellectual and organizational technology for formulating and
implementing policy goals.
~is study of Chinese agrarian policies has also demon-
strated that environment and institutions interacted to create an
-environment of choice". For example, the sequence of decisions in
lIn a similar vein, Martin O. Heisler has argued that the
highly d~veloped political environments of "post industrial societies
change the focus of policy from quantitative or distributive issues
to choices involving the "quality of life". Such observations rein-
force the need for models which link policy processes to their
environmental context. See Heisler, ed., Politics in Europe:
Structures and Processes in S~e Post-Industrial Democracies. (New
York: Davi~ M~Kay Co., Inc., 1974), pp. 24-25 and pp. 84-85.
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the 1955-1957 period was aimed at maximizinq the productivity of rural
resources through a combined policy of collectivization and decentral-
ization. This choice sequence was as much a product of scarce
administrative resources (under-development) as of the goal of institu-
tionalizing a socialist political calculus in the countryside
(ideology) •
In terms of political economy, "the system" is viewed as a
political market in which resources are valued and exchanges take
place. Its parameters are defined by a political calculus, a mode of
social analysis based on class structure, which emerges when ideology
meets environment. For example, in the years immediately following
Liberation, the "new democratic· calculus operated to integrate
political forces in support of the regime. In the countryside, this
was reflected in the pro-rich peasant policies of the 1949-1952 land
reform. During collectivization, rich peasants became targets while
the consolidation with middle peasants Was maintained. By 1963, the
"middle peasant problem" had become the focus of attack.
One result of this study has been to illustrate this continual
redefinition of the political calculus, and its relevance to the
developmental nature of agrarian policies. The Chinese regime appears
to have operated within a broad and flexible conceptualization of both
the political market and the agrarian resource base. This made it
possible for decision makers to deal with quantitative growth and
increasing complexity so as to maximize resource ,productivity.
In Mao's Thought, competition in the political market is
expressed in terms'of conflict and struggle. among "contradictions".
·:If .these fall within the current political calculus, then they are
viewed as non-antagonistic -- contradictions "among the people". But
if they fall outside of the political calculus, they they become
antagonistic -- contradictions "between the enemy and ourselves".
Landlords were the exclusive out-group in the rural political
calculus until the late 1950's. 'During the SEM, they were joined by
rich peasants. Despite the attacks made upon them during this same
campaign, middle peasants have remained within the pale. However,
the regime's "ideological bias" in the countryside has always included
the poor and lower middle peasants. It is significant that whenever
the regime sought to revise its rural political calculus, it relied on
associations of poor and lower middle peasants to function with rural
cadres as a vehicle for change. The formation of these groups during
land reform, and their reappearance during the SEM, can best be
understood from this·perspective. Viewed longitudinally, the regime/
sector relationship shows both flexibility (with ideologically set
parameters) and mutability (within a changing rural environment).
Given that environment and institutions combine to create
an "environment of choice", and that under-development is defined as
resource scarcity, then it follows that policies for development
involved choices which were aimed at the creation of more resources.
In making such choices, resources were necessarily assessed in terms
of their relative use-value, within a single costs/benefits matrix.
Entrepreneurial techniques involved politicization, management and
selective investment. As the resource base grew both quantitatively
and qualitatively, it became more.complex. Vehicles utilized in the
process of resource exchange had to meet the demands of a changing
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-environment of choice".
In the formulation and implementation of Chinese aqrarian
policies between 1949 and 1964, steps toward the lonq-ranqe qoal of
,aqrarian development did not emerqe in linear fashion. As the data
has clearly shown, individual policy outputs reflected resource






















Although these are the basic linkages, there were also many
inter-dependencies which arose as the rural environment became
-increasingly complex. For example, the main responsibility of basic
level cadres was the creation of a value consensus between peasants
and reqime. But the exchange of legitimacy for compliance, using the
intellectual technology of the mass line, also made cadres central to
the exchange of local aUtonany for the political authority (i.e., the
p01iticization process). At the same time, the exchange of informa-
tion, in the absence of State and Party infrastructure below the
xiang, also fell upon the local cadre and his personal ability to
penetrate the rural areas and communicate his findings back to the
decision making apparatus. Other linkages, as for example, that
between investment policies, the potential for mechanization, and
the politicization of rural incomes, have also been demonstrated.
Because neither the rural environment itself nor the
"environment of choice" were static, the use-value of resources and
the patterns of exchange were altered over time. As the political
market evolved, it became increasingly difficult to manage. Linkages,
inter-dependencies and externalities proliferated, and entered into
the calculation of opportunity costs. For example, collectivization
decisions demonstrate an attempt to maximize the creation of rural
material resources while minimizing cost transfers from the modern to
the agrarian sector. To achieve economic goals, "human capital" was
mobilized, as a substitute for monetary or technological inputs. Com-
pliance again rested on "mass line" leadership, (exercised by basic
level rural cadres), rather than on coercive or bureaucratic methods
(employed by more distant Party or State organs).l The existence
lCadre is a generic term for all personnel performing
official functions in any Chinese organization at any level. See
Baum and Teiwes, Ssu-ch'ing, p. 10.
a
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of a consensus based upon a common political calculus was critical to
this policy line.
During the initial stages of communization, this strategy
was extended beyond a point at which it could be cost effective.
Shortages of infoxmation, capital, material output, infrastructure,
and ultimately, authoritative leadership, created an inflationary
spiral. Existing resources of land and labor were not optimally
employed. The returns from traditional technology were soon maximized,
and then just as quickly diminished. In the 1959-1961 period,
resources became so scarce that competition over their use permeated
the regime as well as the agrarian sector. Loss of confidence led to
a critical deflation as rural resources were depoliticized and left
the political market. The basis for consensus thus evaporated.
In the 1960's the agrarian policy matrix was marked by
increasing complexity. In order to build in some controls on the
value of resources, the administrative approach was decentralized
and investments into and within the sector were diversified. For
example, the revision of territorial limits within the communes
reflected geographical, economic, sociological and ,even cultural
differences heretofore ignored. Decision making with respect to the
production and distribution of ,material resources was returned to
the local enterprise -- usually at the team level. Inputs of capital
and technology were funnelled into selected areas, while "self-
reliance" became the operative principle throughout most of the
countryside.
During the SEM, the regime's internal conflicts erupted
-
over the need to recreate consensus on the basis of a political
calculus which would keep the process of exchange moving in the
direction of long-range ideological goals. The conservative faction
in the regime viewed the costs, in terms of the stability which they
had finally brought to the exchange process, as greater than the
benefits, in terms of "continuous revolution". At the Tenth Plenum,
the Maoists presented the alternate interpretation. They conce~
tualized the agrarian environment in terms of three struggles. The
theoretical linkages among the critical variables may best be
understood as follows:
Class Relationships (based on struggle in an
environment appropriate for the realization
of long-range social change goals)~(---------
~ Production (based on normative rather
than material incentives; self-reliance;
collective principles of organization and
distribution; and mass mobilization)~(------
~ Technologx. (based on mass research; unity'
of theory and practice; and the cadre ethic of
"red and expert").
It is important to note that this is not a static equation with
independent and dependent variables but a dynamic relationship among
co-equal variables, all of them politicized within a common
ideological framework.l
By 1964, there was a temporary resolution of the regime
level debate in the direction of "continuous revolution", based
upon the assessment described above. In keeping with the over-all
developmental approach of this period, political consensus was re-
IMao Ze-dong, "On Democratic Centralism," (1962), Schram,
. Talks and Letters, pp. 158-187.
.established and rural resources once ,again entered the political
market. However, the exchange relationship between the regime and the
agrarian sector after the ·institution of the Dazhai model must be
assessed in particular rather than aggregate terms -- on virtually a
briqade-by-brigade basis.l
The Dazhai model resolved many of the contradictions which
had emerged in the course of China's agrarian develoIXl\entsince 1949.
However, it engendered new conflicts. Decentralized development and
self-reliance strengthened local autonomy; variegated interpreta-
tions of ideological goals and values; created monopolies of informa-
tion; and allowed considerable discretion over the use of material
resources. It also perpetuated the dichotemization of rural and
urban development.
Recently, Western research has begun to focus on China's
rural industry as the key to this model of agrarian development. As
the rural labor pool continues to expand, these enterprises provide
employment and needed products for domestic consumption and export.2
The funds thus generated within the agrarian sector have been called.
.. . . the first significant source of discretionary capital since•
the •• " 3• Great Leap • • • • They give the communes a potential for
lRecent statements by the Chinese leadership refer to the
creation of "Cazhai-type counties" throughout the country. See Huo
Guo-feng, "Let the ~fuoleParty Mobilize for a Vast Effort to ceve10p
AgriCUlture and Build Tachai-Type Counties Throughout the Country,"
October 15, 1975, (Peking: FLP, 1975); also, Zhen Yong-gui,
"Thoroughly Criticize the 'Gang of Four' and Bring About a New Up-
'surge in the Movement to Build Tachai-Type Counties Throughout the
country," December 20, 1976, (Peking: FLP, 1977).
2John Sigurdson, "Rural Econanic Planning," in Oksenberg,
China's DevelOpmental Experience, p. 69.
3parish, " ••• Team, Brigade or Commune?", p. 62.
investment into existing or new programs at the brigade and team
levels, making the canmune once again both economically and poli-
tically significant. In 1975, Zhang Qun-jiao noted that further
developments of this type in the communes would be the pre-requisite
for any future change in the level of collectivization (i.e., fran
. 1the teams back to 1958-style multi-functional communes). This
canment, caning from a source which is now defined as "radicalM,
suggests that the Chinese leadership is not contemplating majof
changes in its agrarian development formula.
Western economists believe that inequities within the
agrarian sector will eventually be ironed out with technical
improvements and functional diversification. Some also foresee that
the rural-urban dichotomy will shrink as rural industry becomes self-
generating and self sustaining.2
On the basis of this study, however, two equally important
questions arise. What is the political productivity of this approach--
its political economy? The current dynamic in Chinese agrarian
development is opposite to both Western and Marxist strategies.3
Rather than releasing rural labot to the cities, tne Chinese bring
administrative and technical experts and educated youth to the country-
lIbid., p. 65, quoting Peking Review, April 4, 1975, p. 6.
2see for example, Benedict Stavis, "How China Is Solving
Its Food Problem," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 7,
No.3, (1975), pp. 28-29.
3see Shaffer and Prybyla, From Underdevelopment to AffluenceJ
see also Richard H. Pfeiffer, ",>1aoand Marx in the Marxist-Leninist
Tradition, II Modern China, Vol. 2, No.4, (1~76), pp. 421-460.
side. There they develop not only industries, but also schools,
medical care, and even "proletarian art". More importantly, these
activities take place according to the mass-line -- ~ rather than
~ the peasantry. If these politicization techniques can counteract
th~ rate of differentiation within the agrarian sector and between
the cities and the countryside, then the Chinese model of agrarian
development will prove politically as well as economically productive.
However, if the political market is not greater than the sum of its
parts, then decentralized, differential development may lead to a
fragmentation of the system.
The second question may be posed on two separate levels.
First, what is the comparative potential of the Chinese approach to
agrarian development? And at the same time, what is the utility of
the political economy model as an analytical framework? Decision
makers dealing specifically with problems of agrarian development may
find in the Dazhai model itself or in the tyPes of choices and out-
comes which led to Dazhai some useful perspectives and guidelines
which may be applied to other situational and environmental contexts.
At the same time, the Chinese approach suggests some methods for
dealing with problems of under-development in any policy area. These
have a potentially wider relevance, even to "developed" countries
which continued to be plagued with "pockets of poverty" in some
critical resource categories.
As this research has shown, the Chinese approach may be
·usefully understood, both on its own terms and in a comparative
context, by employing a political economy framework. In the
· interest of making the Chinese experience available to the field of
political science (and of bringing the available analytical technology
of that field to the study of Chinese political pr~cesses), the
research potential suggested by the political economy model deserves
further testing and refinement.
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